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Abstract
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze three 
issues related to the pricing of derivative securities. The 
first issue deals with options pricing and stock return 
volatility. If stock return volatility is a stochastic 
process, as opposed to deterministic process, then the 
present form of commonly-used option pricing models is 
misspecified and arbitrage-based arguments are invalid. 
Since stochastic volatility option models are considerably 
more complex than their deterministic counterparts, it is 
essential to rule out all deterministic possibilities before 
accepting the necessity of stochastic models. The result of 
applying chaos methodology to over 62,000 intra-day implied 
volatility observations shows no evidence in support of the 
deterministic chaos hypothesis. These findings add support 
to the growing literature on preference-based stochastic 
volatility models and reject the notion of deterministic 
volatility.
The second issue addressed herein is the pricing of 
PRIMES and SCORES. This paper argues that these derivative 
securities represent a successful financial innovation. 
Although PRIMES and SCOREs are simply the repackaged cash 
flows of an underlying stock, evidence is found that market 
values of the combined derivatives are greater than those of
vii
the underlying stocks, thus confirming and updating the 
earlier findings of Jarrow and O'Hara (1989).
The third issue adds additional evidence to the current 
controversy over lead-lag relationships between derivatives 
(options) and their underlying assets (stocks). It is 
hypothesized that heterogeneous security designs cause 
changes in market microstructures which, in turn, lead to 
informed trader preference for one vehicle over another. The 
results of this study support the findings of Stephan and 




1.1.1. Options and Volatility
While financial researchers are in general agreement 
that stock price volatility is time-varying, an important 
issue remains as to whether volatility follows a stochastic 
process or a nonlinear deterministic process. If volatility 
can be described by a known function of time, the original 
Black-Scholes formula requires little alteration. 
Instantaneous volatility is simply replaced by the average 
instantaneous volatility expected to prevail over the 
option's remaining life. If volatility is a stochastic 
process, arbitrage-based arguments no longer determine option 
prices and more complicated preference-based models are 
required. The purpose of this paper is to determine whether 
implied volatility is stochastic or deterministic, thus 
driving a wedge between two alternative areas of future 
research (i.e., continued improvement of existing 
deterministic models or greater emphasis on preference-based 
stochastic models).
The options pricing model derived by Fischer Black and 
Myron Scholes (1973) is one of the most significant 
developments in the history of financial economics. The use 
of the law of one price and the creation of a riskless hedge 
have been applied to numerous financial valuation problems. 
The Black-Scholes formula gives a closed form solution for
1
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the price of a European call (and put) option assuming that 
stock prices follow a log-normal diffusion process with 
constant parameters. It is possible, however, that this 
single stochastic process cannot adequately capture the 
dynamics of all the variables underlying option prices. When 
empirical studies suggested that the assumption of constant 
volatility did not hold, models were proposed by Hull and 
White (1987), Scott (1987), Wiggins (1987), and Johnson and 
Shanno (1987) which allow for stochastic volatility. These 
models are rather complex and do not lead to closed form 
solutions without the use of additional, restrictive 
assumptions. This study will determine whether the use of 
more complicated models is really necessary, or whether 
research is better spent modeling implied volatility as a 
time-varying (known or knowable) function of time.
At first sight, implied volatility does not appear to be 
a deterministic function of time. Herein lies the importance 
of testing for deterministic chaos. The strength of chaos 
methodology is its ability to discover the deterministic 
structure of data which appear to follow a stochastic process 
when tested by traditional time-series methodologies. 
Several researchers have found evidence consistent with chaos 
in economic and financial variables which had previously been 
regarded as stochastic in nature (see, for example, Gennotte 
and Marsh (1986), Brock and Malliaris (1989), and Scheinkman 
and LeBaron (1989)). This study extends this research by
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investigating whether implied volatility can be described by 
a nonlinear deterministic process, rendering stochastic 
volatility models unnecessary, or whether implied volatility 
follows a stochastic process, necessitating continued 
research into the parameters of this process and its impact 
on option pricing models.
Investigating the stochastic versus deterministic nature 
of stock price volatility is relevant to both practitioners 
and academicians. A crucial assumption for the Black-Scholes 
equation to hold is ,that the variance of stock returns is 
deterministic. This deterministic requirement could take the 
form of a constant variance or a time-varying variance. If 
the variance is stochastic, however, the presently used 
Black-Scholes formula is misspecified. Practitioners would 
be basing investment decisions on a model which could 
improved upon and academicians would be searching in vein for 
a deterministic process to model volatility. As shown in the 
following literature review, some researchers have modeled 
volatility as if it were a deterministic process while others 
have modeled it as if it were a stochastic process. Before 
placing too much credence on any of the resulting models, one 
should first investigate which of the two processes is, in 
fact, correct. This is precisely the objective of this 
study.
A crucial insight in the derivation of the Black-Scholes 
formula is that if a riskless hedge portfolio can be created,
4
then the future expected value of the call option can be 
discounted back to the present at the risk-free rate. Prior 
to this insight, no justification existed for determining the 
proper discount rate unless risk neutrality was assumed. 
Because the call option is a derivative asset, a riskless 
hedge can be formed by combining stocks and bonds. The stock 
price follows a diffusion process and the bond price is 
deterministic. If one introduces a stochastic variance term 
into this formulation, riskless hedges can no longer be 
formed and the Black-Scholes formula breaks down. Deriving 
a new formula without making unrealistic assumptions about 
investors' preferences, or requiring enormous computation 
time, has proven to be illusive. Continued research in this 
area is useful only if volatility cannot be described by a 
(nonlinear) deterministic process.
This study uses chaos methodology to measure the 
correlation dimension of 62,906 intra-day implied 
volatilities on the S&P 100 Index call option for the period 
covering July 1, 1985 to December 31, 1986. The Brock (1986) 
residual test is then performed on the residuals of a linear 
model fitted to the original implied volatility series in 
order to distinguish deterministic from stochastic data. The 
results show no support for the hypothesis of deterministic 
volatility. These findings contribute to the financial 
literature by demonstrating that the Black-Scholes model is 
misspecified with respect to implied volatility and that
future research should focus on preference-based stochastic 
volatility models. Although this perspective has been 
expressed by earlier researchers based on mispricing patterns 
observed in sample data (see, for example, Sheikh (1991)), 
this study provides direct empirical evidence, as opposed to 
casual observation, based a large data set and chaos 
methodology.
In addition, this paper also investigates whether 
implied volatility follows a stationary or nonstationary 
process. In agreement with French, Schwert, and Stambaugh 
(1987) but contrary to the findings of Stein (1989), the unit 
root hypothesis cannot be rejected using the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test.
1.1.2. PRIMES and SCORES
Over the past twenty-five years, financial innovation 
has increased at an unprecedented pace. Successful 
innovations have expanded the frontiers of market 
completeness and/or increased operational efficiency by 
reducing the costs of transacting. Although most of these 
changes have contributed to capital market responsiveness, 
Van Horne (1985) warns that innovation is also subject to a 
"herd instinct" responsible for misallocating resources from 
market participants to innovation promoters. This paper 
argues that the creation of PRIMES (Prescribed Right to 
Income and Maximum Equity) and SCOREs (Special Claim on 
Residual Equity) resulted in a successful financial
innovation by dividing up the cash flows of an underlying 
stock. Although these derivatives merely repackage the cash 
flows of an equity security, empirical results show that 
market values of the combined PRIME and SCORE are 
consistently above the market value of their corresponding 
share of stock. The purpose of this paper is to examine the 
pricing behavior of PRIMES and SCOREs and to identify the 
source(s) of value added when cash flows are divided into 
separate, tradeable components.
This study takes the perspective that PRIMES and SCOREs 
are best understood within the context of financial 
innovation and optimal security design. To use a familiar 
example, the Modigliani and Miller (1958) propositions state 
that firm value is independent of capital structure (and 
security design in general) under the assumptions of zero 
transaction costs and market completeness. If markets are 
incomplete, however, value can be added by writing 
previously-nonexistent securities. These new or innovative 
securities provide investors with an expanded opportunity set 
of state-time contingent claims. When the zero transaction 
cost assumption is simultaneously relaxed, combined market 
values of multiple securities written on an asset may exceed 
that of a single claim written on the same underlying asset. 
This apparent violation of value additivity is able to 
persist because sufficient levels of transaction costs 
preclude arbitrage.
The creation of PRIMES and SCOREs was a financial 
innovation offering investors an alternative security design. 
These derivatives increased the value of the underlying stock 
by splitting its equity claims into a* dividend component 
(PRIME) and a capital appreciation, or long-term option, 
component (SCORE). Market prices of combined PRIMES and 
SCOREs exceeded that of the underlying stock, at least in 
part, because the marginal investor was able to purchase the 
risk-return bundle which he valued most. By decreasing the 
costs of financial intermediation, PRIMES and SCOREs also 
contributed to the process of channeling scarce resources to 
their most profitable uses.
As further evidence of the success of this innovation, 
subsequent derivative securities (designs) have been proposed 
and/or introduced into the market which mirror the 
characteristics of PRIMES and SCORES. LEAPS (Long-Term 
Equity Anticipation Securities), BOUNDS (Buy-Write Option 
Unitary Derivative) , PERCS (Preferred Equity Redemption 
Cumulative Stocks), and USU (Unbundled Stocks Units) are a 
few examples of such derivatives. Results of this study, 
therefore, have potential implications for an analysis of 
these newer derivative securities and for the broader issues 
of optimal security design and financial innovation.
Based on earlier research (Jarrow and O'Hara (1989) and 
Venkatesh (1991)), value additivity appears to be violated 
with the market prices of PRIMES and SCOREs exceeding that of
the underlying stock. Although Jarrow and O'Hara (1989) 
attempt to explain the existence of the observed premium for 
PRIMES and SCOREs, their results are inconclusive (perhaps 
due to small sample sizes). This paper extends the previous 
study by using data on all 27 trusts covering the entire life 
of the derivative contracts (5 years). Arbitrage-based 
boundary conditions are set up in order to check for market 
efficiency violations and several hypotheses are proposed and 
tested in an effort to identify the source(s) of observed 
premiums.
1.1.3. Lead-Lag Relationships
Financial markets serve as the conduit for optimal 
resource allocation because of the incentives they provide 
for the collection, processing, and release of relevant 
information. The precise manner in which information is 
aggregated by the market, however, is the topic of ongoing 
financial and economic research. One aspect of this research 
is whether informed investors prefer to trade one security 
type over another. For example, an investor with private 
information about a stock return distribution can choose to 
reveal this information (and presumably earn profits) by 
trading the stock and/or by trading its derivative 
securities. Liquidity, transaction costs, leverage effects 
and other imperfections are a partial list of the variables 
affecting such a decision. This study is concerned with 
identifying the variables leading to the preference of one
9
security type over another. Understanding why informed 
traders favor one vehicle to another is valuable to both 
practitioners and academics because of its potential 
contribution to optimal security design, information 
aggregation, and related market microstructure issues.
Currently, empirical evidence on the lead-lag relation 
between common stock and its derivative securities is 
inconclusive. The purpose of this paper is to exploit the 
unique characteristics of derivative securities known as 
PRIMES and SCOREs in order to gain some insight into the 
manner in which information is aggregated in the stock versus 
derivative security markets. This research contributes to 
our understanding of the mechanisms responsible for 
transforming information into prices. Since security design 
is likely to play a role in this process, this study focuses 
on identifying the specific characteristics which separate 
"active" from "passive" securities. The major issue 
addressed herein is whether derivative securities are 
actively impounding private information into market prices or 
whether they are merely passive observers of the pricing 
process.
More specifically, this paper uses vector-autoregression 
(VAR) methodology to test whether stocks lead derivatives as 
suggested by Stephan and Whaley (1990), or whether 
derivatives lead stocks as suggested by Bhattacharya (1987). 
While these earlier studies use options as the only
10
derivative security, the current study uses both the SCORE 
and the PRIME (a covered call). The results of such testing 
will add support to one side or the other of this debate. 
Next, bid-ask spreads of the PRIME, SCORE, and underlying 
stock are decomposed in an effort to identify the source(s) 
of the lead-lag relation. It is hypothesized that 
heterogeneous security designs cause changes in market 
microstructures which, in turn, lead to informed trader 
preference for one vehicle over another.
A priori expectations of the lead-lag relation between 
common stock and its derivatives are not at all clear 
(although theoretically one would anticipate no lead-lag 
relationship). With the existence of market imperfections, 
one might expect the derivative security to lead the stock 
because of the leverage effects induced by budgetary 
constraints. The option market also imposes less-stringent 
restrictions on short sales than does the stock market. 
However, market makers will adjust their bid-ask spread to 
reflect the larger adverse selection component due to 
leverage effects. In addition to greater costs associated 
with informational asymmetries, Jameson and Wilhelm (1992) 
argue that option market makers face increased inventory risk 
over their stock market counterparts. If derivative security 
bid-ask spreads are, in fact, larger because of these two 
components, then informed traders may find it advantageous to 
reveal private information in the stock market.
11
1.1.3.1. Testable Hypotheses
This study uses the findings of earlier research in both 
lead-lag relations and bid-ask spread components to formulate 
testable hypotheses related to the direction and causes of 
the stock-derivative relation. The first testable hypothesis 
is built on the results of Lo and MacKinlay (1990) that large 
stock price changes lead small stock changes. Relative to 
the underlying stock, PRIMES and SCOREs are small by 
definition since they represent, at most, five percent of the 
stock outstanding (as part of the contractual trust 
agreement). Combined PRIMES and SCOREs have the same cash 
flows as common stock and trade on the American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX) in the same manner as ordinary stocks.
This test has some advantages over previous tests 
looking at the lead-lag relationship between large and small 
stocks because the firms are held constant. In other words, 
it is only the size of the stock which varies in this study 
since the large and small stocks are subject to the same 
level of information asymmetry. Also, as discussed in later 
sections, a time grid is established to match the trades of 
different securities across time. This procedure mitigates 
the effects of nonsynchronous trading, even though Lo and 
MacKinlay (1990) report that the lead-lag relationship they 
find could not be explained by nonsynchronous trading.
The second testable hypothesis is designed to shed some 
light on the lead-lag relation between stocks and derivatives
12
(options) . Because the SCORE is a call option and the PRIME 
is a covered call option, useful information can be obtained 
from testing the lead-lag relation between stocks and SCOREs, 
and between stocks and PRIMES. As discussed below, the 
literature is split over the expected direction of causality. 
The results of applying VAR methodology to stocks and 
derivatives should lend support to one of the two sides of 
this debate.
The second testable hypothesis draws on market 
microstructure research related to the decomposition of bid- 
ask spreads. It is commonly accepted that the bid-ask spread 
can be decomposed into at least an order processing component 
and an adverse selection component. Because of the leverage 
effect associated with derivatives, it is hypothesized that 
the related adverse selection component is larger for PRIMES 
and SCOREs than for the underlying stock. Jameson and
Wilhelm (1992) posit that an inventory holding cost component 
is also greater for the derivative (option) than for the 
underlying stock. Unfortunately, this hypothesis is
difficult to test empirically since recent research has shown
that this component is quite small, if, in fact, it even 
exits. Taken together, these tests are designed to provide 
insight into the process by which private information is 
aggregated into market prices and to identify the
characteristics determining whether a particular security 
design is active or passive.
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The third testable hypothesis deals with the lead-lag 
relationship between PRIMES and SCOREs. Although without the 
presence of market imperfections one would anticipate no such 
relationship, previous research has demonstrated that lead- 
lags do in fact exist. Since the SCORE (especially an out- 
of-the-money SCORE) is more informationally sensitive than 
the PRIME, it is hypothesized that announcement effects will 
be impounded into the value of the SCORE before reaching the 
PRIME.
Imperfections induced by the market microstructure of 
the derivatives may also be responsible for generating a 
lead-lag relationship. Although order processing cost 
components should be approximately equivalent in both 
derivatives, the adverse selection component may be higher 
for the SCORE relative to the PRIME because of its heightened 
informational sensitivity. Higher adverse selection 
components in the SCOREs relative to the PRIMES may act as a 
mitigating force on the earlier hypothesized lead-lag 
relationship.
In perfectly efficient capital markets, new information 
should be impounded simultaneously in stock and derivative 
prices. Real world institutional factors, however, may 
create a lead-lag relationship between the two security price 
changes. As noted by Manaster and Rendleman (1982, p.1044), 
"In the long run, the trading vehicle that provides the 
greatest liquidity, the lowest trading costs, and the least
14
restrictions is likely to play the predominant role in the 
market's determination of equilibrium values of the 
underlying stocks.” Based on these criteria, derivatives 
(and options in particular) appear to provide the superior 
investment vehicle due to their inherent leverage and lack of 
short sale restrictions.
Empirical studies by Manaster and Rendleman (1982), 
Bhattacharya (1987), and Anthony (1988) support the argument 
that option prices lead stock prices. However, Stephan and 
Whaley (1990) claim that these previous studies are plagued 
with problems caused by nonsimultaneity in closing prices and 
bid-ask spread effects. In contrast to this earlier work, 
they find that stock price changes lead option price changes 
by approximately fifteen minutes. Kumar, Sarin, and Shastri 
(1993) look at the behavior of option prices around large 
(stock) block transactions and show that option prices adjust 
before stock prices. They also find that option returns are 
related to lagged and contemporaneous stock returns. Even 
more recently, Chan, Chung, and Johnson (1993) argue that 
price discreteness can explain the stock lead over options, 
and that the use of bid-ask midpoints instead of transaction 
prices causes any lead-lag relationship to disappear. As 
seen by this brief summary, the issue of the lead-lag 
relationship between stock and option price changes is an 
unsettled issue.
During the controversy described above, PRIMES 
(Prescribed Right to Income and Maximum Equity) and SCORES 
(Special Claim on Residual Equity) were introduced to the 
market by the Americus Shareholder Service Corporation (ASSC) 
as part of the unprecedented growth in financial innovations 
taking place over the past twenty-five years. These 
derivative securities split the cash flows of a stock into a 
dividend component (PRIME) and a capital appreciation 
component (SCORE). The PRIME retains ownership privileges 
and has cash flows identical to those of a covered call 
option. The SCORE, on the other hand, is equivalent to a 
long-term equity option.
For purposes of research, one of the most useful 
properties of these derivatives is that they trade on the 
American Stock Exchange (AMEX). This means that simultaneous 
market prices can be observed for the underlying stock, 
PRIME, and SCORE. If markets are efficient up to the costs 
of transacting, the combined prices of PRIMES plus SCOREs 
should be equal to that of the underlying stock. These 
observed market prices allow the researcher to test financial 
theories and their implications without requiring one to 
assume the validity of any particular asset pricing model. 
This simplifies the entire testing process since the 
researcher is no longer totally dependent upon the model. 
What follows is a brief description of the characteristics of 
these particular derivative securities.
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1.1.3.2. General Background
In 1983, ASSC set up its first trust for pre-divestiture 
AT&T shares. According to the terms of the trust, AT&T 
shareholders (and, subsequently, the shareholders of 26 
additional firms including post-divestiture AT&T) were 
invited to exchange common stock shares for UNITs of 
ownership in the trust. The exchange provision is terminated 
approximately one year after the creation of the trust, or 
after 5% of the outstanding shares are tendered, whichever 
comes first. The trust also ceases to accept additional 
shares for exchange once the stock price exceeds the 
termination value. The trust is considered to be "open" as 
long as none of these three conditions has been met. When 
the trust is "closed”, investors can no longer tender stock 
shares for trust UNITs, although trading of PRIMES, SCOREs, 
and UNITs continues on the AMEX. The asset base of any 
particular trust is composed solely of the stock provided in 
exchange for UNITs.
Each UNIT of trust ownership is composed of a PRIME and 
a SCORE (the UNIT is perforated down the middle and can be 
divided into two securities). PRIME holders retain most of 
the rights of ownership, such as voting, and have a claim to 
all dividends plus any price appreciation up to a 
predetermined value known as the termination value. SCORE 
holders are entitled to any price appreciation above the 
termination claim (a long-term option). PRIMES and SCOREs
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are protected against both stock dividends and stock splits. 
Each trust has a maturity of five years, at which time UNITs 
are reconverted into the underlying stock.
The trust collects an initial deposit fee ranging from 
0.40% to 1.25% of the common stock price to tender stock for 
UNITs. In addition, $0.05 is charged annually for each PRIME 
as part of a sponsor and trustee fee. As stated in each 
prospectus, however, the trust charges no fee to tender UNITs 
back to the trust in exchange for the stock. This provision 
prevents the combined derivative prices from trading at a 
significant discount to the value of the stock as is commonly 
observed with closed funds.
There are several features which make PRIMES and SCOREs 
useful in empirical research. As previously mentioned, 
market prices exist for the derivatives and their underlying 
assets. Since the expected pricing relationship between 
PRIMES, SCOREs, and stocks is quite straightforward (i.e., 
PRIME + SCORE = Stock), this mitigates the dual hypothesis 
problem of basing all findings on the selection of the 
correct asset pricing model. A second desirable feature is 
that trusts do not charge a fee for redemption. Although 
prices do not always trade within arbitrage-based boundary 
conditions (see Jarrow and O'Hara (1989), Huckins and Vora 
(1993), and Brockman (1994)), the redemption policy has the 
effect of narrowing potential pricing deviations. In 
addition to these general characteristics, there are other
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specific attributes which present unique opportunities for 
testing lead-lag relationships between derivatives and their 
underlying common stock.
1.1.3.3. PRIMES, SCORES, and Lead-Lags
One way to clarify the advantages of using the PRIME and 
SCORE market in testing for lead-lag relationships is to 
enumerate the disadvantages of not having such securities. 
For purposes of exposition, the Stephan and Whaley (1990) 
study is used to demonstrate some of the limitations inherent 
to alternative methods. First of all, a specific option 
pricing model must be used to estimate the value of the stock 
implied by the model. This is achieved by selecting among 
several competing models, inverting the valuation equation, 
and using some type of numerical technique to imply the price 
of the stock.
Since options on the individual stocks in their study 
are American-type and unprotected against the payment of 
dividends, early exercise is a real possibility. Even the 
models which explicitly take this into account, such as the 
Roll (1977), Geske (1979), and Whaley (1981) model, must 
project out and then discount back the relevant future 
dividend stream. Because of these difficulties, Stephan and 
Whaley (1990) limit their investigation to stocks with a 
maximum of two dividend payments during the life of the 
option (although this eliminates only 2.1 percent of their 
sample). They also assume that the market has perfect
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foresight of future dividend payments. Stock return 
volatility is an additional parameter which must be estimated 
before being input into the pricing model. Stephan and 
Whaley (1990) estimate implied volatilities using the 
previous day's transaction prices which, again, requires the 
use of numerical techniques.
An additional problem associated with previous studies 
is that the market structures of stock and option trading are 
often quite different. The Chicago Board of Options Exchange 
(CBOE), for example, closes ten minutes after the New York 
and American Stock Exchanges. The nonsimultaneous pricing 
errors caused by the creation of the so-called "wild card" 
option is discussed in Harvey and Whaley (1991). Procedural 
and institutional factors also separate trading in stocks 
from trading in options. Noting that trading volume patterns 
are distinctly different between the CBOE and New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), Stephan and Whaley (1990-p.208) provide the 
following partial explanation.
First, stock options do not trade until the 
stock has opened. Second, when the first 
stock print appears at the option exchange, 
the stock's options go through opening 
rotation. In the rotation, the markets for 
the stock's options are opened one at a time 
beginning with the shortest maturity, lowest 
exercise price call option and proceeding 
upward through the range of exercise prices 
and chronologically through the more distant 
maturities. When all of the call option 
markets have been opened, the rotation 
procedure is then applied to the markets for 
the stock's put option.
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Therefore, when previous studies find evidence of a 
particular lead-lag direction, it is difficult to know 
whether this is the result of a difference between stock and 
option markets or a difference between stock and option 
securities. The use of PRIMES and SCOREs disentangles these 
effects because the underlying stocks trade on the NYSE while 
both derivatives trade on the AMEX. The market
microstructure of these two exchanges are fairly similar 
compared to that of the CBOE. The results of this study, 
therefore, will provide less ambiguous evidence on whether 
informed investors prefer to trade in stock or derivatives 
since differences in market types are held relatively 
constant.
The purpose of the previous discussion is not to call 
into question the validity of option pricing models nor the 
manner in which they were implemented by other researchers. 
The point is simply that types of securities requiring fewer 
assumptions and/or less estimation could provide more robust 
results. Although PRIMES and SCOREs have both advantages and 
disadvantages to these more traditional derivative 
securities, their use should produce additional and unique 
evidence in the lead-lag debate.
Chapter 2
2.1. Review of Options Research
2.1.1. Deterministic Volatility Models
Since the seminal paper of Fischer Black and Myron 
Scholes (1973) and the opening of the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange in 1973, the financial literature has been inundated 
with options pricing studies. Black and Scholes were the 
first to provide an explicit general equilibrium solution to 
the option pricing problem. Their model begins with the 
creation of a riskless hedge by forming a portfolio 
containing stock and European call options. Stock prices are 
the only source of variability in this portfolio and, 
therefore, the only source of risk. The portfolio becomes a 
riskless hedge by choosing the weights on the stock and calls 
which give the same payoffs in all states of the world.
When the weights on the assets are continuously adjusted 
to maintain this hedge position, the return to the portfolio 
will be the riskless rate. This proved to be an extremely 
useful insight since the expected future value of the 
portfolio can then be discounted back to the present using 
the risk-free rate. Previous researchers had stumbled on 
this very issue as the appropriate discount rate could not be 
found without knowing the price of the call option, and vice 




(2.1) c = S*N(dj - e'rTX*N(d2)
where dt = [ln(S/X) + (r+a2/2)T] / aVt
d2 = [ In (S/X) + (r-a2/2) r ] / ctVt
S = stock price 
X = exercise price 
a = instantaneous variance 
r = risk-free interest rate 
t = time to maturity (in years)
The price of a European call option is a function of
only five variables: (1) the stock price, (2) the variance of
the stock price, (3) the risk-free rate of interest, (4) the 
exercise price, and (5) the time to maturity. Investor 
preferences and expected rates of return on the stock do not 
determine the price of the call option. The most important 
observation for the purpose of this paper is that the 
instantaneous rate of variance is the only variable which is 
not directly observable, and yet it must be deterministic for 
the formulation to work.
Subsequent modifications of the Black-Scholes model are 
primarily concerned with the relaxation of its underlying 
assumptions, the incorporation of dividend-paying stocks, and 
the valuation of American-style options. Thorpe (1973), for 
example, analyzes the effects of restrictions on the use of 
the proceeds from short sales. Merton (1973b) generalizes 
the model to the case of a stochastic interest rate. If 
instead of the assumption of a constant rate, the risk-free 
rate of interest is a known function of time, the Black-
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Scholes formula can be easily altered to reflect this change. 
The instantaneous rate of interest is simply replaced by the 
average instantaneous risk-free rate during the remaining 
life of the option. The same logic holds true for the 
constant implied volatility assumption. If the instantaneous 
implied volatility is a known function of time (as opposed to 
Constant through time), the model parameter, a1, is simply 
replaced by its average value during the remaining life of 
the option.
The compound option model of Geske (1979) views the 
equity in a levered firm as a call option on the underlying 
value of the firm. Another formulation with similarities to 
the compound option model is the constant elasticity of 
variance model (CEV) proposed by Cox and Ross (1976). In 
this model, stock price volatility is defined as ctS"“ where 
0<a<l. Volatility, therefore, is inversely related to stock 
price.
Numerous other Black-Scholes variations have been 
proposed based on differing assumptions about the stochastic 
process of the underlying stock. The pure jump option model 
was first proposed by Cox and Ross (1976) , and developed more 
fully by Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979). Instead of 
continuously changing stock prices, this model has stock 
prices following a discrete, jump process. And instead of 
the log-Normal terminal stock price distribution, the jump 
model assumes a log-Poisson distribution. Merton (197 6)
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proposes an option model which superimposes jumps on 
geometric Brownian motion. This jump diffusion model 
combines aspects of the discrete and continuous models. The 
displaced diffusion model of Rubinstein (1983) is based on 
the assumption that the firm holds two types of assets: risky 
assets, which have constant volatility, and riskless assets, 
which generate a risk-free rate of return.
2.1.2. Options on Dividend Paying Stocks
Since the S&P 100 Index call (the option used in this 
study) is an option on dividend-paying stocks, a short review 
of the effects of dividends on option pricing is included. 
When the no dividends assumption is relaxed, an adjustment to 
the Black-Scholes model is required. Since the call option 
holder does not have a claim to the dividend, and yet the 
stock price is decreased by an amount approximately equal to 
the dividend, the effect of dividends on call prices is 
negative. To adjust for this effect (on European call 
options), the present value of future dividends to be paid 
out during the life of the option is subtracted from the 
current stock price. The new stock price net of the present 
value of escrowed dividends, S“, is simply substituted for S 
in the original Black-Scholes model.
This simple adjustment is insufficient, however, if the 
call is an American-style option. In this case, the dividend 
may be large enough to trigger early exercise on the ex- 
dividend date (actually, on the day preceding the ex-dividend
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date). Although Merton (1973b) showed that it is never
optimal to exercise early on an American call option, this
boundary condition only applies to a non-dividend paying 
stock. When a dividend is included, investors may find it 
optimal to exercise if the following condition is met.
(2.2) Dn > X(l-e_r(7wra))
where:
X = strike price
Dn= dividend amount at time n
Tn= time until dividend payment (in years)
r = time to maturity (in years)
r = risk-free interest rate
The inequality in equation (2) demonstrates that American 
call options will tend to be exercised only if the dividend 
is quite large and the final ex-dividend date is fairly close 
to the maturity of the option.
Historically, researchers have calculated the American 
call price by using a European approximation, a constant 
proportional dividend yield simplification, Black's (1975) 
approximation, or the Roll (1977), Geske (1979), Whaley
(1981) American option formula (hereafter, RGW). The Black
(1975) model is obtained by taking the higher of the Black- 
Scholes value using S’ (stock price net of present value of 
escrowed dividends) and the Black-Scholes value using the 
time to ex-dividend as the time to maturity of the option. 
Whaley (1982) shows that the European call option and Black's
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approximation techniques are inferior to the RGW model which 
explicitly accounts for the payment of discrete dividends.
The constant proportional dividend yield model treats 
the yearly dividend rate as a carrying cost. This technique 
is criticized by Harvey and Whaley (1992b) based on evidence 
of large pricing errors which result from treating the 
discrete and seasonal nature of dividend payments as a 
continuous process. The constant dividend yield method 
understates the value of early exercise because the amount of 
the dividend is spread over the life of the option. These 
issues are important for this paper because the computation 
of implied volatilities is sensitive to any built in option 
pricing biases. It is essential, therefore, to correct for 
any known biases of the constant volatility model before 
constructing the implied volatility series.
The RGW American call option formula is used in this 
study to calculate implied volatilities on options with the 
possibility of early exercise. The RGW formula for an option 
paying a single dividend, Dlf at time, tx, is
(2.3) c=(S-D,erTl) *N(bj) + (S-D,^"1) *M(a1,-b1;-V(Tl/r) ) 
-Xe'rT*M(a2,-b2;-V(rl/r)) - (X-D,) e'"1) *N(b2)
M(a,b,p) is the cumulative probability of a standardized 
bivariate normal distribution where the first variable 
is less than a, the second is less than b, and the 
coefficient of correlation is p.
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where:
a, = [lnfS-Dje*"1) /X + (r+a2/2)T)] / ctVt 
a2 = at - o Vt
bi = [lnCS-Dne"1) /S° + (r+cj2/2) Tj) ] / aVr1 
b2 = b, - aVTj
t! = time until dividend payment (in years) 
t = time to maturity of option (in years)
S° is the solution to c(S°,r,) = S° + Dj - X;
where c denotes the Black-Scholes price without
considering dividends.
In addition to the RGW formula, Harvey and Whaley (1992b) 
provide a binomial method for pricing American-style options 
when the underlying stock (or stock index) pays multiple 
discrete (known) dividends. It should be kept in mind, 
however, that both of these methods deal with known dividends 
as opposed to predicted dividends.
2.1.3. Empirical Results of Previous Research
The empirical results of applying the options formulas 
described above have shown that pricing biases are quite 
common. The first empirical test of the Black-Scholes model 
was performed by the authors themselves. They investigated 
over-the-counter option prices on 545 securities between 1966 
and 1969 (these options are dividend protected). After 
comparing actual prices with model prices, the authors put 
their sample options into undervalued and overvalued 
categories. Although they are able to generate excess 
profits using a trading rule, the inclusion of transaction 
costs makes it impossible for the trader to exploit the 
inefficiency.
2 8
Galai (1977) uses data from the Chicago Board of 
Exchange (CBOE), where options are not dividend protected, to 
extend the Black-Scholes study. His tests consists of (1) an 
ex post test which assumes that traders can use the closing 
price on day t to determine whether an option is 
(over)undervalued, and also assumes that traders could 
transact at the closing prices on day t, and (2) an ex ante 
test which assumes the trader must wait until day t+1 before 
transacting. Galai finds that even with the unrealistic ex 
post assumption, a one percent transaction cost wipes out any 
excess returns. Bhattacharya (1983) uses CBOE transaction 
data and obtains similar results. Option prices appear to be 
efficiently determined down to the transaction cost level.
MacBeth and Merville (1979) test the Black-Scholes model 
using CBOE daily closing prices on six major companies (AT&T, 
Avon, Kodak, Exxon, IBM, and Xerox) covering the period from 
December 31, 1975 to December 31, 1976. They find that
Black-Scholes prices are on average less than market prices 
for in-the-money options. Conversely, Black-Scholes prices 
are on average greater than market prices for out-the-money 
options. The extent of the pricing bias increases with the 
extent to which the option is in-the-money (out-of-the- 
money) . Henceforth, this will be referred to as the 
moneyness bias. Also, the extent of the pricing bias 
increases as the time to expiration increases (i.e. the time- 
to-maturity bias).
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Using the same data, MacBeth and Merville (1980) compare 
the Black-Scholes model against the CEV model. As discussed 
above, the primary difference between the two models is that 
the CEV model assumes variance to be a function of stock 
prices. In this study, MacBeth and Merville find an inverse 
relationship between variance and stock prices, consistent 
with the CEV and compound option models. Not surprisingly 
then, the authors' study supports the use of the CEV model 
over the Black-Scholes model.
Beckers (1980) performs a similar test comparing the CEV 
and Black-Scholes using daily observations from September 18, 
1972 to September 7, 1977. His study confirms the earlier 
work of MacBeth and Merville (1980) by showing that variance 
was an inverse function of stock price for 38 of the 47 
stocks observed. This effect is referred to as the
volatility bias, and as will be seen, is quite prevalent in 
empirical testing results. The volatility bias refers to the 
tendency of an options pricing model to underprice options on 
low-risk stocks and to overprice options on high-risk stocks.
Whaley (1982) uses the RGW formula (which accounts for 
early exercise privileges) and finds that the earlier- 
reported moneyness and time-to-maturity biases vanish. These 
biases, therefore, appear to be spurious in nature and 
created by the researcher's failure to account for the 
differences between American and European option models on 
dividend paying stocks. The RGW formula is able to alleviate
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all systematic biases with the notable exception of the 
volatility bias. Whaley gives the following three possible 
explanations for this bias: (1) the stock return standard
deviation (volatility) is nonstationary, (2) the assumption 
of dividends being known with certainty, and (3) a zero tax 
rate differential assumption between capital gains and 
dividend income. More will be said about the nonstationarity 
property of implied volatilities in the results section of 
this paper.
Geske and Roll (1984) also attempt to adjust for the 
effect of early exercise on American option values. They use 
transaction data for every option traded at midday on August 
24, 1976 and split this data into a subsample containing only 
options on stocks with no scheduled dividends (i.e. no early 
exercise premium). The authors show that although the 
moneyness, time-to-maturity, and volatility biases are 
present for the overall sample, the moneyness and time-to- 
maturity biases are significantly reduced in the subsample of 
nondividend paying stocks. The volatility bias, however, is 
not reduced in the subsample. These findings offer support 
for Whaley's (1982) hypothesis that the moneyness and time- 
to-maturity biases are the result of ignoring early exercise 
premiums implicit in American options on dividend-paying 
stocks. On the other hand, the volatility bias appears to be 
a function of statistical errors in variance parameter 
estimates.
Rubinstein (1985) uses a nonparametric methodology to 
compare the performance of five different option pricing 
models; namely, the compound option, pure jump, jump 
diffusion, absolute diffusion, and displaced diffusion 
models. Intraday data was collected on thirty active stock 
options from the Berkeley Options Database covering the 
period August 23, 1976 to August 31, 1978. Rubinstein then 
compared the implied volatilities of matched pairs of call 
options differing only in terms of exercise price (moneyness 
bias) or time-to-maturity. If the underlying option model 
being tested is properly specified, then there is a 50/50 
chance that the implied volatilities of the in-the-money 
option is greater than that of the out-of-the-money option. 
The same logic holds for the short-term versus long-term 
option.
For the subperiod of August 23, 1976 to October 21,
1977, Rubinstein's results confirm the earlier findings of 
MacBeth and Merville (1979). That is, the Black-Scholes 
model undervalued in-the-money options. But during the 
October 24, 1977 to August 31, 1978 subperiod, the bias
reverses itself and in-the-money options are overvalued. 
Also, no single alternative model proved to be superior to 
the Black-Scholes model in both time periods. These results 
were obtained in spite of adjusting for the early exercise of 
dividends.
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Evnine and Rudd (1985) use end-of-the-hour snapshots of 
S&P 100 Index options and Major Markets Index (MMI) options 
over the period from June 26, 1984 to August 30, 1984. The 
authors attempt to adjust for any early exercise premium by 
incorporating predicted dividends into the binomial option 
formula. The authors do not, however, take into account the 
"wild card option" property of these options. They find that 
option prices frequently violate put/call parity and 
arbitrage boundaries. Substantial deviations are observed 
between the theoretical prices of the binomial option pricing 
model and actual market prices, although the authors suspect 
some of the deviation to be the result of nonsynchronous 
pricing. Figlewski (1985) performs a similar test on the 
pricing of NYSE index options covering the period from 
September 1983 to September 1984.
Sheikh (1991) extends the work of Rubinstein (1985) by 
examining the pricing of S&P 100 call options over the period 
from July 5, 1983 to February 29, 1984. He uses the same 
methodology as Rubinstein (1985) (discussed above) and finds 
that the systematic biases of the Black-Scholes model are 
both statistically and economically significant. No single 
arbitrage-based option model is able to account for the 
patterns observed in the implied volatilities series. 
Preference-based stochastic volatility option models, 
however, appear to capture the observed patterns rather well. 
The author notes that the failure of the arbitrage-based
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models may be due to the difficulty encountered when 
replicating index options. Two possible reasons for this 
difficulty are: (1) the high cost of reconstructing an option 
on an index containing 100 stocks, and (2) stochastically 
changing volatility. The second possibility is the focus of 
this paper.
The Black-Scholes model and its deterministic offspring 
continue to be used today both in practice and in academia 
due to their robustness, and because no other model has been 
able to fully replace them. It does appear, however, that 
adjustments should be made to capture the effects of 
dividends and early exercise opportunities. According to 
some researchers (i.e. Whaley (1982), Geske and Roll (1984)), 
these adjustments account for most of the systematic pricing 
biases encountered in much of the empirical work reviewed 
earlier. The volatililx bias, however, has been a persistent 
finding even after adjusting for dividends and early 
exercise.
2.1.4. Stochastic Volatility Models
As discussed above, the Black-Scholes model is properly 
specified only if volatility is constant through time. This 
possibility has been clearly rejected by previous research 
(Blattberg and Gonedes (1974), Latane and Rendleman (1976), 
Schmalensee and Trippi (1978), MacBeth and Merville (1979), 
Christie (1982), etc.). If volatility is a known function of 
time, the Black-Scholes instantaneous volatility variable is
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simply replaced by the average volatility over the remaining 
life of the option. Although earlier research rejects the 
idea of volatility being a linear function of time (Stein 
(1989), Poterba and Summers (1986)), it is still possible for 
volatility to be a deterministic nonlinear function of time. 
This possibility provides the motivation behind the current 
study.
There has been a considerable amount of research 
attempting to explain the causes of stock price volatility. 
Volatility has been related to changes in expected stock 
returns (Merton (1980), Pindyck (1984), Poterba and Summers 
(1986), and French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987)), 
macroeconomic variables (Officer (1973) , Merville and Pieptea 
(1989), and Schwert (1989)), and financial leverage (Black
(1976), and Christie (1982)). These studies represent an 
attempt to explain changes in stock price volatility as a 
function of other economic variables.
Clark (1973), Blattberg and Gonedes (1974), and Epps and 
Epps (1976) suggest that stock price volatility changes 
randomly through time. Rosenberg (1973), Poterba and Summers
(1986), Stein (1989), and Harvey and Whaley (1992a) model 
volatility as an autoregressive process. And finally, 
Merville and Pieptea (1989) find that volatility follows a 
mixed mean-reverting diffusion process with superimposed 
discrete white noise.
The above research is relevant to this study because 
option pricing models are dependent on the type of process 
which best describes volatility. Hull and White (1987), 
Johnson and Shanno (1987), Scott (1987), and Wiggins (1987) 
develop stochastic-volatility option pricing models whereby 
volatility itself follows a diffusion process. The 
stochastic volatility diffusion process is an additional 
source of uncertainty imperfectly correlated with the 
Brownian motion driving the asset price process. And if 
volatility is not perfectly correlated with a traded asset, 
options cannot be priced by arbitrage alone. One consequence 
of stochastic volatility (without making additional 
assumptions), therefore, is the need for preference-based 
option pricing formulations.
In the Hull and White (1987), Scott (1987), and Wiggins
(1987) models the term in the partial differential equation 
involving the risk of the hedge portfolio drops out, but for 
different reasons. Hull and White claim that the volatility 
risk will not be priced because volatility is uncorrelated 
with aggregate consumption. Scott assumes that volatility 
risk is idiosyncratic and, therefore, can be diversified 
away. Wiggins assumes that the correlation of the market 
with the volatility of the stock is equal to the correlation 
of the market with the stock price times the correlation of 
the stock price with its volatility. This assumption, like 
the others, has the effect of setting a zero price for the
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risk of the hedge portfolio. Stochastic volatility creates 
an additional source of risk but, due to the fairly 
unrealistic assumptions described above, this risk is not 
priced by the market. All three models either implicitly or 
explicitly specify the volatility movement as a mean- 
reverting diffusion process.
Merville and Pieptea (1989) empirically test the 
validity of a mean-reverting stochastic volatility. Their 
conclusion can be summarized as follows: the mean-reverting 
hypothesis is correct, there is a significant discrete white 
noise component in the volatility process, the instantaneous 
variance is pulled toward a long-term value, and there is 
evidence of a marketwide volatility effect. The authors also 
speculate that just as individual stock returns are 
correlated with overall market returns, individual stock 
volatilities are correlated with an overall market 
volatility. Although they do not specify the mechanism that 
creates such a correlation, the authors suspect that it is a 
function of macroeconomic variables.
2.2. Data
The S&P 100 Index option was selected because its 
underlying index consists of a broad cross-section of stocks 
representing such diverse industry groups as industriales, 
financials, and transportation. The S&P 100 Index option is 
by far the most actively traded option in the world and its 
implied volatility can be considered a proxy for overall
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market volatility. The S&P 100 Index is a value-weighted 
index composed of 100 blue-chip stocks.
Since this study requires the use of intra-day 
transaction data, it is essential to select such an actively 
traded option in order to minimize the effects of 
nonsynchronous trading. In addition, chaos methodology is 
most effective when using large numbers of observations. The 
properties of the S&P 100 option, therefore, makes it a 
natural choice for the current study.
Raw data was collected on S&P 100 options from the 
Berkeley Options Tapes (Resorted Data) covering the period 
from July 1, 1985 to December 31, 1986. The study was
restricted to this period due to data availability and 
pervasive index value miscodings covering the period between 
March 1983 and June 1985 (see Sheikh (1991)). The Berkeley 
Options Tapes data base contains the following information: 
transaction type, stock symbol, date, time (in hours, 
minutes, seconds), month of maturity, strike price, call 
price, bid/ask prices, volume, and underlying stock or index 
price.
The first set of filters placed on the raw data was used 
to obtain a single series of matched option values (matched 
with respect to time-to-maturity, call versus put, and strike 
price or in-the-moneyness). The following filters were 
applied to the raw data:
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1) keep options with two months to maturity —  short­
term and long-term maturities are deleted
2) puts were deleted from the data set
3) keep only at-the-money options (.99 < S/K < 1.01)
where S=index price, K=strike price
At-the-money options are used for the purpose of estimating 
implied volatilities because they are the most informative. 
As demonstrated in Harvey and Whaley (1991), the partial 
derivative of option price with respect to volatility is 
maximized where S/K is close to unity. Following Rubinstein 
(1985) and Sheikh (1991), puts are deleted because their 
early exercise premiums complicate the computation of implied 
volatilities.
The second set of filters are the result of recent 
research pertaining to peculiarities of the options market. 
The last fifteen minutes at the close (3:00-3:15 Eastern
Standard Time) of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE)
give rise to the so-called "wild card option" because the 
stock market is not trading during this time. Information 
releases during this time interval are reflected in options 
prices with no adjustment to the underlying index value. 
Harvey and Whaley (1991) find that "spurious negative serial 
correlation is induced in the volatility changes if closing 
option prices are used." For this reason, transactions 
occurring in the last fifteen minutes of trading are not 
included in the data set.
Sheikh (1991) notes that option prices, during the first 
thirty minutes of trading on the CBOE, reflect the clearing
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mechanism of limit orders accumulated overnight. Since these 
prices may contain a considerable noise component, 
transactions occurring in this time period are deleted from 
the data set (as suggested by Sheikh (1991)).
The midpoint of bid/ask spread is used instead of actual 
transactions prices because the random movement between bid 
and ask prices in successive transactions can create 
artificial first-order serial covariance (see Roll (1984)). 
Without correcting for this negative serial covariance in 
transaction prices, implied volatilities would exhibit the 
same artificial pattern.
The bid/ask spread midpoint is a good proxy for true 
price because market makers continuously adjust their quotes 
to be centered on the expected true price. It is only the 
inventory cost component of the bid/ask spread which could 
cause the market maker to quote spreads more favorable to 
buys or sells (i.e. where expected price is not equal to 
bid/ask midpoint). Recent research (see, for example, 
George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1992)) has shown the inventory 
cost component of bid/ask spreads to be insignificant. On 
the other hand, Jameson and Wilhelm (1992) provide empirical 
evidence that option market makers face inventory costs quite 
different from that of their stock market counterparts. These 
unique costs are the result of the discrete rebalancing of 
hedge portfolios constructed to alleviate both stock return 
volatility and option return volatility.
Although previous studies have used European-style 
formulas or American-style approximation methods to value S&P 
100 Index options (see, for example, Franks and Schwartz
(1988), Schwert (1990), Day and Lewis (1992), Stein (1989), 
or Sheikh (1991)), Harvey and Whaley (1992b) demonstrate 
convincingly that these valuation techniques are prone to 
large pricing errors. These errors are mainly the result of 
approximating discrete and seasonal dividends using a 
constant dividend yield. If the actual dividends paid on the 
index are used in the valuation procedure, the right to early 
exercise turns out to have significant value to the option 
holder. For the purpose of this paper, discrete dividends 
must be taken into account in order to obtain an unbiased 
estimate of implied volatilities.
Ex-dividend dates and dividend amounts on all stocks 
underlying the S&P 100 Index for the period covering this 
study were generously provided by Campbell Harvey of Duke 
University. Daily Treasury Bill interest rates were 
collected from the Wall Street Journal. The quoted T-Bill 
rate nearest the maturity date of the option is used as a 
proxy for the risk-free rate of interest.
Since the S&P 100 option is an American-type option, the 
Black-Scholes call option formula is misspecified. The 
appropriate valuation formula for an American call option on 
dividend paying stocks with early exercise possibilities is 
provided by Roll (1977), Geske (1979), and Whaley (1981).
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Using the dividend data discussed above, all S&P 100 call 
options covering the period from July 1, 1985 to December 31, 
1986 were tested for early exercise possibilities by applying 
equation (2). Of the original 62,906 observations, 18,862 
options were found to have the possibility of early exercise. 
This relatively large number is consistent with the results 
of Harvey and Whaley (1992b) who find significant early 
exercise premiums for S&P 100 Index options.
Unlike the binomial option model used by Harvey and 
Whaley (1991), this paper uses the RGW model. The binomial 
model accounts for the index paying multiple known discrete 
dividends during the life of the option. The RGW model is 
useful when one can identify the date on which the option may 
be exercised (i.e. the day before ex-dividend date). This 
paper attempts to take the point of view of the investor who 
will rationally exercise only if equation (2) is satisfied. 
Using this inequality, the dividend and date corresponding to 
the largest difference between Dn and Xfl-e'^7"™*) is identified 
and used in the RGW formula. This method simply means that 
investors have the highest probability of exercising their 
options when the exercise premium reaches its maximum.
The total data set is split into two subsets; 18,862 
options with early exercise possibility and 44,044 without 
such possibility. Implied volatilities are then computed 
using the RGW formula for all options with early exercise 
possibilities, and the Black-Scholes formula for all options
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without early exercise possibilities. The numerical 
solutions were obtained from the DNEQNF International 
Mathematical and Statistical Library (IMSL) subroutine which 
solves a system of nonlinear equations using the Levenberg- 
Marquardt algorithm and a finite-difference approximation to 
the Jacobian.
Since the purpose of this study is to determine whether 
stock return volatility is a deterministic or stochastic 
process, it may seem odd to calculate implied volatilities 
using a deterministic model. The appropriateness of this 
methodology is addressed further in Feinstein (1989) and 
Corrado and Miller (1993). For the purposes of this study, 
note that "although the Black-Scholes constant variance 
assumption is violated in practice, the model's predictions 
are likely to be indistinguishable from stochastic volatility 
option pricing models when the options are near-the-money and 
have short times to expiration (Corrado and Miller (1993) 
p.6-7)."
2.3. Testing for Chaos
2.3.1. Chaos and Nonlinear Dependency
It has been shown empirically in economics and physics 
research that data generated by a deterministic system can 
appear to be generated by a stochastic system (the "tent" 
function is but one example). In particular, processes which 
had been described as a random walk in the financial 
literature may actually be deterministic if the proper test
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is applied. A random walk model is characterized by 
statistically independent observations. Although stock price 
rates of returns have been shown to be uncorrelated, this is 
not sufficient to prove statistical independence. It is 
possible for rates of return to be linearly uncorrelated but 
nonlinearly dependent. Nonlinear dependence resulting from 
a purely deterministic process can appear random when tested 
by commonly used linear techniques.
Several methodologies have been proposed to find 
nonlinear dependencies. Granger and Anderson (1978) and 
Subba Rao and Gabr (1980) introduced bilinear time-series 
models of the form
(2.4) Xj = et + ax̂ e,.!
Robinson proposed nonlinear moving average models. The 
simplest of these models can be represented by
(2.5) x, = e, + ae^e^
Tong and Lim (1980) developed the threshold autoregressive 
model characterized by
(2.6) Xt = ax,.! + et/ if x,.! < 1
= jSxu + et, otherwise
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In each of these three examples, et is assumed to be a 
sequence of normal i.i.d. random variables. The most popular 
nonlinear model in empirical econometric work is Engle's
(1982) autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) 
model, of which the simplest form is
(2.7) x, = et
where et is conditionally normally distributed with mean zero 
and variance [h, = a + 0X,.!2]. And finally, the generalized 
conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model, developed by 
Bollerslev (1986), models the conditional variance as a 
function of both lagged error terms and lagged variances.
Time series data generated by any of the above five 
models exhibits little or no serial correlation, and yet x, 
may not be stochastically independent of xu . Therefore, the 
weakness of more traditional tests of linear dependence, such 
as autocorrelation coefficients and runs tests, is that they 
fail to detect nonlinear dependence.
A chaotic process can be defined as a nonlinear, 
deterministic process that has first and second moment 
properties identical to those of a stochastic series. This 
time series has two characteristics: (1) theoretically, no
point is ever reached more than once although empirically 
this may occur due to rounding and, (2) the pattern of the 
evolutionary process through time is extremely sensitive to
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the system's initial conditions. A forecast based on 
imprecise initial information will be inaccurate and the 
magnitude of the inaccuracy will increase exponentially as 
the time period covered by the forecast increases.
Chaos techniques discussed in Brock (1986), Scheinkman 
and LeBaron (1989), Hsieh (1989), and Booth, Chowdhury and 
Hatem (1991) are used to test for deterministic chaos in the 
implied volatilities. The basic concept behind chaos 
methodology is to test for randomness by plotting the data in 
n-dimensional space and observing any subsequent clusterings. 
The chaos program begins by plotting in 2-dimensional space 
(X^X^) and seeing whether the result is evenly distributed 
(white noise), or whether dense areas appear. Evenly 
distributed data indicate that, at least in 2 dimensions, the 
data is random (no observed structure) . Then the 2- 
dimensional space is increased to 3-dimensional space, and so 
on. If a density (structure) is formed at some dimension, 
then this is the data's correlation dimension. A correlation 
dimension of 6, for example, indicates that there exists some 
form of dependency at the 6th dimension. The embedding 
dimension (number of dimensions) is increased until structure 
is found. If the embedding dimension approaches infinity (or 
at least gets very large) and clusterings are never observed, 
then the data can be considered to be white noise. In this 
case, the correlation dimension approaches infinity as the 
embedding dimension approaches infinity.
In the field of physics, the correlation dimension is 
used to distinguish chaotic deterministic systems from 
stochastic systems. The drawback to this technique is the 
lack of a proper statistical theory. Ramsey and Yuan (1987) 
show that even with as many as 2000 observations the 
estimated correlation dimension may be substantially biased. 
The usefulness of chaos in economic and financial modeling 
has been demonstrated by Baumol and Benhabib (1989), Brock 
and Malliaris (1989), and Rosser (1991). Various statistical 
techniques used to detect the presence of chaos have been 
provided by Grassberger and Procaccia (1983a), Brock (198 6), 
Brock, Dechert, and Scheinkman (1987), and Brock (1991). 
Grassberger and Procaccia (1983a) and Takens (1983a, 1983b) 
were the first to propose algorithms which attempt to 
distinguish between data generated by a deterministic system 
and that generated by a stochastic system.
The correlation dimension, as described above, provides 
topological information about the underlying process 
generating the data. The correlation dimension is roughly 
equal to the nonlinear degrees of freedom of the time series. 
This measure, when combined with the embedding dimension, is 
used to determine whether a process is chaotic or stochastic. 
The embedding dimension is the dimension of the space 
required to contain the data under study. For truly random 
data, the correlation dimension increases monotonically as 
the embedding dimension increases.
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More specifically, the correlation dimension is based on 
the concept of the correlation integral. Let {rt, t=l,.... ,T} 
be an i.i.d. time series. Let M(m) be the embedding 
dimension whereby M represents the Mth embedding dimension 
and m is the value of M used in mathematical operations. 
Next create M-dimensional vectors, referred to as M- 
histories, such that rtM = {rt,rt+1,.... ,rx.m+1}. In this manner, 
a single time series is converted into a set of time series 
with overlapping entries. The dynamics of the original time 
series are represented by the M-histories if m > 2n+l, where 
n is the time series' true dimensionality. The correlation 
integral measures the spatial correlation among the points in 
the M-histories for any particular embedding dimension.
(2.8) CM (e,T) = 2[ (T-m-1) (T-m) ]'* S1<i<j< ^ +iI((rMr rMj)
where Ie is an indicator function that equals one if | | rMj- 
rMj| | < e and zero otherwise. | | . | | is the sup-norm distance 
between rM; and rMj. So the correlation integral is a measure 
of the fraction of the pairs of all points that are within an 
e distance of each other.
For an infinite series, the correlation dimension is
(2.9) Dm (T) = limf.>0{ln CM (e,T)/ln e}
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The choice of the values of e and M is influenced by the 
length of the series, and it should also be noted that e and 
M are interrelated. If the e selected is too small, then 
CM (e,T) = 0, and if e is selected too large, then CM (e,T) = 
1. Because we want a value of CM (e,T) somewhere between 
these two extremes, .5 a < e < 1.5ct is often chosen in
practice (where a is the original series' standard 
deviation). We also want M to be as large as possible for 
any given e because the estimate of the series' true 
dimensionality is constrained by the size of M. After e and 
M have been selected, then various In CM (e,T) are regressed 
on their corresponding In e values and the resulting slope is 
the estimate for DM (T) at that particular M.
After obtaining the DM (T) measure it can be compared to 
the Dm (T) of a Gaussian series. Another use of this measure, 
as suggested by Scheinkman and LeBaron (1989), is to compare 
it to the Dm (T) obtained from the original series after it 
has been scrambled. The purpose of scrambling is to 
eliminate any time series structure without altering the 
existing distribution. The objective of both comparisons is 
to determine whether nonlinear dependencies are present. 
This is done by checking whether the DM (T) for either of the 
random series is significantly higher than that of the 
original series. The DM (T) should be infinite for a truly 
random series and Brock (1986) shows that the residuals from 
a linear or smooth nonlinear transformation will have the
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same DM (T) as the original series if the series is 
deterministic (i.e., the Brock residual test).
As just discussed, at least two approaches are available 
to make comparisons and test the DM (T) s. The first method is 
to compare the DM (T) from a given random series to that 
obtained from the series under study. The second method is 
to create many random series through repeated scrambling or 
Gaussian simulation and use the lowest DM (T) value as a 
benchmark for comparison purposes. Both techniques suffer 
from the fact that they do not provide statistical 
inferences. However, bootstrapping techniques can overcome 
this shortcoming by estimating the probability distribution 
of the Dm (T) of the random series (Booth, Chowdhury, and 
Hatem (1991)). Statistical significance testing can then be 
conducted based on this estimated distribution.
Another statistical test, developed by Brock, Dechert, 
and Scheinkman (1987) BDS, relates CM (e,T) to C^e,!), the 
correlation integral with the smallest possible embedding 
dimension for a given e. The BDS statistic is given by
(2.10) BDSM (e,T) = T 5[CM (e,T) - C1 (e,T)m]/VM (e,T)
where VM (e,T) is the variance of the numerator's limiting 
distribution. VM (e,T) is asymptotically distributed as 
normal with a zero mean and unit variance. The null 
hypothesis of the BDS is that the series is purely stochastic
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(i.e., independently and identically distributed 
(i.i.d.)).
A shortcoming of the BDS test, however, is that a 
rejection of the null leaves open a lot of alternative 
possibilities. The BDS test, in the context of this study, 
could only be used to determine whether implied volatilities 
are i.i.d. versus not i.i.d. But the purpose of this study 
is to distinguish between deterministic and stochastic 
processes. Since the BDS test is unable to make this 
distinction, an alternative test is needed. The stated 
purpose of the Brock (1986) residual test, on the other hand, 
is to distinguish deterministic from stochastic systems.
2.3.2. The Use of Bootstrapping
According to the findings of other researchers looking 
for the presence of deterministic chaos (Booth, Chowdhury, 
and Hatem (1991), for example), bootstrapping techniques may 
provide some answers. The general idea is to randomly 
scramble the original time series and then calculate the 
correlation dimension of the scrambled series. The process 
of scrambling does not disturb the stochastic properties 
(moments) of the series, but it destroys any time 
dependencies (at least in a pseudo-random sense). Since the 
correlation dimension of the scrambled series represents that 
of a (pseudo) random series, it can be compared to the 
correlation dimension of the original series.
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If the correlation dimension of the original series is 
significantly different from that of the scrambled series, 
then one concludes that this evidence "is consistent with the 
presence of chaos." Since calculating the correlation 
dimension is the result of an estimation process, the 
original series is scrambled several times in order to 
generate a sample. In this study, the original time series 
is scrambled 100 times and correlation dimensions are 
calculated for each resulting (scrambled) series.
2.3.3. Brock's Test for Deterministic Chaos
The Brock (1986) residual test was motivated by the 
recent interest in nonlinear dynamics found in the applied 
sciences. This interest is the result of several findings 
showing that trajectories generated by certain nonlinear 
difference equations appear completely random to visual 
inspection (see, for example, Sakai and Tokumaru (1980)). 
The Brock residual test is designed to identify 
deterministic, nonlinear behavior in a finite data set. It 
begins from the point of view that if the data is generated 
by a deterministic, nonlinear, "chaotic" dynamical system, 
then this gives rise to certain testable implications.
One of the implications of such a system, as opposed to 
a stochastic system, is that the correlation dimension will 
be low (see the above discussion on correlation dimension). 
A low correlation dimension means that the data can be fit 
into a low number of dimensions. Another implication is that
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the correlation dimension of the residuals of an estimated 
linear (or smooth nonlinear) time series model will be the 
same as that of the original series. The intuition behind 
this last implication is that if the original series is 
deterministic, a time series model fit to this series can 
only produce deterministic residuals. If the data had 
contained a stochastic component, on the other hand, it would 
be captured in the residuals.
The Brock residual test, therefore, uses the properties 
of the correlation dimension and the implications of 
deterministic data to construct a test for distinguishing 
deterministic from stochastic systems. The first step is to 
calculate the correlation dimension of the original series 
and to check whether or not it is low. Next, the residuals 
from a linear (or smooth nonlinear) model are collected and 
run through the chaos methodology to obtain their correlation 
dimension. If the two correlation dimensions are identical, 
then the system generating the data is deterministic.
Unfortunately, the distributional properties of 
correlation dimensions have yet to be developed. This makes 
it difficult to say how different the two correlation 
dimensions have to be in order to be considered 
(statistically) significantly different. One can get a 
notion of how different is significantly different by 
comparing the correlation dimensions of time series with 
known deterministic versus stochastic properties. This
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technique, however, does not yield statistically testable 
hypotheses. A second potential problem with using the Brock 
residual test is that it may confuse deterministic chaos with 
random noise in a short data set. Fortunately, this study 
uses a large data set and, therefore, is not subject to this 
shortcoming.
Although a low correlation dimension is indicative of a 
high level of structure in the data and vice versa, it does 
not establish whether the data is deterministic or
stochastic. As discussed above, the next step in the Brock
test is to fit a linear (or smooth nonlinear) model to the
original time series. Since this study fits an
autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model, the data is first 
tested for stationarity. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
(equation 11) is applied to determine whether the data 
possesses a unit root.
(2.11) Ayt = m + /St + (a-ljy,., + Ŝ Ay,.; + et
Since the results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
show implied volatility to be a nonstationary process (see 
table 2.3), the first difference of the original series is 
used to fit an ARIMA model. The general form of an 
ARIMA(p,d,q) model is shown below in equation number 12. 
From this general form, specific models are tested and 
selected using a variety of criteria.
5 4
(2.12) Yt = 0 ^  + 02Yt.2 + 03Y,.3 + ... + 0pYt.p + e,
+  ^ 2 ^ t-2  ^ 3 ^ t-3  ^ q ^ t-q
where Y, is the first difference of yt,
0 and 0 are unknown parameters,
p is the order of the AR process,
q is the order of the MA process,
and e's are i.i.d. normal errors with mean zero.
Several selection criteria, such as Akaike's Information 
Criterion (AIC), Mallow's PC, Schwarz's SC, adjusted R2,
etc., are used to find a model which provides a good fit to
the data. After testing a considerable number of alternative 
models, an ARIMA(3,1,1) model is found to provide the best 
fit.
The residuals of the ARIMA are then collected and run 
through the same chaos methodology used on the original 
series. The correlation dimension of the residuals is then 
compared to the correlation dimension of the original series. 
If the original series is characterized by low dimensional
deterministic chaos, then the residuals will have the same
correlation dimension as that of the original series. These 
results, and others, are discussed in the next section.
One possible way to mitigate the shortcomings of Brock's 
residual test is to apply a bootstrapping technique similar 
to the one discussed above. With only two correlation 
dimensions, one from the original series and one from the 
ARIMA residuals, it is not possible to perform hypothesis 
testing. However, it has been established that the residuals
5 5
from any linear or smooth nonlinear model must have the same 
correlation dimension as the original series in order to pass 
the deterministic test. Based one this, one can generate a 
sample of residual correlation dimensions and test whether 
they are significantly different from that of the original 
series.
Since the estimation of the correlation dimension is 
subject to sampling error, a single residual series 
correlation dimension conveys limited information. For this 
reason, the construction of a sample of residual correlation 
dimensions provides additional evidence that the original 
series is (is not) characterized by deterministic chaos. If 
the correlation dimension of the original series lies within 
a 95% confidence interval of the residual correlation 
dimensions, for example, then this is taken as evidence in 
support of deterministic chaos.
2.4. Empirical Results
2.4.1. Correlation Dimensions
Summary statistics on implied volatilities are presented 
in Table 2.1. The 62,906 observations on implied volatility
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have a mean of .1519545 and standard deviation of .0386673. 
Harvey and Whaley (1991), who also generate implied 
volatilities of the S&P 100 call option, report a mean and 
standard deviation of .1588 and .0253, respectively, using 
closing prices from August 1, 1988 to July 31, 1989. Table
2.1 also reports a minimum implied volatility value of
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.0533485, a maximum of .2621002 (yielding a range of 




Observations 62,906 Mean 0.1519545
Minimum 0.0533485 Std. Dev. 0.0386673
Maximum 0.2621002 Skewness -0.0649528
Range 0.2087518 Kurtosis -0.4924232
Table 2.2 gives the correlation dimensions for six 
separate embedding dimensions. As seen in the table, the 
correlation dimensions of .927964894, .994403172,
1.041526671, 1.07962689, 1.111827605, and 1.133936418 for
embedding dimensions of 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 and 30,
respectively, do not increase significantly as the 
embedding dimensions are increased. This result signifies 
that implied volatility is described by a low correlation 
dimension and, therefore, contains a great deal of structure. 
Such a low correlation dimension tells us, for example, that 
implied volatility does not resemble white noise which, 
theoretically, has a correlation dimension of infinity. 
Although the nature of this structure (nonlinear
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deterministic versus stochastic) is not known without further 
testing, the possibility of modeling this process appears 
promising. This finding may explain why Harvey and Whaley 
(1992a) reject the hypothesis that changes in volatility are 
unpredictable, and are able to forecast volatility with 
surprising precision.
Table 2.2 
Correlation Dimension (Raw Data)







The correlation dimensions for the 100 scrambled series 
are summarized in table 2.3. After calculating correlation 
dimensions at embedding dimensions of 5, 10, and 15 for the 
first couple of scrambled series, it was concluded that 
significant computer time would be saved by using only the
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embedding dimension of 15 (since all correlation dimensions 
are greater than 10).
Table 2.3
Correlation Dimensions (Scrambled Series)
Number of Observations per Series 62,905
Number of Scrambled Series 100
Mean Correlation Dimension 12.04709
Standard Deviation of Series 0.22275
Max. Correlation Dimension 11.52478
Min. Correlation Dimension 12.56295
5th Percentile 11.68533
95th Percentile 12.40000
The results in table 2.3 show that the correlation 
dimensions of the scrambled series are significantly 
different from that of the original series. This means that, 
based on a sample size of 100, the original series is 
significantly different from a (pseudo) random series. 
Although this is not a direct test for deterministic chaos, 
it does provide evidence consistent with it.
The results for the augmented Dickey-Fuller test are 
shown in table 2.4. This is a rather powerful test because 
the independent variables include 67 lagged first differences 
and because of the overall size of the data set. The t-
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statistic on lagged volatilities is -2.743. Based on table 
values, the null hypothesis (unit root) cannot be rejected.
Table 2.4 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test
Variable Df Parm. Est. Std. Error T-test
intercept 1 0.000122 0.00004800 2.551
(mu)
time trend 1 1.1146E-9 0.00000000 1.410
(beta)
lagl value 1 -0.001023 0.00037300 -2.743
(a-1)
lagged dif. ** N/A N/A N/A
(Si's)
All reported results are from the following Augmented 
Dickey Fuller formula: Ayt = ji + j81 + (a-1)y^ + Ê Ay,.; + et.
The coefficient on lagl is not significant at 10% level. 
Results are not shown for the 67 lagged difference 
coefficients. However, all but five are significant at the 
.05 level.
This evidence supports the earlier findings of French, 
Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987) showing that implied volatility 
is a nonstationary process and contradicts the findings of 
Stein (1989) showing it to be a stationary process. The 
significance of the finding in this paper is that it is based 
on a very large data set of meticulously constructed implied 
volatilities (adjusted for dividends, bid/ask spreads, wild 
card option bias, early morning trading bias, etc.).
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After taking the first difference of the original 
series, an ARIMA(3,1) is chosen to fit the series. The 
parameter estimates and associated test statistics are shown 
in Table 2.5. The t-statistics on all coefficients are 
statistically significant at the .01 level.
Table 2.5 
ARIMA Model
Parameter Estimate Std. Error T-ratio Lag
Mean 5.6161E-7 3.3557E-6 0.17 0
MAI Term -0.89754 0.0045321 -198.04 1
AR1 Term 0.38353 0.0061169 62.70 1
AR2 Term 0.19797 0.0050290 39.37 2
AR3 Term 0.06490 0.0045829 14.16 3
All reported results are based on the following ARIMA 
formula:
Y, =  0iY t.j +  0 2Yt-2 + 03Yt-3 + . . .  + 0pYt.p +  e t
+  f ljCn +  0 2 £ t-2 +  0 3 e t-3 +  • • • +  0 qe t-q'
The residuals from the ARIMA(3,1,1) model are estimated 
and collected in order to perform the Brock residual test. 
Table 2.6 displays the results of running the chaos 
methodology on the residuals of the ARIMA(3,1,1) model. At 
an embedding dimension of 5, the correlation dimension is 
4.118326094. At embedding dimensions of 10, 15, 20, 25 and
30, the correlation dimensions are 7.806769147, 10.64416294, 
12.20368006, 13.33597006, and 15.60311914, respectively.
Since the correlation dimensions are still increasing 
significantly as the embedding dimensions are increasing, one 











This evidence clearly suggests that the correlation 
dimensions of the original series and the residuals of the 
ARIMA(3,1,1) model are not equivalent. Based on the Brock 
residual test, therefore, this study rejects the hypothesis 
of deterministic chaos and, by default, accepts the notion of 
stochastic volatility. The implications of this finding were 
discussed above in the introduction and are examined further 
in the summary and conclusion section.
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As noted above, however, the Brock residual test does 
not provide a framework from which to statistically test the 
null hypothesis (i.e., are the two correlation dimensions 
significantly different in a statistical sense?). Although 
a correlation dimension of 1.13393 6418 certainly appears to 
be different from 15.60311914, this has not been demonstrated 
statistically. To this end, a sample of 100 different ARIMA 
models are fit to the original series and their residuals are 
collected. These residuals are used to generate 100
correlation dimensions, which, according to Brock's residual 
test, should be equivalent to the correlation dimension of 
the original series. The results are shown in table 2.7.
As seen in table 2.7, the correlation dimension of the 
original series does not lie within a 95% confidence interval 
of the residual correlation dimensions. In fact, the 
correlation dimension of the original series is far smaller 
than the minimum value of any of the 100 residual correlation 




Correlation Dimensions (ARIMA Residual Series)
Number of Observations per Series 62,905
Number of Scrambled Series 100
Mean Correlation Dimension 10.70828
Standard Deviation of Series 0.18308
Max. Correlation Dimension 11.32936





The 1970's and 1980's ushered in the greatest number of 
financial innovations in U.S. history. Although the rate of 
increase may have reached its peak (see Miller (1986) and Van 
Horne (1985)), the process continues to turn out innovative 
financial products and services each year. Competition and 
the profit motive provide the stimulus for change while 
relatively free and open markets sort useful from useless 
innovations. Barring severe information asymmetries, a 
financial innovation will survive the discipline of the 
market only if it improves operational efficiency and/or 
increases market completeness. Based on these criteria, 
Americus Shareholder Service Corporation (ASSC) appears to 
have created just such an innovation.
In 1983, ASSC set up its first trust for pre-divestiture 
AT&T shares. According to the terms of the trust, AT&T 
shareholders (and, subsequently, the shareholders of 26 
additional firms including post-divestiture AT&T) were 
invited to exchange common stock shares for UNITs of 
ownership in the trust. The exchange provision is terminated 
approximately one year after the creation of the trust, or 
after 5% of the outstanding shares are tendered, whichever 
comes first. The trust also ceases to accept additional 
shares for exchange once the stock price exceeds the 
termination value. The trust is considered to be "open" as
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long as none of these three conditions has been met. When 
the trust is "closed" investors can no longer tender stock 
shares for trust UNITs, although trading of PRIMES, SCORES, 
and UNITs continues on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX). 
The asset base of any particular trust is composed solely of 
the stock shares exchanged for UNITs.
Each UNIT of trust ownership is composed of a PRIME and 
a SCORE (the UNIT is perforated down the middle and can be 
divided into the two securities). PRIME holders retain most 
of the rights of ownership, such as voting, and have a claim 
to all dividends plus any price appreciation up to a 
predetermined value (termination value). Holding a PRIME is 
equivalent to writing a covered call option. SCORE holders 
are entitled to any price appreciation above the termination 
claim (i.e. a long-term call option). PRIMES and SCORES are 
protected against both stock dividends and stock splits. 
Each trust has a maturity of five years, at which time UNITs 
are reconverted into the underlying stock.
The trust collects an initial deposit fee ranging from
0.40% to 1.25% of the common stock price to tender stock for 
UNITs. In addition, $.05 is charged annually for each PRIME 
as part of a sponsor and trustee fee. As stated in each 
prospectus, however, the trust charges no fee to tender UNITs 
back to the trust in exchange for stock. This provision, as 
described elsewhere, has important implications for the
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construction of empirical methods designed to test for 
arbitrage violations.
There are several features about these derivative 
securities which make them particularly desirable for 
empirical research. The first feature is data availability. 
All 27 trusts are composed of large, well-established firms 
(see table 3.1) which trade quite frequently. Even more 
significant, however, is the fact that UNITs, PRIMES, and 
SCOREs are all traded on the AMEX. While most other studies 
investigating the pricing behavior of derivative securities 
need to premise their results on some particular asset 
pricing model, PRIME and SCORE prices have a very simple 
theoretical relation to stock prices (i.e., PRIME + SCORE = 
stock)
A second desirable feature is the trust's redemption 
policy. The PRIME and SCORE, or unseparated UNIT, can be 
purchased in the open market and exchanged for the underlying 
stock at no charge from the trust (commissions, bid-ask 
spreads, etc. still apply). This feature guarantees that the 
value of the combined derivative securities is at least equal 
to the value of the underlying stock and provides a useful 
way of deriving arbitrage-based pricing bounds (see the 
methodology section). Without the redemption feature, 
Ingersoll (1976) argues that a combination of income and 
capital shares may sell at a discount to the underlying asset 
value.
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A third desirable characteristic, although unfortunate 
from the perspective of ASSC, is that all 27 trusts were 
terminated by the end of 1992 and are very unlikely to be 
reintroduced in their earlier form due to an unfavorable
I.R.S. ruling. Proposed I.R.S. amendments were finalized in 
1986 which treated the trusts as associations taxable as 
corporations for federal income tax purposes. Under the new 
provisions, the transfer of stock shares for UNITs of the 
trust is treated as a taxable transaction (although the 
already-existing trusts were exempt from this provision) . 
But from a researcher's point of view, this means that the 
entire universe of this particular derivative security can be 
captured in one manageable data set. This makes it more 
difficult to argue that results obtained are sensitive to the 
time period under study.
Another reason for studying the behavior of PRIMES and 
SCORES is that these derivatives are the forerunners of, or 
share characteristics with, several related securities. 
Mortgage-backed securities (MBS), for example, have been 
split into interest only (10) and principal only (PO) 
components. PERCS (Preferred Equity Redemption Cumulation 
Stock) have recently been issued by several large 
corporations including General Motors, Texas Instruments, 
Tenneco, RJR Nabisco, Tandym and Sears & Roebuck. These 
securities carry a dividend yield of approximately double
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that of the common stock but have a limited maturity and 
termination value (a close cousin to PRIMES).
BOUNDS are another close relative to PRIMES in that they 
allow an investor to purchase the cash flows of a covered 
call option. LEAPS (Long-term Equity Appreciation
Participation) are long-term equity options which began 
trading subsequent to SCORES and were designed to fulfill the 
demand for maturities in excess of 9 month exchange-traded 
options. Shearson-Lehman1s Unbundled Stock Unit (USU) is yet 
another innovation which, like PRIMES and SCORES, divides 
equity into separate component claims. As this partial list 
demonstrates, a better understanding of PRIME and SCORE 
pricing behavior could lead to generalizations about several 
other recently-developed innovations.
This study uses daily data from December 21, 1983 to
December 31, 1992 to investigate the pricing of PRIMES and 
SCORES versus that of the underlying stock. The results show 
that PRIMES plus SCORES traded at a premium to the stock, on 
average, for 26 of 27 trusts over the entire trading period. 
Arbitrage-based boundary conditions are tested and shown to 
be violated for most of the firms, confirming the results of 
Huckins and Vora (1993a) and Jarrow and O'Hara (1989). 
However, once all relevant transactions costs are included, 
only 4 of the 27 firms violate the boundary conditions. 
Since value appears to have been created by the repackaging 
of otherwise identical cash flows, the focus of this paper is
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to determine the source(s) of value and to understand why 
premiums are resistent to arbitrage.
Several competing hypotheses are tested in an effort to 
determine the source of the added value. These hypotheses 
can be grouped into the following categories: (1) market
completeness, (2) heterogeneous levels of risk aversion, (3) 
heterogeneous beliefs, (4) transactions cost reduction, and 
(5) tax advantages. The weight of the evidence supports the 
view that the creation of PRIMES and SCORES was a successful 
financial innovation adding to the completeness of the 
market. Investors were able to purchase the types of claims 
they demanded at lower transaction costs.
The paper is organized in the following manner. Section
3.2 summarizes relevant research focusing on the role of 
financial innovation and optimal security design as applied 
to the market for PRIMES and SCORES. Section 3.3 discusses 
the five hypotheses to be tested and section 3.4 describes 
the data and methodology. Section 3.5 contains the results 
of the study, while the summary and conclusion is contained 
in chapter 5.
3.2. Review of Related Literature
3.2.1. Financial Innovation
In general, the role of financial markets is to channel 
the savings of society from lower-valued uses to higher­
valued uses. Financial innovation is successful only when it 
is able to improve market efficiency. Operational efficiency
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gains reduce the spread between what savers receive and what 
borrowers pay for funds, thereby lowing the cost of financial 
intermediation. Market completeness refers to the situation 
in which every possible contingency has a corresponding, and 
distinct, marketable security. In an incomplete market, 
therefore, the demand for a particular type of security may 
go unfilled, thus creating a potentially profitable 
opportunity for financial innovators. Commenting on this 
point, Van Horne (1985, p. 622) states that,
As with most things, it [financial innovation] 
is a matter of degree. The sheer number of 
different types of securities necessary to make 
the market truly complete is bound to result in 
an incomplete market in the real world. The 
issue is whether a sufficient number of time- 
state claims exist to make the market reasonably 
complete, not entirely so.
Although the profit motive is the driving force behind 
all financial innovations, certain economic environments 
stimulate change more rapidly than others. According to 
Miller (198 6), the root causes of financial innovations over 
the past twenty-five years have come from changing government 
regulations and taxes. Coalitions of interest groups, using 
the government as a vehicle to gain economic advantages, 
exert pressure for beneficial regulatory and tax changes. 
Groups with opposing interests then search for innovative 
ways to circumvent, or at least mitigate, the impact of the 
new regulations. This dynamic process, referred to as the
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"regulatory dialectic" by Kane (1986) , is subject to a great 
deal of political and social manipulation.
Silber (1975,1981,1983) views financial innovation as 
mainly the result of corporate attempts to mitigate financial 
constraints. These constraints are imposed both by 
government and by the marketplace. As firms try to maximize 
wealth and find that the process is hindered by obstacles, an 
incentive is created to avoid or at least relax these 
constraints. The dynamic activity of reducing the cost of 
adhering to any particular constraint is the essence of 
financial innovation. When interest rates underwent a period 
of high volatility, for example, the cost of holding fixed- 
rate preferred stock increased. Firms responded to this 
constraint by creating an adjustable-rate preferred stock, 
thereby mitigating the effects of high interest rates.
A broader view on the subject, however, sees financial 
innovation as the result of several environmental changes 
(see Van Horne (1985)). Volatile inflation and interest 
rates, technological advances, the level of economic 
activity, academic work on market efficiency, as well as 
regulatory and tax changes all contributed to the surge in 
financial innovation observed over the last twenty-five 
years. These conditions, along with the profit motive and 
the market system, have generated such variety in financial 
products and services that the market (and academia) is still 
sorting the useful from the useless.
72
Although most of the innovations have improved 
operational efficiency and/or market completeness, Van Horne 
(1985) argues that some new products lack any economic 
substance and may in fact be driven by the desire to merely 
produce accounting profits, or by nothing more than a "herd" 
instinct. Besides the misallocation of resources resulting 
from such unfounded innovations, human capital (investment 
and commercial bankers, lawyers, accountants, etc.) is also 
wasted on unproductive activities. Over time, however, one 
would expect competitive forces to prevail and to drive 
useless innovation out of the market.
Finnerty (1988) provides an extensive summary of the 
types of financial innovations (engineering) which have 
reached the market over the past two decades. He 
distinguishes three types of financial engineering: (1) the 
development of new types of financial instruments such as 
mutual funds, options, and convertibles, (2) the development 
of new types of financial processes such as shelf 
registration, wire transfers of funds, and electronic 
security trading, and (3) innovative solutions to problems in 
corporate finance such as cash and debt management strategies 
and new forms of asset-based financing.
In addition to these three types of innovation, Finnerty 
(1988) also categorizes eleven factors responsible for 
innovations. These are (1) tax asymmetries, (2) transaction 
costs, (3) agency costs, (4) risk reduction and/or
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reallocation, (5) increased liquidity, (6) regulatory or 
legislative changes, (7) interest rate level and volatility, 
(8) price level and volatility, (9) academic work, (10) 
accounting benefits, and (11) technological advances. It is 
important to list here the types of innovations as well as 
the factors generating innovations because one of the 
arguments of this paper is that the behavior of PRIMES and 
SCORES is best understood within this context. PRIMES and 
SCORES are a new type of instrument which may have been 
motivated by tax asymmetries, transaction cost reduction, 
market completion (Van Horne (1985)), or risk reallocation.
One potential source of value creation with respect to 
PRIMES and SCORES not previously tested is the issue of risk 
reduction and/or reallocation. As stated by Finnerty (1988
p. 18),
If a company can repackage a security's payment 
stream so that it either involves less risk or 
reallocates risk from one class of investors to 
one that is less risk-sensitive and thus 
requires a smaller risk premium, and does so in 
a manner that investors cannot duplicate as 
cheaply by utilizing existing securities, then 
shareholder value will be enhanced.
Therefore, if the creation of PRIMES and SCORES reallocated 
risk by unbundling the average risk of the stock into two 
distinct risk components, then value may have been added by 
allowing investors to bid on their preferred risk level. 
This is closely related to the market completeness hypothesis
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since the risk/return relationships of the two derivatives 
represent new securities which did not previously exist. The 
empirical implications of this hypothesis are discussed in 
the testable hypotheses section.
3.2.2. Optimal Security Design
Optimal security design can be seen as a subcategory of 
financial innovation. Little had been written about the way 
securities should be constructed before an article by Allen 
and Gale (1988). Previously, research on capital structure 
and general equilibrium under incomplete markets had taken 
the types of securities issued by firms as exogenously 
determined. In their paper, Allen and Gale (1988) address 
the more basic issue of whether debt, equity, or other 
currently existing securities are really the "best" that the 
firm can issue. Modigliani and Miller (1958) demonstrated 
that capital structure (and security design in general) is 
irrelevant to firm value under the assumptions of market 
completeness and no short sale restrictions. However, when 
markets are incomplete and short sales are restricted (to 
avoid costless arbitrage), security design becomes very 
relevant.
Allen and Gale build a model of optimal security design 
based on heterogeneous endowments and risk preferences. In 
an incomplete market structure with short sale restrictions, 
they determine optimal security design by explicitly 
incorporating the transaction costs of issuing securities.
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Since the issuance of securities is a costly endeavor, the 
firm will issue more than one type of claim only if it 
increases firm value. The incentive to issue a second 
security lies in the investors' heterogeneous attitudes 
toward risk. Optimal securities will be constructed such 
that earnings in each state of nature will be totally 
allocated to the group which values them most, with the other 
group receiving nothing. In this way, the firm receives the 
highest marginal revenue for all issuances.
Since the same underlying group of assets are being 
repackaged to fit the demands of heterogeneous investor 
groups, some type of market imperfection must be present to 
prohibit costless arbitrage opportunities. Without such 
imperfection(s), arbitrageurs could buy the parts and sell 
the whole or buy the whole and sell the parts, depending on 
relative market prices. Allen and Gale (1988) assume that 
substantial short selling costs provide just such a 
mechanism. As noted in subsequent sections, this cost is in 
fact a real barrier to arbitrage in the market for PRIMES and 
SCORES. Although PRIMES and SCORES do not divide earnings in 
such an extreme manner as in the Allen and Gale (1988) model, 
the value added could nevertheless be the result of 
heterogeneous investors purchasing the income stream they 
value most.
Building on Allen and Gale (1988), Madan and Soubra 
(1991) introduce the effects of marketing costs into their
model. They try to reconcile the extreme security designs 
predicted by Allen and Gale (1988) to what is actually 
observed in the marketplace. Their model posits that equity, 
debt, and warrants may be optimal security designs, at least 
in simple cases. Similar to the previous authors, Madan and 
Soubra show that, under incomplete markets and short sale 
restrictions, only the investors that value any particular 
financial product the most will hold it, and its market price 
will equal this maximum personal valuation. Differences in 
individual state prices provide the motivation for the
diversity of financial contracts offered in the market.
Boot and Thakor (1993) claim that it may be advantageous 
to partition the cash flows of an asset into distinct 
financial claims, and attempt to determine the optimal
partition. They show that dividing a security into an
"informationally sensitive" component and an "informationally 
insensitive" component makes informed trading more 
profitable. In other words, by splitting out the
informationally sensitive component into a separately traded 
security, informed traders have more to gain by collecting 
and revealing private information. As stated by the authors 
(p.1358), "This 'informational leveraging up' of his wealth 
position means that an informed trader can be compensated for 
his information acquisition cost with a smaller divergence 
between the 'true' value and the equilibrium price for S
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[informationally sensitive security] than for the composite 
security."
This view of optimal security design is closely related 
to that of Gorton and Pennecchi (1990) who argue that 
uninformed traders are made better off by having 
informationally insensitive securities available for trading. 
These two studies suggest that firms can increase their value 
by partitioning cash flows and creating securities based on 
an information-sensitive clientele effect. Since value is 
added by affecting this partition, individual investors or 
other outside third parties (i.e., ASSC) will create such 
securities if the firm is reluctant to do so.
Related optimal security design research includes that 
of Harris and Raviv (1989), Zender (1991), and Duffie and 
Jackson (1989). Harris and Raviv (1989) investigate the 
determinants of security design while focusing on corporate 
control issues. They argue that security design should not 
only consider the optimal allocation of cash flows, but also 
the optimal allocation of voting rights (control). From this 
perspective, securities should be designed to minimize the 
conflicts of interest which inherently exist between those 
with control and those seeking control. Their main result is 
that a single voting security is optimal to other forms of 
voting allocation schemes.
Zender (1991) is also concerned with the allocation of 
cash flows and control rights. His model includes an active
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investor, who is assigned control, and a passive investor. 
Disagreements over investment and dividend policy are 
resolved by optimal contracting. The contributions of this 
paper can be summarized as the (p. 164 6)
interpretation that securities are designed to 
implement optimal investment decisions, 
providing a possible explanation for the state- 
contingent transfer of control, allowing an 
endogenous examination of decision-making 
incentives within the firm, and providing a 
model of the intuition that existing instruments 
are designed so that in each state the owner of 
the residual control rights owns the residual 
cash flows...
Duffie and Jackson (1990) model optimal futures 
contracts under the assumptions of incomplete markets and 
mean-variance preferences. Since futures exchanges are the 
acting (or designing) agent in this model, the objective of 
such a contract is to maximize trading volume. This type of 
research could be of great interest to the futures exchanges 
which have recently been plagued by a high failure rate of 
marketing new products.
3.2.3. PRIMES and SCORES
Jarrow & O'Hara (1989) were the first researchers to 
publish a study on what they referred to as the "relative 
mispricing of PRIMES and SCOREs to the underlying stock." 
Using daily stock prices of only 5 firms (Exxon, American 
Home Products, Bristol-Myers, Dupont, and Merck) covering the 
period from September 10, 1985 to June 30, 1987, they find
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that the value of PRIMES plus SCORES exceeded that of the 
underlying stock for each firm. Next, the authors establish 
arbitrage-based bounds tests in order to determine whether 
arbitrage profits were possible during the period under 
study. Their test consists of a new nonparametric 
statistical technique used to determine whether the premium 
(PRIME plus SCORE minus stock price) represents a violation 
of market efficiency.
Their statistical methodology, discussed more fully in 
the methodology section, accounts for measurement errors due 
to nonsynchronous trading, bid/ask spreads, differential 
marginal trading commissions, and typographical errors which 
occur during the data preparation process. After explicitly 
estimating the pricing discrepancies arising from the above- 
mentioned imperfections, the authors find that PRIME and 
SCORE prices continue to exceed that of the underlying stock, 
and sometimes by a considerable amount. This apparent market 
inefficiency is all but extinguished, however, once short 
sale and trust size (5% of outstanding shares) constraints 
are included into the formulation. But even if arbitrage is 
not possible after considering all transaction costs, the 
authors clearly establish that investors value PRIMES and 
SCORES more highly than the stock. Next, they try to 
identify the source of this increase in value.
Three explanations are investigated to find which is 
most consistent with the behavior of PRIMES and SCORES. The
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first hypothesis suggests that PRIMES and SCORES add value by 
spanning states of nature previously unavailable to investors 
(i.e., a market completeness hypothesis). The value of the 
SCORE, in particular, is suspected of providing a new and 
unique payoff structure since it is essentially an option 
with a 5 year maturity while exchange-traded options were 
restricted to 9 month maturities. This hypothesis is tested 
by comparing actual SCORE prices with those estimated by the 
Black-Scholes option pricing model.
The transaction cost hypothesis states that the SCORE 
adds value because it saves on the costs of dynamic hedging. 
Long-term options can be replicated by taking positions in a 
risk-free bond and the underlying stock. The difficulty in 
creating such a synthetic long-term option is the enormous 
amount of transaction costs incurred during the continuous 
(or at least quite frequent) rebalancing process. So even if 
the SCORE is not a unique security, it could be valuable to 
investors by reducing the transaction costs associated with 
dynamic hedging. The transaction cost hypothesis is also 
consistent with the actual value of the SCORE exceeding that 
predicted by the Black-Scholes option pricing model.
Jarrow and O'Hara test the validity of the first two 
hypotheses by arguing that hedging costs are captured by 
implicitly estimating volatility because, under proportional 
transaction costs, the standard Black-Scholes hedge with an 
adjusted volatility will approximate the option's value.
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This point is developed more extensively in Leland (1985) and 
Jarrow & Wiggins (1988). Since implied volatilities take 
into consideration the cost of transacting and historical 
volatilities do not, SCORE prices based on the former should 
outperform those based on the latter. The authors test this 
implication and find that the implicit volatility model 
prices the SCORE more accurately than the historical 
volatility model.
Unfortunately, this test may not provide the evidence 
suggested by the authors since it is fairly well-established 
that implicit volatility models outperform historical 
volatility models (see Latane & Rendleman (1976), Chiras & 
Manaster (1978), etc.). So this result may have very little 
to do with the specific pricing of SCORES and a lot to do 
with the general nature of implicit versus historical 
volatilities. It is quite difficult to obtain reliable 
estimates of implied volatilities for long-term options.
The third hypothesis tested in the study is that tax 
considerations are responsible for the observed premiums. 
Within the tax clientele argument there are two 
possibilities: (1) corporations and other exempt institutions 
benefit greatly from the corporate dividend exclusion rule by 
purchasing PRIMES only (i.e., value added is due to the 
PRIMES), and (2) splitting stock shares into PRIMES and 
SCORES gives their holder an additional tax-timing option 
unavailable to the holder of the underlying stock.
Tax law changes which lowered the amount of dividends 
qualifying for exclusion and raised the tax rate on capital 
gains became effective on January 1, 1987. Both of these 
changes have the effect of reducing the desirability of 
holding PRIMES and SCORES for tax purposes. The two tax 
hypotheses are tested jointly by regressing daily price 
discrepancies (premiums or discounts) on a constant plus 
dummy variable which equals one if the date is on or after 
January 1, 1987, and zero otherwise. Although the results 
show no evidence in favor of the tax hypothesis, the 
methodology used here is rather weak. If the markets are 
informationally efficient, the effect of tax changes is 
likely to be impounded into prices before the actual changes 
become effective. Also, due to data constraints, only one 
firm was included in the regression.
Jarrow & O'Hara (1989) conclude that the transaction 
cost hypothesis is probably the best of the three in terms of 
its explanatory power, although neither market completeness 
nor the tax hypothesis can be rejected. The premium for 
PRIMES and SCORES persists over time because regulatory 
constraints on short sales and trust size limit the 
effectiveness of arbitrage. Based on a relatively small 
sample (5 of 27 trusts) over a relatively short time horizon, 
the authors find evidence supporting the view that PRIMES and 
SCORES are valuable financial innovations (the market valued 
these derivatives even if the I.R.S. did not).
Unfortunately, in the case of the derivative securities 
issued by ASSC, it was the I.R.S. and not the market which
sealed their fate. On May 2, 1984, the I.R.S. proposed new
amendments to Treasury Regulation Section 301.7701-4 (c) which 
reclassified the trust as an association taxable as a 
corporation. This market imperfection makes it very unlikely 
that new trusts will be formed, at least in their earlier 
form. As the following review of previous research reveals, 
however, investors found value in the PRIME and SCORE 
securities and were willing to pay a premium to acquire them. 
It appears that these derivatives survived the discipline of 
the market but fell prey to changing governmental tax policy.
The purpose of the present study is to determine whether 
the value of the premium continued to persist for all 27 
trusts over the entire life of the securities. The source of 
this premium is then investigated using new tests and a
complete data set, along with some variations of the tests
described above.
A second study involving these derivative securities was 
conducted by Venkatesh (1991). His study tests whether cum- 
ex trading in the stock is significantly greater than cum-ex 
trading in PRIMES due to transaction costs and other market 
imperfections. Direct trading costs for PRIMES exceed those 
for the stock because of limited supply (5% of outstanding 
shares), lower trading frequency and volume, and higher bid- 
ask spreads. This implies that cum-ex activity will cause a
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greater drop in stock price than PRIME price, and that ex-day 
volume will be greater for the stock than for the PRIME.
The author finds some empirical evidence supporting both 
of these implications, suggesting that PRIMES are not widely 
held for dividend capture purposes. From the perspective of 
the present paper, the significance of Venkatesh's study is 
that it confirms the earlier findings of Jarrow & O'Hara 
(1989). During 1988, the author finds an average premium of 
32 cents for 26 trusts using data from the Institute for 
Study of Securities Markets (ISSM).
Although not many empirical studies have been published 
on PRIMES and SCOREs (as seen from above), there are several 
working papers which warrant attention. Huckins and Vora 
(1993a,1993b), for example, test for the market premiums 
described above for 2 6 of the total 27 trusts. Although they 
look at 26 trusts, as opposed to Jarrow and O'Hara's 5, they 
use weekly instead of daily data. In one of the studies, 
(1993b) , they test the hypothesis that premiums are the 
result of "when-issued" trading. When a trust is first 
established, PRIMES, SCORES, and UNITS trade on a "when- 
issued" basis until the minimum float and distribution 
requirements of AMEX are met (i.e., one million shares and 
800 investors). During this period, common stock is accepted 
in exchange for UNITs but no money changes hands. The 
authors find little to no support for the hypothesis that 
this institutional factor produces the observed premiums.
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In a second and related study, Huckins and Vora (1993a) 
show that PRIME and SCORE premiums exhibit a considerable 
amount of variability, both cross-sectionally and across 
time. They attribute these premiums to noise trading, 
institutional practices, asset uniqueness, and heterogeneous 
expectations. Potential problems with these two studies is 
that the authors use weekly data and find some, albeit weak, 
support for almost all possible sources of the PRIME and 
SCORE premium.
Barber (1993) takes a rather different approach from 
previous studies by applying the noise trading model of 
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman (1990) (hereafter 
DSSW) to the premium anomaly. The DSSW model posits that 
irrational traders are able to materially affect security 
prices because their misperceptions about fundamental values 
are correlated. This view of the market, in contrast to that 
of Fama's (1965) where irrational investors are overwhelmed 
by rational arbitrageurs, sees correlated misperceptions as 
an undiversifiable element of risk. Rational investors must 
consider this additional source of risk when attempting to 
arbitrage differences from fundamental values for securities 
traded predominately by noise traders. Therefore, prices may 
vary from fundamental values over long periods of time even 
after taking into account transaction costs.
There are two direct implications of the DSSW model as 
it relates to assets traded predominately by noise traders.
First of all, returns on such assets will be cross- 
sectionally correlated because of correlated misperceptions. 
And secondly; prices on such assets, as noted above, will 
deviate from fundamental values. After stating these 
predictions of the DSSW model, Barber then documents that 
PRIMES and SCORES are traded predominantly by noise traders 
(individual investors) and that the levels and changes in 
premiums are correlated across trusts. He also shows that 
changes in average premiums (across trusts) are correlated 
with changes in average discounts of closed-end funds and 
with returns on small stocks. Closed-end funds and small 
stocks are predominantly traded by small investors (see Lee, 
Shleifer, and Thaler (1991)). Finding that these
correlations are significant, Barber concludes that the 
premium on PRIMES and SCOREs is the result of noise trading.
MacDonald and Smith (1993) demonstrate that PRIMES and 
SCOREs may be useful for research purposes unrelated to the 
behavior of premiums. While there is considerable agreement 
that "surprise" earnings announcements contain relevant 
information, it is not clear to what extent stock price 
adjustment results from changes in the market's expectations 
of future dividends, capital gains, or both. MacDonald and 
Smith attempt to distinguish expected changes to capital 
gains from dividends. They conclude that approximately 75% 
of good news surprises are impounded in the SCORE, with the 
remaining 25% going to the PRIME.
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3.3. Tests and Hypotheses
3.3.1. Existence of Premiums
The first test is designed to document whether or not 
premiums exist for all 27 trusts over their entire lives. If 
markets are efficient, it should be impossible to find 
arbitrage situations where one purchases the underlying 
stock, exchanges it for a PRIME and a SCORE, sells the PRIME 
and SCORE, and realizes a gain on the round trip. In other 
words, PRIMES and SCOREs should neither sell at a discount 
nor at a premium to the underlying asset. Ignoring 
transaction costs and other market imperfections for the 
moment, this hypothesis is tested by comparing the prices of 
PRIMES plus SCOREs to that of the stock. If markets are 
efficient, there will be no significant difference between 
the two positions (PRIMES plus SCOREs versus stock).
As discussed in the methodology section, the above test 
is easily rejected due to market imperfections. A more 
relevant efficiency test is then constructed to account for 
imperfections of the market for PRIMES, SCOREs, and 
underlying stocks. Following the methodology of Jarrow & 
O'Hara (1989), arbitrage boundary conditions are created 
which specifically test for arbitrage opportunities. These 
nonparametric statistical tests, using the empirical 
distribution of the data, are designed to take into account 
the combined effects of commissions, nonsimultaneous trading, 
bid/ask spreads, and measurement errors.
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3.3.2. No-Arbitrage Condition
Since this first test, and the test statistic described 
in the methodology section, are both concerned with arbitrage 
boundaries, a brief discussion on this subject is warranted. 
There are two conditions under which the no-arbitrage 
condition is violated. First of all, the stock could sell at 
a premium to the combined PRIME and SCORE. Under these 
circumstances, the arbitrageur would purchase the PRIME and 
SCORE, convert them into the stock, and then sell the stock. 
Since the trust does not collect fees for exchanging PRIMES 
and SCOREs into stock and no annual management fee is charged 
on such transactions, the arbitrageur pays only trading 
commissions. If trading commissions are, for example, c 
percent of purchases and sales, then the lower arbitrage 
boundary condition can be written as
(3.1) -c(Pt + Ct + St) <= P, + Ct - St 
where:
Pt = price of the PRIME
Ct = price of the SCORE
S, = price of the stock
c = combined trading commissions and bid/ask spread as
percent of purchases and sales
The second potential arbitrage violation would occur if 
the combined PRIME and SCORE trade at a premium to the stock. 
In this case there are two possible methods of arbitrage 
depending on whether the trust is open or closed. If the
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trust is still open (i.e., stock can be tendered for UNITs), 
the arbitrageur would buy the stock, tender it to the trust, 
and then sell the PRIME and SCORE. The commissions and 
bid/ask spreads are the same as above but an additional fee 
(m) would be charged for the stock/UNIT exchange. The upper 
bound on this arbitrage condition can be expressed as
(3.2) P, + Ct - St <= c(Pt + Ct + St) + mSt
where m represents the fee (as a percentage of S,) for 
transforming stocks into UNITs
If the trust has been closed, then the arbitrage 
strategy must be altered. When PRIMES and SCORES trade at a 
premium, the arbitrageur must short sell the PRIME and SCORE, 
buy the underlying stock, and hold this position until 
maturity. Since these two positions must be equal at 
maturity, the arbitrageur, in effect, locks in the price 
differential. The difficulty with this strategy is that 
Regulation T of the Federal Reserve Board's margin rules 
requires that all proceeds of short sales be deposited in a 
non-interest bearing account. The costs of short sales 
restrictions can be quite severe in this case because of the 
long-term nature of these derivative securities. If i 
tepresents the present value of interest lost as a percent of 
short selling the PRIME and SCORE, then the upper bound of 
this arbitrage strategy is
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(3.3) Pt + Ct - St <= c(Pt + Ct + St) + i(Pt + Ct)
Combining the upper and lower boundary conditions of 
equations (1) , (2) , and (3) gives the no-arbitrage condition 
expressed below in equation (4). This relationship will be 
used to develop the nonparametric test statistic described in 
the next section.
(3.4) -c(Pt + Ct + St) <= Pt + Ct - S, <= c(Pt + C, + St) + Mt 
where:
Mj = mt if the trust is open
Mj = i (Pt + Ct) if the trust is closed
The next 5 hypotheses represent an attempt to explain 
the results of the first test (i.e. the existence of a 
premium). Although market efficiency based on the no­
arbitrage conditions is generally not rejected when 
transaction costs are included, it is clearly demonstrated 
that PRIMES plus SCORES are more valuable (on average) than 
their underlying stocks. This is an intriguing result 
warranting further investigation. Why are investors willing 
to pay a premium for two claims, as opposed to one, written 
on the same underlying cash flows? What is the source of 
this additional value? The following hypotheses address 
these issues by dividing competing explanations into two 





The first hypothesis claims that the premium for PRIMES 
and SCORES is due to market incompleteness. Under this 
scenario, the SCORE security is unique because of its long­
term maturity (5 years) and, therefore, valuable to investors 
who demand such a payoff structure. Although all 27 firms 
had exchange-traded options during the period covered in this 
study, these options have maturities of 9 months or less. So 
during most of the life of the SCORE, uniqueness is a real 
possibility. However, with 9 months or less remaining on the 
life of the SCORE, this derivative offers nothing different 
from the run-of-the-mill exchange-traded option. Market 
completeness, during the last 9 months, cannot be used to 
explain any premium. (I assume here that if the striking 
price on the SCORE is different from those on the exchange- 
traded options, there is no demand for the SCORE'S striking 
price. Otherwise, the exchange would have activated just 
such a striking price).
This framework suggests a relatively straight-forward 
test for the market completeness hypothesis. If market 
completeness is responsible for the premium, then the premium 
should disappear when the SCORE has 9 months or less to 
maturity. This is tested by regressing the premium on a 
constant and a dummy variable which equals one during the 
first 51 months of the life of the SCORE, and zero otherwise.
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A statistically significant and positive coefficient on the 
dummy variable will support the completeness hypothesis. The 
Wilcoxon rank sums test is also used to test for 
significance. (Due to the lack of normality reported on the 
premiums, most of the tests listed in this section are 
duplicated using an appropriate nonparametric method.)
As mentioned in the introduction, several new derivative 
securities were introduced into the market after PRIMES and 
SCORES began trading. LEAPS are one such derivative which 
were introduced both on the CBOE and AMEX on October 5, 1990. 
These long-term option contracts have expirations of up to 
two years, more than doubling the expiration of concurrently- 
existing exchange traded options. If the market completeness 
hypothesis is valid, then one would expect the PRIME plus 
SCORE premiums to decline after the introduction of LEAPS. 
This hypothesis is tested using the same dummy variable 
formulation discussed above. Namely, premiums are regressed 
against a dummy variable which equals one if the SCORE is 
traded before October 5, 1990, and zero otherwise.
However, showing that a new security is unique is only 
part of the story. One must also try to identify why this 
uniqueness is valued by the market. This study attempts to 
add greater precision to the completeness hypothesis by 
testing the following two hypotheses (heterogeneous risk 
preferences and heterogeneous beliefs).
It should also be noted that even under conditions of 
homogeneous expectations and risk preferences (a 
representative investor, for example), the creation of two 
new linearly independent securities may add value to the 
investor’s portfolio by reducing the nonsystematic risk of 
the portfolio. Since the returns of the PRIME and SCORE are 
not perfectly correlated and their weights can always be 
rebalanced, the representative investor may be willing to pay 
a premium for the two derivatives above the price of the 
underlying stock.
3.3.3.2. Hypothesis Two
The second hypothesis is an effort to explain observed 
premiums as the result of an incomplete market where 
investors have heterogeneous attitudes toward risk (i.e., 
differing cost-benefit assessments). Allen and Gale (1988) 
argue that when markets are incomplete and investors have 
dissimilar attitudes toward risk (two very realistic 
assumptions), different individuals or groups may value 
assets quite differently. Because these individuals assign 
different values on consumption in different states of 
nature, asset prices will reflect the attitudes of the 
individuals which value it most highly. This line of 
reasoning is closely related to that of Edward Miller (1977). 
Miller argues that in a market characterized by short sale 
restrictions, prices will be determined by the marginal, as 
opposed to the average, investor.
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With short sale restrictions and an emphasis on marginal 
investors' attitudes, value can be created by issuing more 
than one type of claim on an underlying asset. If an asset's 
cash flows can be divided into high and low-risk categories, 
for example, separate claims could be issued for each cash 
flow stream. Highly risk-averse investors would tend to bid 
up the price of the low-risk claim while risk-neutral (or low 
risk-averse) investors would tend to bid up the price of the 
high-risk claim. Under these circumstances, the value of the 
two claims could exceed that of a single claim issued on the 
combined cash flow stream. This same explanation may 
contribute to explaining the observed capital structure of 
most corporate entities (i.e., debt and equity).
This hypothesis posits that value added (the premium) is 
the result of separating high-risk (SCORE) and low-risk 
(PRIME) equity claims. This implies that the more 
successfully one can separate the two securities into 
distinct risk classes, the greater the potential value added. 
If a single cash flow is split up into two identical cash 
flows each with the same risk and return properties, no value 
is added according to this hypothesis. However, if the risk 
of one cash flow is significantly different from that of the 
other (from the subjective viewpoint of investors), then a 
risk-clientele effect is possible.
The testable implications of this hypothesis are as 
follows. Risk can be divided into systematic and
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unsystematic risk. Since unsystematic risk can be 
diversified away, financial theory maintains that investors 
are compensated only for holding systematic, or 
undiversifiable, risk. Although the validity of beta as a 
measure of systematic risk can be questioned, it is utilized 
here to distinguish distinct levels of risk. Hypothesis two 
maintains that the greater the difference in risk (as 
measured by beta) between the PRIME and the SCORE, the 
greater the potential value created by the derivative 
securities.
Therefore, the behavior of premiums, both cross- 
sectionally and through time, should be a function of the 
difference between PRIME and SCORE betas. This is tested by 
calculating quarterly betas for each firm (SCORE and PRIME) 
using the market model, and then taking the difference 
between the SCORE beta and PRIME beta. The difference 
between the two betas is ranked into percentiles (from 
smallest to largest). If the average quarterly premiums are 
significantly higher for the 75th percentile than for the 
25th percentile, then this is taken as evidence in support of 
the risk-clientele hypothesis. Both the difference in means 
t-test and the Wilcoxon rank sums test are used in this 
formulation.
3.3.3.3. Hypothesis Three
The third hypothesis, while closely related to the 
second, tests whether heterogeneous beliefs (i.e., subjective
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probability functions) can account for observed premiums. 
This hypothesis posits that investors value the introduction 
of a new investment vehicle which permits them to express 
their opposing views related to price in a cost-efficient 
manner (i.e., a leverage effect). However, since
heterogeneous beliefs are very difficult (impossible) to 
measure empirically, one must settle for the use of proxies.
The empirical test for hypothesis number three is 
related to the SCORE'S in-the-moneyness. If the stock price 
divided by the striking price (in-the-moneyness) is unity or 
greater, then the behavior of the SCORE is similar to that of 
the underlying stock. As a call option becomes more in-the- 
money, its value becomes more of a linear function of the 
value of the stock. Small differences in beliefs will have 
less of an impact on price than when the option is far out- 
of-the-money. If divergent opinions account for the premiums 
as claimed in this hypothesis, then these premiums should be 
more pronounced for far out-of-the-money SCORES than for far 
in-the-money SCORES.
The empirical implication of this argument is that 
premiums and the level of at-the-moneyness should be 
inversely related. More specifically, premiums are regressed 
on stock price divided by striking price. A statistically 
significant and negative coefficient is taken as evidence in 
support of the heterogeneous expectations hypothesis. In 
addition to this test, premiums associated with the top 5,
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10, and 20 percentile in-the-money SCORES are compared to 
those of the bottom 5, 10, and 20 percentile in-the-money 
SCORES (top out-of-the-money SCORES). The t-test and 




The fourth hypothesis to be tested relates to the 
possible reduction in transaction costs due to the traded 
SCORE. Without such a derivative security, dynamic hedging 
could produce a synthetic long-term option only after 
incurring prohibitively large transaction costs. Leland 
(1985) and Jarrow & Wiggins (1988) argue that these hedging 
costs are at least partially captured in implied volatility 
estimates. Historical volatility measures, on the other 
hand, will not reflect these hedging costs.
If the observed premium of PRIMES plus SCORES over the 
stock price is due to a reduction in transaction costs 
associated with hedging, then one would expect implied 
volatilities to exceed volatilities based on historical 
returns. Unfortunately, implied volatilities are very 
difficult to estimate accurately for long-term options (i.e., 
high standard errors). Therefore, a much simpler and 
straight forward test is used to test this hypothesis.
Since dynamic hedging costs are a direct function of the 
time to maturity, the level of premiums should be positively
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related to time (to maturity). This is tested by regressing 
premiums on a time variable representing the number of days 
to maturity. A statistically significant and positive 
coefficient on the time variable is taken as support of the 
transaction cost hypothesis. As done in the previous
sections, parametric and nonparametric percentile tests are 
also performed.
While the arguments above are built on the notion that 
the SCORE is the transaction costs saving instrument, there 
is also reason to believe that the PRIME reduces transaction 
costs. Shefrin and Statman (1993) site two separate surveys, 
one by the Philadelphia Stock Exchange (1992) and the other 
by Louis Harris (1976), showing that covered call writing is 
the most important objective of individual options investors. 
In addition, on July 17, 1992, the AMEX filed a request with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to begin trading 
BOUNDS. These derivative securities are very closely related 
to PRIMES in that they give their holder the right to the 
cash flows of a covered call option. It is quite possible 
that the AMEX requested the right to trade this derivative 
only after observing the demand for PRIMES.
If one combines these results with Barber's (1993) claim 
that individual investors dominate the PRIME and SCORE 
market, then it follows that PRIMES may be used primarily as 
a vehicle to write long-term covered calls. The question 
then arises whether it is less expensive to write a covered
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call, or to transform a stock into a PRIME and SCORE. In 
this scenario, the SCORE is equivalent to the option premium 
the call writer would have received if he had sold the call 
to the market. In other words, by transforming the stock 
into a PRIME and a SCORE, the original owner has written a 
covered call and holds the call premium in the form of the 
SCORE. The SCORE can then be held or sold back to the 
market.
The costs involved in transforming stock into PRIMES and 
SCORES have been described above. The costs involved with 
writing a covered call option include commissions and the 
bid-ask spread. Although it is quite difficult to compare 
these costs across individual investors, it is probably safe 
to say that an investor wishing to write a long-term (five 
year) covered call could do so at lower cost by obtaining a 
PRIME. Without this vehicle, an ordinary covered call would 
have to be "turned over" several times in order to mimic the 
long-term maturity. Each turn means additional exposure to 
commissions and bid-ask spreads. Therefore, the transaction 
cost reduction hypothesis may apply to the PRIME, and well as 
to the SCORE.
3.3.4.2. Hypothesis Five
The fifth hypothesis posits that tax clientele effects 
may explain the premiums. Corporations, and other tax exempt 
institutions, value PRIMES more highly than individuals 
because of the I.R.S. dividend exclusion rule. The PRIME
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represents a cheaper way of obtaining rights to the dividend 
stream than does purchasing the underlying stock. The tax 
hypothesis also asserts that the SCORE is valued because of 
the additional tax timing option it represents. An 
individual holding stock with unrealized capital gains, for 
example, does not have the opportunity of selling the 
dividend stream asset while holding the capital appreciation 
asset. Premiums observed in the market could be due to 
either one, or both, of these tax effects.
If PRIMES trade above market values because of dividend 
capture advantages, then the volume of PRIME trading around 
ex-dates should reflect this pattern. Specifically, PRIME 
trading volumes are split into two groups; one group
encompassing five days before ex-date, ex-date, and five days 
after ex-date, and the other group encompassing all other 
trading days. Using dummy variables equalling one if the 
trade occurred on days described above and zero otherwise, 
differences between the means of each group are compared. 
This same technique is also applied to additional day
intervals (i.e., at plus and minus two days). According to 
the dividend capture hypothesis, group one's mean volume 
should exceed that of group two. Venkatesh (1991) has 
provided some preliminary evidence against this hypothesis 
although his data set spans only 1988.
Since PRIMES and underlying stocks can both be used to
capture dividends, it is also important to test the
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relationship between PRIME and stock volumes at and around 
ex-dividend dates. In other words, if premiums are due to 
the additional advantage of PRIMES to capture dividends, then 
one would expect the usual difference in volumes to be 
reduced around ex-dividend dates. Although volumes may 
increase for both PRIMES and stocks, this test is designed to 
determine whether the difference between stock volume and 
PRIME volume increases or decreases. If this difference 
significantly decreases around ex-dividend dates, then this 
is taken as evidence in support of the dividend capture 
hypothesis. As previously discussed, percentile t-tests and 
Wilcoxon rank sums tests are performed to contribute 
additional evidence.
The tax-timing hypothesis is tested simultaneously with 
the dividend exclusion hypothesis in Jarrow & O'Hara (1989) 
by comparing pre and post January 1, 1987 returns. This date 
of demarcation corresponds to the change in tax law which 
lowered the amount of dividends qualifying for exclusion 
(from 85% to 80%) and increased the tax rate on capital 
gains. To test this hypothesis, premiums are regressed 
against a constant and dummy term. The dummy term is one if 
the premium was observed before the tax change, and zero 
otherwise. Since Jarrow and O'Hara found no evidence of a 
premium due to tax-timing, this test is not repeated herein. 
It should be noted, however, that this is a weak test at best
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because the researcher has no way of identifying when, if at 
all, the effect of the tax change was reflected in price.
3.4. Data and Method of Analysis
Daily closing price, return, volume, and dividend data 
is collected from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) for all PRIMES, SCORES, and underlying stocks. A 
daily premium, defined as PRIME price plus SCORE price minus 
stock price, is calculated for each of the 27 trusts. This 
data is summarized in table 3.1. Monthly T-Bill rates are 
collected from the CRSP government bond files (Fama files). 
These interest rates are used to estimate the costs 
associated with short selling needed to construct arbitrage 
bounds.
Since the PRIMES and SCORES have identical cash flows 
(combined) as that of the underlying stock, there are 
boundary conditions on the extent of divergence in a market 
which permits no free lunches (see the subsection on no­
arbitrage conditions). When combined PRIME and SCORE prices 
differ from stock prices, arbitrageurs earn risk-free profits 
by buying the less expensive security(ies) and selling the 
more expensive security(ies) . The presence of transaction 
costs and other market imperfections, however, means that 
there will be a range of prices which permit no arbitrage 
opportunities. The methodology described below is designed 
to take into account all potential market imperfections while
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testing for the presence of arbitrage (i.e., a market 
efficiency test).
The nonparametric statistical method used in this paper 
follows that developed by Jarrow & O'Hara (1989). The 
underlying purpose of this methodology is to separate "true” 
pricing discrepancies (violations of the no-arbitrage 
condition) from noise. The test statistic is based on the 
assumption that price deviations can be described by a 
composite of two distributions; one symmetric with respect to 
zero and the other asymmetric. Because of the manner in 
which the trusts are constructed (i.e., investors can 
exchange PRIMES and SCORES for the stock at no cost), pricing 
deviations to the left of zero (PRIMEs+SCOREs-stock < 0) are 
likely to be the result of market imperfections as opposed to 
arbitrage opportunities. These same market imperfection and 
noise discrepancies will be found with equal likelihood on 
the right-hand side of the distribution (PRIMEs+SCOREs-stock 
> 0). The asymmetric part of the distribution is due to the 
additional costs associated with arbitraging PRIME and SCORE 
premiums (as discussed above).
Therefore, the left-hand side of the distribution can be 
used to estimate the level of bid-ask spreads, commissions, 
measurement error, and other imperfections in the right-hand 
side distribution. Assuming price premiums (PRIMEs+SCOREs- 
stock) , represented by 8, are drawn from a random sample of
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n independent, identically distributed observations, then the 
null and alternative hypotheses can be stated as
(3.5) H0: 1 - F(6 + M) < F(-6)
Hj: 1 - F(6 + M) > F(-6)
where:
F (.) = cumulative probability distribution
6 = observed pricing premium
M = additional costs associated with arbitraging
positive pricing premiums (described above in no­
arbitrage section)
Since the sample cumulative distribution, Fn(a), is a 
consistent estimator for the true, underlying distribution, 
F(a), 6 is located such that Fn(-6) = 0.05. If the
distribution of J's were symmetric with respect to zero, then 
1 - Fn(6) should also equal approximately 0.05.
Incorporating the asymmetric part of the S ' s into this 
formulation means that the mass in the right-hand tail of the 
distribution (1 - Fn(6 + M)) should be approximately 0.05 
under the null. The null hypothesis is rejected if 1 - Fn(6 
+ M) is significantly larger than 0.05. The following test 
statistic, described in detail in the appendix of Jarrow & 
O'Hara (1989) , is used to test the null and alternative 
hypotheses. Under the null hypothesis of no arbitrage 
opportunities, equation 3.6 holds.
(3.6) 1 - Fa(6 + M)




L = -Ztt/2[n(l-q)q]1/2 + (l-q)n
q = ([zan +0. In] + Z^tZ^ +0.19n]1/2) / 2[n + Z^] 
n = no. of observations
Z^ is defined by N(Z,^) = l-a/2 for cumulative normal 
distr.
The null hypothesis is rejected with a (1-a) percent 
confidence level if more than (1-L/n) percent of the sample 
distribution is found to lie to the right of (0+M) . This 
follows from the fact that, under the null, (1-L/n) percent 
of the distribution will lie to right of (6+M) with 
probability less than a. If more than (1-L/n) percent of the 
distribution lies to right of (6+M), therefore, the null 
cannot maintained.
One advantage of this testing procedure is that one does 
not have to make the assumption of normally distributed 
premiums. In fact, the Wilkes-Shapiro test for normality is 
rejected in 26 of the 27 trusts. An additional advantage of 
this method is that it accounts for the presence of market 
imperfections (i.e., bid-ask spreads, commissions, 
nonsimultaneity of prices, measurement errors, etc.) and uses 
the empirical distribution of the premiums to explicitly 
estimate the effects of this noise. This allows the 
incorporation of market imperfections into the testing method 
without requiring the direct estimation of their magnitudes.
Other techniques used in this study, such as regression 
with dummy variables, difference-in-means t-tests, and the
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Wilcoxon sign rank and rank sums tests are not discussed 
herein. Since these standard procedures are explained in 
basic statistics and econometrics textbooks, they will not be 
discussed herin.
3.5. Emperical Results
General statistics are presented in table 3.1. Average 
prices for the stock, PRIME, and SCORE are listed, as well as 
the average premium in dollar and percent of stock price 
terms. The Wilcoxon sign rank and t-test results are based 
on the null hypothesis of the premium equalling zero. All of 
the firms, with the exceptions of Arco and Exxon, experienced 
a positive and statistically significant premium during the 
life of the derivative contracts. Arco's premium was
positive but not significant, while Exxon shows a 
significantly negative premium (at least based on the 
Wilcoxon test). Merck and Hewlett Packard have conflicting 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































H„: PREMIUM=0 FOR T-TEST AND WILCOXON SION RANK
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Average daily trading volumes of SCORES are 
significantly larger than those of PRIMES. SCORE volumes 
range from a low of 60,000 for AT&T (1) to a high of 900,000 
for AT&T (2). PRIME volumes range from a low of 24,000 for 
Arco and Union Pacific to a high of 237,000 for AT&T (2). 
For each individual stock, however, SCORE volume is 
considerably higher than PRIME volume. Since the number of 
shares outstanding for each derivative is the same (by 
construction), it is evident that investors prefer to trade 
the SCORE and hold the PRIME. This is consistent with the 
argument that investors value these derivatives based on 
their separable characteristics. For example, if investors 
want to obtain the cash flows associated with a covered call 
option, they need only purchase and hold a PRIME.
Based on the summary statistics in table 3.1, it is 
clear that investors value PRIMES and SCORES more highly than 
the underlying stock. The percentage premiums show that the 
derivative prices exceed stock prices by approximately one 
percent of the stock price. Although this creates the 
potential for arbitrage, additional costs must be considered 
before coming to such a strong conclusion. The statistics in 
table 3.1, for example, do not account for nonsynchronous 
data, bid-ask spreads, differential commission structures, 
etc., or for the costs associated with arbitrage.
Table 3.2 reports the results of applying the Jarrow and 









RESULT OF NULL 
HYPOTHESIS
AMERICAN EXPRESS 0.0790 0.3406 REJECT NULL
AMERICAN HOME PR 0.0824 0.1415 REJECT NULL
AT&T (1) 0.0861 0.4563 REJECT NULL
AT&T (2) 0.0737 0.6619 REJECT NULL
AMOCO 0.0829 0.0774 FAIL TO REJECT
ARCO 0.0892 0.0526 FAIL TO REJECT
BRISTOL MEYERS 0.0775 0.3087 REJECT NULL
CHEVRON 0.0781 0.3350 REJECT NULL
COCA COLA 0.0847 0.2915 REJECT NULL
DOW CHEMICAL 0.0781 0.4348 REJECT NULL
DU PONT 0.0808 0.0458 FAIL TO REJECT
E. KODAK 0.0795 0.5769 REJECT NULL
EXXON 0.0958 0.2521 REJECT NULL
FORD 0.0805 0.4477 REJECT NULL
GTE 0.0766 0.4033 REJECT NULL
G.E. 0.0771 0.2950 REJECT NULL
G.M. 0.0795 0.2993 REJECT NULL
HEWLETT PACKARD 0.0871 0.1972 REJECT NULL
IBM 0.0785 0.5193 REJECT NULL
J&J 0.0794 0.2978 REJECT NULL
MERCK 0.0864 0.2370 REJECT NULL
MOBIL 0.0779 0.3102 REJECT NULL
PHILLIP MORRIS 0.0768 0.5786 REJECT NULL
P&G 0.0863 0.0881 REJECT NULL
SEARS 0.0823 0.2508 REJECT NULL
UNION PACIFIC 0.0841 0.1561 REJECT NULL
XEROX 0.0875 0.2414 REJECT NULL









RESULT OF NULL 
HYPOTHESIS
AMERICAN EXPRESS 0.0790 0 . 0 0 0 0 FAIL TO REJECT
AMERICAN HOME PR 0.0824 0 . 0 0 0 0 FAIL TO REJECT
AT&T (1) 0.0861 0 . 0 0 0 0 FAIL TO REJECT
AT&T (2) 0.0737 0.3783 REJECT NULL
AMOCO 0.0829 0 . 0 0 0 0 FAIL TO REJECT
ARCO 0.0892 0 . 0 0 0 0 FAIL TO REJECT
BRISTOL MEYERS 0.0775 0 . 0 0 0 0 FAIL TO REJECT
CHEVRON 0.0781 0 . 0 0 0 0 FAIL TO REJECT
COCA COLA 0.0847 0.1590 REJECT NULL
DOW CHEMICAL 0.0781 0 . 0 0 0 0 FAIL TO REJECT
DU PONT 0.0808 0 . 0 0 0 0 FAIL TO REJECT
E. KODAK 0.0795 0.1830 REJECT NULL
EXXON 0.0958 0 . 0 0 0 0 FAIL TO REJECT
FORD 0.0805 0 . 0 0 0 0 FAIL TO REJECT
GTE 0.0766 0.1746 REJECT NULL
G.E. 0.0771 0 . 0 0 0 0 FAIL TO REJECT
G.M. 0.0795 0 . 0 0 0 0 FAIL TO REJECT
HEWLETT PACKARD 0.0871 0 . 0 0 0 0 FAIL TO REJECT
IBM 0.0785 0 . 0 0 0 0 FAIL TO REJECT
J&J 0.0794 0 . 0 0 0 0 FAIL TO REJECT
MERCK 0.0864 0 . 0 0 0 0 FAIL TO REJECT
MOBIL 0.0779 0 . 0 0 0 0 FAIL TO REJECT
PHILLIP MORRIS 0.0768 0 . 0 0 0 0 FAIL TO REJECT
P&G 0.0863 0 . 0 0 0 0 FAIL TO REJECT
SEARS 0.0823 0 . 0 0 0 0 FAIL TO REJECT
UNION PACIFIC 0.0841 0 . 0 0 0 0 FAIL TO REJECT
XEROX 0.0875 0 . 0 0 0 0 FAIL TO REJECT
H,S PRIME+SCORE PRICES = STOCK PRICE
1 1 2
this nonparametric test is described in the methodology 
section of this paper, and in the appendix of the study 
mentioned above. Table 3.2 reports only the case where M=0 
(i.e., arbitrage costs pertaining to PRIME plus SCORE 
premiums have not been included). Without considering the 
additional costs of short selling, the null hypothesis of no 
arbitrage profits is rejected for 24 out of the 27 firms. 
This is not all that surprising, however, since short selling 
costs are a substantial component of the effectivearbitrage 
boundary. These costs represent the present value of 
interest lost while proceeds are escrowed in a non-interest 
bearing account. With an initial maturity of 5 years, short 
selling restrictions on PRIMES and SCOREs allow premiums to 
deviate considerably from zero.
Table 3.3 reports the results of the arbitrage-bounds 
test when all relevant costs are included in the formulation 
(i.e., the costs of short selling). In this case, the null 
hypothesis is maintained for all but 4 firms; AT&T (2), Coca 
Cola, G.T.E., and Eastman Kodak. The general conclusion of 
these arbitrage-bounds tests, therefore, is that the market 
values PRIMES and SCOREs above their underlying stock, but 
not enough so as to earn arbitrage profits in excess of 
transactions costs.
Table 3.4 gives the results of testing the market 
completeness hypothesis. Premiums are regressed against a 
dummy variable equalling one if the observation occurred
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during the first 51 months of the life of the derivative, and 
zero otherwise. In effect, this is a difference-in-means 
test between two time periods; one period when no option 
with an equivalent maturity was trading, and another period 
when such an option existed. The results are supportive of 
the completeness hypothesis since all but one firm, AT&T (1) , 
show a statistically significant and positive dummy 
coefficient. Therefore, premiums are significantly larger 
when no close substitute is available.
The results of a related test are reported in table 3.5. 
Since long-term (2-year) equity options began trading on the 
CBOE and AMEX on October 5, 1990, SCOREs with less than two 
years to expiration lost their uniqueness after this date. 
If the market completeness hypothesis is valid, then one 
would expect premiums to be higher in the pre-LEAPS period 
than in the post-LEAPS period. Table 3.5 shows that for all 
firms with associated LEAPS (on October 5), premiums were 
significantly higher in the pre-LEAPS period, at the one 
percent level, using both parametric and nonparametric 
methods.
If wealth is increased due to improved completeness, 
then the PRIME and SCORE must offer something unique and 
valued. One possibility is that they offer investors with 
heterogeneous risk preferences the opportunity to purchase 













AMERICAN EXPR 22400.5 15.2294** 0.8190 15.043**
AMERICAN HOME 78470.0 4.5160** 0.2395 3.595**
AT&T (1) 114013.0 -9.7428** -1.9018 -9.313**
AT&T (2) 58071.0 13.4516** 0.5834 13.141**
AMOCO 63336.0 7.0616** 0.3959 5.90**
ARCO 54079.5 6.1994** 0.4063 6.369**
BRISTOL MYERS 104917 1.7225 0.4167 4.082**
CHEVRON 58772.5 11.5582** 0.6404 10.031**
COCA COLA 33554.5 9.3381** 0.6951 6.574**
DOW 35162.0 16.7203** 2.1735 11.779**
DU PONT 68888.5 9.35108** 0.3738 6.483**
E. KODAK 40503.0 15.3391** 1.3822 12.115**
EXXON 34119.5 5.02380** 0.2461 4.644**
FORD 45996.5 14.6916** 0.9055 13.462**
GTE 60294.0 12.2917** 0.4833 11.097**
G.E. 86000.5 6.4810** 0.3283 6.337**
G.M. 48097.5 14.6212** 0.6161 13.482**
HEWLETT PACK 28910.0 11.1651** 0.9104 12.062**
IBM 36320.5 15.7892** 1.5781 11.642**
J & JOHNSON 54222.0 11.4041** 0.6998 10.594**
MERCK 65648.0 7.8700** 0.6784 5.653**
MOBIL 68698.5 10.5854** 0.4951 9.964**
PHIL MORR 31074.5 16.7977** 2.2316 8.529**
P & G 18857.5 8.6624** 0.6079 7.695**
SEARS 36750.5 11.1888** 0.5221 10.696**
UNION PAC 50202.0 8.5750** 0.4621 7.749**
XEROX 37637.5 10.0336** 0.6466 9.823**













AMERICAN EXPR 110772.0 22.109** 0.8167 25.410**
AMERICAN HOME 118308.0 7.255** 0.3314 5.899**
AT&T (2) 140766.0 12.875** 0.4537 12.576**
BRISTOL MYERS 173347.0 5.390** 0.6078 7.477**
COCA COLA 113701.0 13.324** 0.7413 10.642**
DOW 126016.0 18.966** 2.2873 17.046**
DU PONT 178327.0 6.0538** 0.1911 4.110**
E. KODAK 131044.0 15.562** 1.3615 15.977**
GTE 239994.0 5.259** 0.1870 5.563**
G.E. 219784.0 4.152** 0.2152 5.356**
G.M. 178656.0 14.423** 0.51667 15.400**
J & JOHNSON 180674.0 10.117** 0.5284 10.463**
MERCK 153077.0 9.947** 0.7521 8.314**
PHIL MORR 115215.0 24.202** 2.8131 15.524**
P & G 88336.5 4.949** 0.2671 4.907**
SEARS 116294.0 17.718** 0.5908 19.224**
* SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEVEL; ** SIGNIFICANT AT 1% LEVEL
the difference in risk classes created by the derivatives, 
the greater the potential value added. This intuition is 
tested by comparing average quarterly premiums with the 
difference in quarterly SCORE and PRIME betas. The results 
of this test are reported in table 3.6. In general, very
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little significance is found and for the few statistically 
significant examples that do show up, the sign is in the 
opposite direction of that hypothesized.
One of the shortcomings of the previous test is that the 
top and bottom 25th percentiles contain only 5 observations 
each. With such a small sample, it is rather difficult to 
obtain significant results. On the other hand, the only way 
to increase the sample size would be to calculate SCORE and 
PRIME betas over smaller and smaller intervals. These small- 
interval beta estimates then contain large standard errors, 
thus reducing their reliability.
A second way that PRIMES and SCOREs could add value is 
by offering investors with heterogeneous beliefs the 
opportunity to trade on two different segments of the firm's 
cash flows. In other words, if investors disagree about the 
far right-hand side of the distribution of returns, for 
example, buying and selling SCOREs would be more cost 
effective than trading in the stock. Using this vehicle, the 
investor buys or sells only the part of the distribution in 
guestion (a leverage effect). The more an option is out-of- 
the money, the greater the potential impact of heterogeneous 
beliefs on prices.
The results of regressing premiums against the SCORE'S 
in-the-moneyness are shown in table 3.7. Statistically 
significant and negative coefficients are evidence in support 
of the aforementioned hypothesis. Out of 27 firms, 14 have
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Zable 3.6
Heterogeneous Risk Preference Hypothesis
Variable Is Difference Between SCORE and PRIME Betas 
(Values Represent Smallest Minus Largest Percentiles)




AMER EXPRESS 1.2040 1.0408
AMER HOME PR -0.1356 -0.0000
AT&T (1) 0.4831 0.4003
AT&T (2) 0.1645 0.2402
AMOCO -0.2482 -0.8356
ARCO 0.9696 0.4178











HEW PACKARD 0.7245 0.6267
IBM 0.5841 -0.6267
J & J 1.1654 0.8356
MERCK -2.3093 -1.8415
MOBIL 1.3348 0.4178
PHIL MORRIS 0.4753 0.6267
P & G -1.9449 -1.2533
SEARS -0.3246 -0.5605
UN PACIFIC -2.6515* -2.1617*
XEROX -1.5528 0.8356













AMER EXP -1.8391 -22.971** 3.8807 27.462**
AMER HOME 0.5334 3.831** -0.2782 -2.241*
AT&T (1) -2.4792 -6.491** 2.5386 7.928**
AT&T (2) 1.4280 14.295** -0.6862 -7.910**
AMOCO -1.0515 -5.783** 1.4838 7.435**
ARCO 0.1430 0.856 -0.1362 -0.773
BR MYRS 0.9114 5.869** -0.2120 -1.476
CHEVRON 0.9750 7.082** -0.6624 -4.077**
COKE 1.1142 15.095** -0.5935 -12.413**
DOW -9.0805 -18.384** 13.3960 21.445**
DU PNT 0.1235 0.906 0.0543 0.411
KODAK 0.6494 1.889 0.2992 0.647
EXXON 1.5582 18.478** -1.1553 -19.111**
FORD -1.0904 -9.035** 1.8297 12.617**
GTE 0.8157 9.934** -0.3867 -5.879**
G.E. 0.0137 0.138 0.4559 3.966**
G.M. -1.7539 -13.490** 2.6357 15.299**
HEW PAC 0.5382 4.235** -0.8260 -3.831**
IBM -0.9353 -2.672** 3.4793 5.384**
J & J 0.9451 11.725** -0.4043 -5.916**
MERCK 1.20778 9.804** -0.7606 -8.168**
MOBIL 0.1926 1.647 0.1369 1.114
PH MOR 4.0659 16.905** -1.3787 -10.515**
P & G 0.5901 6.656** -0.3338 -4.895**
SEARS -0.7987 -8.105** 1.5407 9.703**
UN PAC 0.9120 6.137** -0.7607 -4.491**
XEROX -0.4594 -3.278** 0.9944 4.263**
* SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEVEL; ** SIGNIFICANT AT 1% LEVEL
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the hypothesized sign and 12 of them are statistically 
significant. Since the (significant) coefficients are split 
roughly 50% positive and 50% negative, no support for the 
heterogeneous beliefs hypothesis is obtained from this test. 
However, if one looks only at the extreme in and out-of-the- 
money cases (i.e., the top and bottom 5th percentiles) , some, 
albeit weak, support is found. In tables 2.8 and 2.9, 
statistically significant and positive test values are 
consistent with the heterogeneous beliefs hypothesis. 
Looking at the 5th percentile t-test in table 3.8, for 
example, one finds 15 firms with statistically significant 
positive values, 6 with statistically significant negative 
values, and 6 with insignificant values. Results are similar 
using the Wilcoxon rank sums test as reported in table 3.9. 
As one moves from the 5th percentile to the 25th percentile, 
the results converge to those obtained from the regression 
methodology shown in table 3.7.
Table 3.10 gives the results of testing the transaction 
cost hypothesis. Transaction costs associated with dynamic 
hedging are a direct function of time to maturity. If the 
creation of the SCORE is responsible for value added because 
of transaction cost savings, then the estimated time 
coefficient (in days) should be positive and statistically 
significant. This predicted result is true for 20 of the 27 
firms (5 are significantly negative).
1 2 0
Tables 2.11 and 2.12 analyze the results in table 3.10 
more closely. The test results for the nonparametric 
Wilcoxon rank sums test and the parametric t-test are very 
similar. Out of 27, no less than 20 (depending on the 
specific percentile) display the hypothesized sign at an 
appropriate level of confidence. It is really only AT&T (1) 
which is consistently and significantly negative in sign. 
The PRIMES and SCOREs of this firm, however, were the first 
introduced into the market almost 2 years before the next 
firm's (Exxon) derivatives began trading. In addition to 
this potential learning curve, AT&T was experiencing a great 
deal of uncertainty related to its government mandated 
breakup.
Results from testing the tax advantage hypothesis are 
presented in table 3.13. In this test, PRIME volumes are 
regressed against a dummy variable equalling one if the 
observation occurred between -5 and +5 days of an ex-dividend 
date. If PRIMES offer advantages to corporations (and other 
exempt institutions) due to the dividend-exclusion provision 
of the tax code, then these entities will trade the security 
with the intent of dividend capture. This should be evident 
by increased trading at and around ex-dividend dates.
According to the results given in table 3.13, the 
dividend capture hypothesis is not strongly supported. Only 
4 of the 27 firms have positive and statistically significant 




Variable Is Option In-The-Moneyness 
(Values Represent Smallest Minus Largest Percentiles)






AMER EXPR -14.2686** -20.4948** -30.5907**
AMER HOME -0.4439 3.2428** 1.4377
AT&T (1) 12.3492** 4.6002** -9.4720**
AT&T (2) 3.7900** 4.7255** 6.8140**
AMOCO -1.8698 -3.0980** -3.6650**
ARCO -0.0307 0.9779 1.7563
BRS MEYERS 2.3270* -2.6831** -7.3556**
CHEVRON 6.2622** 7.5301** 5.8838**
COKE 6.7495** 8.2690** 10.5800**
DOW -14.1200** -17.6649** -19.5656**
DU PONT 3.5588** 2.4493* -1.7712
KODAK 1.2940 2.2539* 0.9284
EXXON 9.8929** 11.3651** 17.6074**
FORD -4.3075** -7.1015** -10.7428**
GTE 9.8730** 9.5384** 8.0904**
G.E. 3.3483** 2.6521** -1.2011
G.M. -4.2276** -8.4308** -15.6669**
HEW PACK 3.2256** -1.0758 4.7005**
IBM -18.1322** -8.4024** -1.3484
J & J 0.2065 -2.2101* -2.6773**
MERCK 5.3885** 7.6382** 7.7640**
MOBIL 3.1129** 2.4168* -3.0054**
PHIL MOR 9.9478** 13.7024** 15.6096**
P & G 6.1723** 4.1681** 0.8427
SEARS -18.9109** -15.3664** -6.6204**
UN PAC 5.6992** 7.3802** 5.1234**
XEROX -0.657 -0.5974 -4.1587**




Variable Xs Option In-The-Moneyness 
(Values Represent Smallest Minus Largest Percentiles)






AMER EXPR -9.4748** -12.8590** -18.0696**
AMER HOME -.9954 2.9090** 1.7046
AT&T (1) 8.5873** 3.6627** -8.3061**
AT&T (2) 3.45348** 4.8952** 7.4889**
AMOCO -2.4045* -2.7484** -4.9624**
ARCO 0.1817 1.4279 2.0455*
BRS MEYERS 2.3769* -2.4653* -6.7607**
CHEVRON 6.2933** 7.4913** 5.4852**
COKE 6.3946** 8.4661** 10.4055**
DOW -8.5371** -11.8303** -15.7315**
DU PONT 3.4871** 2.4206* -1.9630*
KODAK 1.4633 2.5767** 2.0579*
EXXON 7.0315** 8.9071** 13.4329**
FORD -3.7248** -6.0907** -9.0509**
GTE 8.1959** 9.5900** 9.1406**
G.E. 2.7800** 2.4055* -1.9747*
G.M. -4.8486** -8.5568** -13.8433**
HEW PACK 3.1448** -0.9272 4.6368**
IBM -9.6371** -9.1232** -5.7088**
J & J 0.8479 -2.4237* -2.6831**
MERCK 5.4386** 6.8827** 6.8860**
MOBIL 3.1269** 2.6236** -2.8772**
PHIL MOR 7.7881** 10.3117** 13.4133**
P £ G 5.1929** 3.7799** 0.7456
SEARS -9.2231** -10.9342** -6.3997**
UN PAC 6.4031** 8.2060** 5.4337**
XEROX -0.7335 0.1232 -3.0046**











AMER EXPR -0.2418 -6.890** 0.000586 18.265**
AMER HOME 0.2980 6.161** -0.000085 -1.741
AT&T (1) 2.8653 22.308** -0.002580 -21.013**
AT&T (2) 0.2468 7.825** 0.000447 14.726**
AMOCO 0.4097 8.392** -0.000150 -2.996**
ARCO -0.1383 -2.959** 0.000201 3.936**
BR MYRS 1.0696 14.703** -0.000430 -6.078**
CHEVRON 0.0824 1.796* 0.000389 8.651**
COKE -0.8297 -13.445** 0.001175 20.430**
DOW 0.8574 6.183** 0.000675 4.831**
DU PNT 0.3401 8.177** -0.000188 -4.539**
KODAK 0.5752 6.582** 0.000343 3.905**
EXXON -0.5081 -15.547** 0.000501 16.412**
FORD 0.0641 1.285 0.000372 7.834**
GTE 0.1510 4.726** 0.000208 6.903**
G.E. 0.5260 14.119** -0.000414 -3.953**
G.M. -0.285 -0.834 0.000276 8.407**
HEW PAC -0.4573 -8.827** 0.000560 11.510**
IBM -0.3604 -3.936** 0.001405 16.163**
J & J 0.4385 8.635** 0.000066 1.243
MERCK -0.5902 -7.316** 0.000947 12.218**
MOBIL 0.2319 6.298** 0.000099 2.812**
PH MORR 0.0304 0.163 0.001988 10.497**
P & G -0.0439 -0.831 0.000237 4.649**
SEARS -0.4481 -15.789** 0.000621 23.737**
UN PAC 0.0025 0.056 0.000303 6.724**
XEROX -0.3898 -8.332** 0.000587 12.635**




Variable Is Days to Maturity 
(Values Represent Largest Minus Smallest Percentiles)






AMER EXPR 23.4998** 28.4022** 26.1789**
AMER HOME 5.6543** 5.6260** -4.9201**
AT&T (1) -24.3989** -26.2550** -25.9330**
AT&T (2) 15.1095** 22.9111** 12.6578**
AMOCO 6.2926** 7.4023** -0.4819
ARCO 5.7512** 4.8106** 2.3126*
BRS MEYERS 1.4369 -3.3423** -9.0576**
CHEVRON 14.9413** 10.9357** 6.9091**
COKE 17.6867** 17.4784** 14.7195**
DOW 7.7279** 9.4598** 7.4887**
DU PONT 1.8252 -0.4846 -2.0953**
KODAK 7.5895** 5.2974** 6.3016**
EXXON 9.1001** 10.8238** 16.9015**
FORD 13.5727** 14.7815** 10.6111**
GTE 15.6479** 22.8164** 14.2660**
G.E. 2.7617** 3.2802** -1.3274
G.M. 20.1051** 16.6774** 9.8718**
HEW PACK 9.6362** 9.4613** 9.1067**
IBM 18.7166** 17.7642** 20.2231**
J & J -1.8160 -3.8486** -1.4285
MERCK 0.1908 5.3984** 10.5697**
MOBIL 11.4396** 10.8184** 6.4521**
PHIL MOR 6.8289** 8.2007** 16.1263**
P & G 10.5149** 7.3978** 2.2044*
SEARS 21.9188** 25.1266** 26.8028**
UN PAC 3.6222** 4.8734** 5.4454**
XEROX 5.3588** 6.9758** 10.5044**




Variable Xs Days to Maturity 
(Values Represent Largest Minus Smallest Percentiles)






AMER EXPR 9.2093** 13.0248** 17.0085**
AMER HOME 5.6577** 6.0311** -4.1505**
AT&T (1) -8.9611** -12.5761** -12.4839**
AT&T (2) 9.2600** 13.0709** 11.1831**
AMOCO 5.2378** 7.2988** -0.08161
ARCO 5.4773** 4.9557** 2.4806*
BRS MEYERS 1.5055 -3.5735** -8.5245**
CHEVRON 8.9464** 11.0588** 7.6903**
COKE 8.8143** 12.1263** 14.9261**
DOW 7.1584** 9.2421** 7.6276**
DU PONT 1.7039 -1.6777 -3.1708**
KODAK 6.9893** 6.9952** 8.2199**
EXXON 6.7379** 8.5837** 13.2268**
FORD 8.6578** 10.8578** 8.4304**
GTE 8.8648** 12.9652** 12.5729**
G.E. 1.9178 2.3599* -2.0089*
G.M. 9.3105** 11.7257** 8.0580**
HEW PACK 7.9775** 8.6447** 8.6128**
IBM 9.6008** 13.4629** 18.0883**
J & J -2.3378* -4.1278** -1.6211
MERCK -0.1300 2.8069** 9.0452**
MOBIL 8.4441** 8.8124** 5.7778**
PHIL MOR 6.0707** 7.8981** 13.5714**
P & G 7.1345** 7.3332** 2.8314**
SEARS 9.2348** 12.6972** 17.2544**
UN PAC 2.9184** 4.7956** 5.8702**
XEROX 4.5698** 6.5361** 9.8046**
* SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEVEL; ** SIGNIFICANT AT 1% LEVEL
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regression for days -2 to +2 gives similar results with only 
3 firms experiencing statistically significant volume 
increases (table 3.14). Both the -5 to +5 and the -2 to +2 
findings are verified using the Wilcoxon rank sums test in 
table 3.15.
Tables 2.16, 2.17, and 2.18 follow the same pattern as 
tables 2.13, 2.14, and 2.15 except that in place of PRIME 
volume, the variable of interest is the difference between 
stock volume and PRIME volume. This test is designed to 
determine which of the two possible dividend-capture vehicles 
is preferred by investors. These results are rather 
interesting in that stocks appear to be the security of 
choice. Since the independent variable in these regressions 
is stock daily trading volumes minus PRIME volumes, a 
positive coefficient signifies that stock volume increased 
relative to PRIME volume.
Although the tax timing hypothesis is not tested in this 
study, the results above demonstrate rather convincingly that 
the use of PRIMES for tax-related purposes is not the source 
of the premiums. In contrast, support is found for both the 
market completeness and transaction cost reduction 
hypotheses. Based on the findings presented above, it 














AMER EXPR 80547 16.385** -14836 -1.231
AMER HOME 44956 12.306** 20584 2.419*
AT&T (1) 43562 10.004** -3451 -0.332
AT&T (2) 225199 20.004** 72544 2.697**
AMOCO 34156 17.861** 2833 0.626
ARCO 23326 10.542** 6207 1.183
BRS MYRS 91591 14.905** 13899 0.933
CHEVRON 60925 16.251** -3637 -0.405
COKE 53817 13.295** 10645 1.126
DOW 47149 12.996** 846 0.096
DU PONT 104088 14.709** -28 -0.002
KODAK 63349 12.310** -24174 -1.939
EXXON 77363 2.920** 227870 3.631**
FORD 58246 12.651** -5839 -0.536
GTE 197132 12.513** 11144 0.295
G.E. 115692 20.016** 7073 0.509
G.M. 76929 15.498** 13130 1.120
HEW PACK 45176 14.114** -6931 -0.928
IBM 96968 17.148** -18662 -1.393
J & J 77210 13.925** -4363 -0.329
MERCK 43971 16.586** 10099 1.584
MOBIL 67160 17.984** 2821 0.315
PHIL MOR 100760 14.068** 34240 1.999*
P & G 30862 10.472** 381 0.056
SEARS 46491 16.906** 4390 0.656
UN PAC 24420 16.620** -2469 -0.710
XEROX 27338 16.697** -124 -0.032













AMER EXPR 79352 16.940** -15647 -0.954
AMER HOME 47230 13.611** 16412 1.440
AT&T (1) 43054 10.408** -1129 -0.080
AT&T (2) 229812 21.554** 100758 2.679**
AMOCO 33821 18.659** 9579 1.566
ARCO 24143 11.479** 3239 0.459
BRS MYRS 93862 16.054** 1117 0.055
CHEVRON 60435 16.979** -1724 -0.141
COKE 55377 14.431** 4331 0.339
DOW 47261 13.686** 377 0.032
DU PONT 103556 15.369** 6694 0.279
KODAK 61250 12.512** -24724 -1.443
EXXON 75415 3.025** 468983 5.666**
FORD 57501 13.196** -3591 -0.237
GTE 196059 13.138** 37721 0.714
G.E. 117237 21.363** -3934 -0.206
G.M. 77042 16.426** 27378 1.670
HEW PACK 44079 14.527** -1931 -0.192
IBM 94595 17675** -11705 -0.624
J & J 76888 14.616** -5300 -0.291
MERCK 45247 17.912** 5393 0.631
MOBILE 66025 18.649** 19765 1.600
PHIL MORR 98337 14.555** 99747 4.286**
P & G 31205 11.183** -2803 -0.313
SEARS 46618 17.811** 7435 0.817
UN PAC 24188 17.321** -2309 -0.497
XEROX 27550 17.702** -2642 -0.506




Variable Is PRIME Volume 
(Values Represent Ex-Dividend Days Minus Non-Ex Days)




AMER EXPRESS -0.9110 -0.8934
AMER HOME PR 1.5527 1.9274
AT&T (1) -0.0094 -0.8436
AT&T (2) 3.6517** 2.5454*
AMOCO 0.4049 1.6342
ARCO 0.4509 0.4991











HEW PACKARD -1.4364 -0.5103
IBM -1.5800 -1.0105
J & J 2.2115* 1.1681
MERCK -0.9278 -1.4641
MOBIL -0.0882 -0.4103
PHIL MORRIS 2.4244* 3.7962**
P & G 1.3072 0.6141
SEARS 1.2607 1.2278
UN PACIFIC 0.0709 -0.7050
XEROX 0.6910 -0.0553














AMER EXPR 12772 57.068** -358 -0.654
AMER HOME 3086 42.823** 205 1.225
AT&T (1) 18661 43.332** 4707 4.579**
AT&T (2) 18088 48.298** 4766 5.327**
AMOCO 5611 56.237** 169 0.720
ARCO 3273 31.344** 635 2.567*
BRS MYRS 8783 53.838** -1188 -3.004**
CHEVRON 5692 44.959** 210 0.696
COKE 7843 52.415** -3311 -0.947
DOW 6979 60.191** -450 -1.603
DU PONT 6869 56.499** 74 0.550
KODAK 10415 51.931** 30 0.062
EXXON 12518 53.735** -802 -1.454
FORD 10755 53.783** 1822 3.849**
GTE 7525 15081** 5259 4.398**
G.E. 14897 69.874** 295 0.577
G.M. 11519 24.911** 5161 4.725**
HEW PACK 6814 48.864** -111 -0.343
IBM 16362 74.752** -83 0.160
J & J 6352 55.808** 187 0.690
MERCK 6999 64.730** 93 0.361
MOBIL 6911 59.205** 1043 3.723**
PHIL MOR 15241 50.943** -1136 -1.588
P & G 4925 47.262** 698 2.922**
SEARS 7395 50.065** -221 0.5380
UN PAC 2408 43.238** 153 1.161
XEROX 339 34.888** 595 2.573*














AMER EXPR 12724 59.669** -138 -0.186
AMER HOME 3110 45.489** 154 0.686
AT&T (1) 18962 46.310** 6075 4.360**
AT&T (2) 18189 51.807** 9127 7.371**
AMOCO 5601 59.210** 460 1.441
ARCO 3370 33.851** 179 0.539
BRS MYRS 8668 55.737** -1047 -1.934
CHEVRON 5677 47.268** 613 1.483
COKE 7841 55.328** -646 -1.369
DOW 6948 62.849** -448 -1.180
DU PONT 6869 59.335** 159 0.386
KODAK 10471 54.949** -618 -0.928
EXXON 12412 55.985** -402 -0.547
FORD 10876 57.453** 2477 3.761**
GTE 7577 16.174** 10814 6.525**
G.E. 14917 73.696** 378 0.537
G.M. 11691 26.895** 9200 6.055**
HEW PACK 6727 50.973** 728 1.663
IBM 16341 78.927** 86 0.119
J & J 6384 59.113** 6 0.017
MERCK 7011 68.114** 76 0.126
MOBIL 6928 62.871** 1989 5.174**
PHIL MOR 15152 53.331** -1296 -1.325
P & G 4977 50.388** 833 2.624**
SEARS 7381 52.493** -279 -0.571
UN PAC 2431 45.895** 53 0.302
XEROX 3398 36.877** 1126 3.642**




Variable Is Difference in Volumes 
(Values Represent Ex-Dividend Days Minus Non-Ex Days)




AMER EXPRESS -0.9110 -0.8934
AMER HOME PR 1.5527 1.9274
AT&T (1) -0.0094 -0.8436
AT&T (2) 3.6517** 2.5454*
AMOCO 0.4049 1.6342
ARCO 0.4509 0.4991











HEW PACKARD -1.4364 -0.5103
IBM -1.5800 -1.0105
J & J 2.2115* 1.1681
MERCK -0.9278 -1.4641
MOBIL -0.0882 -0.4103
PHIL MORRIS 2.4244* 3.7962**
P & G 1.3072 0.6141
SEARS 1.2607 1.2278
UN PACIFIC 0.0709 -0.7050
XEROX 0.6910 -0.0553
* SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEVEL; ** SIGNIFICANT AT 1% LEVEL
Chapter 4
4.1. Previous Research
4.1.1. Evidence of Lead-Lag Relations
Manaster and Rendleman (1982) conducted one of the first 
studies testing for the lead-lag relation between stocks and 
options. They analyze close-to-close returns on portfolios 
based on the relative difference between actual stock prices 
and implied stock prices. As discussed above, implied stock 
prices are obtained from inverting the option pricing model. 
This technique is very similar to the calculation of implied 
volatilities in that it requires the use of numerical 
techniques and is sensitive to the particular model selected. 
The authors find that closing options prices contain superior 
information to that of closing stock prices and that it takes 
up to one day of trading for the stock prices to adjust.
Unfortunately, differences in the stock and option 
markets can completely explain the results of their study. 
As mentioned previously, the option market closes ten minutes 
after the stock market closes (3:10 versus 3:00 P.M. CST, 
respectively). Information released during this period will 
be impounded into the price of the option with no effect on 
the price of the stock. The stock will have to wait until 
trading resumes the next day in order to reflect this 
information. This phenomenon is priced by the market and is 
known as the "wild card" option.
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Bhattacharya (1987) examines the intraday lead-lag 
relation between stock and option markets using transaction 
data. He tries to identify arbitrage opportunities between 
the two markets by looking at the difference between observed 
bid-ask stock prices and implied bid-ask stock prices. 
Implied bid-ask stock prices are found using the same 
technique as in Manaster and Rendleman (1982). Bid-ask call 
prices are used to imply the prices of the underlying bid-ask 
stock prices. An arbitrage opportunity is identified if the 
implied bid is higher than the actual ask (i.e., the stock is 
underpriced), or if the implied ask is lower than the actual 
bid. Next, a trading strategy is developed attempting to 
exploit any mispricing between the two markets. The author 
finds that any profits made using such a strategy are wiped 
out once transaction costs are included. He also finds, 
however, that statistically significant excess returns are 
possible for overnight holding periods. This anomalous 
result is consistent with the findings of Manaster and 
Rendleman (1982).
Although Bhattacharya (1987) shows that information from 
the options market can be useful in the stock market, his 
testing method is unidirectional. In other words, he tests 
only for the possibility of information flowing from the 
options market to the stock market. For a more complete 
test, the possibility of information flowing from the stock 
market to the option market would also have to be analyzed.
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Showing that option price changes have some predictive power 
over stock price changes does not mean that the reverse does 
not also occur. Stock price changes may also have predictive 
power, and nothing in this study precludes this predictive 
power from being even greater than that for option price 
changes.
Anthony (1988) takes a somewhat different approach to 
the previous two studies by examining changes in trading 
volume as opposed to prices. He uses daily data to test 
whether trading in the option market induces trading in the 
stock market. Unfortunately, daily volume figures are 
subject to the same criticism as closing price figures. 
Information released in the last ten minutes of trading on 
the option market may cause investors to increase their 
trading volume. This same piece of information would not be 
digested by the stock market until the following (trading) 
day. Just as with Manaster and Rendleman (1982) , the design 
of the markets, and not the design of the securities, may be 
responsible for the results.
Anthony (1988) finds that option volumes lead stock 
volumes for thirteen firms, stock volumes lead option volumes 
for four firms, and the direction of causality is ambiguous 
for the remaining eight firms. Even though these results do 
not appear to be particularly strong, Anthony concludes that 
trading in options leads trading in stocks by one day.
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Finucane (1991) also finds that options lead stocks. 
The author tests this relationship using the S&P 100 Index 
option and its one hundred underlying stocks. However, it is 
very possible that this lead/lag relationship is induced by 
infrequent trading since the S&P 100 Index option is the most 
widely traded option in the world. Although the one hundred 
underlying stocks are also traded frequently, it is unlikely 
that market-wide information could be impounded in all one 
hundred stocks as rapidly as in the single option contract.
Stephan and Whaley (1990) produced the first study 
claiming that stock price changes lead option price changes. 
The authors begin by discussing the shortcomings of previous 
studies supporting the opposite conclusion (as described in 
the section above) . According to Stephan and Whaley, the two 
major problems in these earlier studies are (1) the use of 
daily data with inherent biases due to the nonsimultaneity of 
closing prices, and (2) the use of simulated trading 
strategies instead of focusing directly on measuring the 
lead-lag relation between relative price changes. After 
correcting for these deficiencies, the authors reach the 
opposite conclusion of all previous studies (i.e., stock 
price and volume changes lead option price and volume 
changes).
Because this paper’s results are so radically different 
from earlier studies, closer inspection is warranted. 
Stephan and Whaley (1990) use intraday data on forty-three
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firms traded on the CBOE covering the period 1/2/86-3/31/86. 
Price changes are defined over five minute intervals 
beginning at 8:35 A.M.. As done in previous studies, they 
calculate implied stock prices using option prices, and then 
compare these implied prices to actual stock prices. 
Autocorrelation functions were calculated for each series and 
both displayed the negative serial correlation implied by the 
bid-ask spread effect (see Roll (1984) , Glosten (1987), Choi, 
Salandro, and Shastri (1988), and Stoll (1989)). The first- 
order correlation of the implied stock price series is larger 
than that of the stock price series (-0.225 versus -0.091, 
respectively). This is the result of higher bid-ask spreads, 
as a percentage of price, in the option market than in the 
stock market.
According to the authors, negative first-order serial 
covariance implies a moving average process of order one. 
The bid-ask spread effect, therefore, is purged from both 
series by using the residuals after fitting a MA(1) model to 
the data. The residuals (i.e., innovations) from the MA(1) 
model, in contrast to the original series, should be serially 
uncorrelated. Subsequent multiple time series analyses are 
performed using both the original series and the series of 
innovations.
Next, the authors run a series of regressions based on 
the model developed by Sims (1972) designed to test for 
causality. They use a model with six lead and six lagged
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regressors, along with the time 0 variable. The results show 
that price changes in the stock market lead price changes in 
the option market. Using bid-ask adjusted innovations, stock 
price changes lead options by fifteen to twenty minutes on 
average. The authors also document intraday trading patterns 
and show that the volume pattern for options is distinctly 
different from that of underlying stocks. Since these 
patterns differ mostly in the first hour of trading, this 
hour is dropped from the data set and new regressions are 
run. The results show that the same lead-lag relationship 
remains even in the truncated data set.
The authors perform a similar analysis on trading 
activity. These results reinforce the earlier price change 
results by showing that stock market volume tends to lead 
option market volume. Commenting on the results of earlier 
studies and the commonly held notion that option price 
changes lead stock price changes, Stephan and Whaley (1990) 
state (p.215-6), "Our results using more refined data and a 
more general methodology indicate that the consensus may be 
wrong."
Another study which finds evidence that the consensus 
may be wrong is by Kumar, Sarin, and Shastri (1993). These 
authors investigate the behavior of option prices around 
large block transactions in the underlying security. 
Bootstrapping techniques are used to test the reaction of 
stock and option prices for both uptick and downtick block
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trades. The authors also use a Sims-type (1972) model to 
directly test for the relationship between stock and option 
abnormal returns.
Their findings can be summarized as follows: (1) stock 
prices adjust within approximately fifteen minutes after both 
types of block trades, (2) stock prices exhibit abnormal 
behavior approximately fifteen minutes prior to a downtick 
block trade and display no abnormal behavior prior to an 
uptick trade, (3) option prices exhibit abnormal behavior 
approximately thirty minutes before and one hour after both 
types of block trades, and (4) the returns on options are 
related to contemporaneous and lagged returns on underlying 
stocks.
Although option prices begin to aggregate information 
prior to stock prices, the authors attribute this to 
intermarket frontrunning (an institutional factor). 
Intermarket frontrunning describes the situation in which 
trading in the derivative security market is based on 
knowledge of an impending stock trade that is expected to 
affect the value of the derivative security. This means that 
private information, destined for the stock market, was 
intercepted by the derivatives market. Although derivative 
prices adjusted more quickly due to this irregularity, 
informed traders had actually chosen the stock market to 
release their private information. Therefore, the authors
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interpret their findings as additional support that stock 
price changes lead option price changes.
More recently, Chan, Chung, and Johnson (CCJ) (1993) 
have challenged the conclusions reached by Stephan and 
Whaley. After confirming the latter*s results, CCJ go on to 
show that the stock lead disappears when bid-ask midpoints 
are used instead of transaction prices. The authors 
hypothesize that Stephan and Whaley's results can be 
explained by the infrequent trading of the options. Their 
infrequent trading hypothesis asserts that stocks will lead 
options because small moves in the stock will not be 
immediately reflected in the option due to tick size. In 
other words, information releases may induce stock price 
changes which barely clear the one-eighth tick price barrier. 
The related (theoretical) option price change may not be 
large enough to clear the same barrier, thus making it 
unprofitable to trade. Under this scenario, the option will 
trade only after the stock has made more that one price 
change in the same direction.
CCJ posit that since the results reported in Stephan and 
Whaley are actually due to price discreteness, using bid-ask 
midpoints instead of transaction prices should mitigate the 
spurious lead-lag relationship. Although bid and ask quotes 
are also discrete, the market maker is free to adjust either 
the bid or the ask or both. In this way, the quote midpoint 
can immediately reflect the information impounded in stock
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price changes even though the option does not trade. When 
the authors use quote midpoints instead of transaction 
prices, they find that the earlier reported results of 
Stephan and Whaley disappear. They conclude that the stock 
market does not impound information into prices more quickly 
than the option market.
4.1.2. Information Aggregation and Market Microstructure
The manner in which information is aggregated into 
market prices is the subject of ongoing financial and 
economic research. Results predicted by existing models are 
sensitive to assumptions about the types of market 
participants and their risk preferences, and about the level 
of market competition. The competitive noisy rational 
expectations models of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Diamond 
and Verrecchia (1981), and Verrecchia (1982) assume that 
informed traders take equilibrium price as given in spite of 
the fact that they influence it by actively trading on their 
superior information. This assumption leads to the 
unacceptable result that when informed traders are perfectly 
competitive and very close to risk neutral, all incentive to 
acquire costly information is effectively extinguished. This 
follows because information-based trading reveals so much of 
their information that they are unable to earn sufficient 
profits. Fully-revealing rational expectations models, 
therefore, are unable to provide investors with the proper 
incentives to collect private information.
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Kyle (1989) refers to this condition as the 
"schizophrenia problem" and proposes his own model as a 
possible cure. His model assumes that informed traders are 
imperfect competitors who choose to withhold some of their 
information from the market in order to maintain an optimal 
level of information asymmetry. Hellwig (1980), on the other 
hand, proposes the existence of a "large" market in which the 
informed trader is so "small" that informed trading will not 
fully reveal all his private information. In both cases, 
however, an incentive is devised to motivate the costly 
acquisition and revelation of information.
Research on the relationship between information 
aggregation and market microstructure was greatly influenced 
by Kyle (1985). In his continuous auctions model, one risky 
asset is exchanged for a riskless asset among three types of 
market participants. The risk-neutral informed trader has 
superior information about the ex post liquidation value of 
the risky asset, while the exchange behavior of the noise 
trader is random. The third participant is a risk-neutral 
market maker who sets prices based on the observed quantities 
traded by the other participants. In this model, the 
informed trader is able to earn positive profits because of 
his monopoly power and ability to release information 
gradually over time. Noise traders provide the necessary 
"camouflage" preventing the market maker from impounding all 
relevant information into prices.
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Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) add the effects of 
discretionary trading into the basic Kyle framework. They 
show that discretionary traders will tend to concentrate 
their trading volume in the same period in order to mitigate 
the asymmetric information effects of informed trading. This 
result is similar to that of Bhushan (1991) where, in the 
absence of noise trading, liquidity traders will concentrate 
in one asset. The presence of noise trading provides a 
motive for the holding of diversified assets by risk-neutral 
liquidity (discretionary) traders. The results of these two 
papers demonstrate that liquidity traders will want to 
concentrate their trades in assets and/or time periods with 
an abundance of noise trading. Large amounts of noise 
trading, however, is also attractive to the informed trader.
Chowdry and Nanda (1991) look at trading the same asset 
in multiple markets. They show that the interaction between 
liquidity traders and informed traders will lead to one of 
the markets dominating the other(s). Because markets face 
competition from other markets, this study focuses on the 
actions that market makers can take in an effort to attract 
order flow. Market makers compete to offer the lowest cost 
of trading at their location. Part of this competition is to 
deter informed trading by voluntarily making public all 
relevant pricing information.
Closer to the issues addressed in this paper, John, 
Koticha, and Subrahmanyam (1991) study the differential
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market microstructures between stocks and options. With 
simultaneous trading in both securities, the informed trader 
faces a trade-off between leverage effects and higher bid-ask 
spreads associated with options. The authors hypothesize 
that the increased leverage in the options market will 
attract informed traders. Market makers, aware of this 
attraction, will widen their spread as compensation for 
expected losses to informed traders. The increased spread 
may become so large as to negate the earlier leverage 
advantage. They also show that stock price volatility 
decreases and stock market liquidity increases with 
concurrent trading in options.
Glosten and Milgrom's (1985) model posits a risk-neutral 
specialist operating in a market characterized by 
heterogeneously-informed traders. This paper bridges the gap 
between information aggregation and bid-ask spreads. The 
authors claim that a positive bid-ask spread will arise under 
such conditions (of asymmetric information), even if the 
market maker earns zero profits, because of adverse 
selection. The competitive market maker needs to set a bid- 
ask spread wide enough to compensate for trading losses to 
informed traders. Similar to Akerlof 's (1970) lemons market, 
there can be occasions when the market shuts down due to the 
level of asymmetric information. If informed traders are too 
numerous and/or their information is too accurate, the market
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maker may have to widen the spread to such an extent that it 
precludes further trading.
Security design, therefore, can cause differences in the 
market microstructure of the respective securities. Besides 
the hypothesized increase in adverse selection associated 
with derivative securities, Jameson and Wilhelm (1992) claim 
that inventory costs are also significantly impacted. They 
argue that option market makers face an additional element of 
risk resulting from the option's stochastic return 
volatility. The marginal contribution of an individual 
option to the risk introduced by discrete rebalancing of the 
hedge is a function of the option's gamma. The gamma of an 
option is a measure of the sensitivity of its hedge ratio to 
changes in its underlying stock price. Since competitive 
market makers must be compensated for this additional risk, 
the inventory cost component of the bid-ask spread is 
expected to be larger for the derivative (option) than for 
the underlying stock.
4.1.3. Bid-Ask Spread Decomposition
The first attempt to model the cost components of the 
quoted spread was made by Demsetz (1968). Subsequent to this 
seminal work, research became somewhat compartmentalized in 
that new studies tended to specialize on one component of the 
spread. Tinic (1972) looked at order-processing costs while 
Stoll (1978), Amihud and Mendleson (1980), and Ho and Stoll 
(1981) concentrated on inventory holding costs. Adverse
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selection costs were investigated by Copeland and Galai 
(1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and Easley and O'Hara 
(1983). Partly due to improvements in data availability, 
recent research has focused on estimating bid-ask spread 
components using transaction returns. Below is a summary of 
the models developed to explain the components of the bid-ask 
spread.
Roll (1984) derives a simple measure of the spread based 
on the negative autocovariance of stock returns. His 
estimator is based on two important assumptions: (1) there is 
no informational component to the spread, and (2) the 
expected return of a security is constant through time. 
Relaxation of the first assumption led to the subsequent 
model of Glosten and Harris (1988) in which an adverse 
selection component plays a significant role. Relaxation of 
both the first and second assumptions led to the model of 
George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991). These two later 
developments will be discussed below. The main contribution 
of Roll's (1984) paper, however, is the estimation of the 
"effective" bid-ask spread using the first-order serial 
covariance of price changes taken directly from a time-series 
of market prices. Subsequent bid-ask spread decomposition 
models begin with Roll's simple model.
Glosten and Harris (1988) decompose the spread into one 
component due to asymmetric information and a second 
component due to inventory holding costs, specialist monopoly
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power, and clearing costs. The inventory cost component is 
referred to as the transitory component because its impact on 
the stock price series is unrelated to the underlying value 
of the stock. The adverse selection component is created by 
informed traders possessing an information set superior to 
that of the market marker. Market makers are aware of the 
existence of informed traders even though they are anonymous. 
Because market makers cannot distinguish informed from 
uninformed trades, they widen the spread beyond what it would 
otherwise have been in order to recover losses to informed 
traders.
The Glosten and Harris asymmetric information model, in 
addition to explaining transaction costs, can also provide 
insights into the manner in which private information is 
impounded into prices. This model is based on the Glosten 
and Milgrom (1985) model where rational market makers 
continuously revise their expectations of future stock prices 
by observing the flow of orders received from the trading 
public. A buy order, for example, has a positive probability 
of having been submitted by an informed trader. The market 
maker will incorporate this information into prices by 
revising his bid-ask spread upward. The Glosten and Harris 
model, therefore, assigns to the market maker the central 
role of transforming private information into public prices.
The authors estimate the parameters of their model by 
using New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) common stock transaction
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prices for the period 1981-1983. Using cross-sectional 
regression analysis to test various implications related to 
the two spread component model, the authors claim that they 
cannot reject the hypothesis that a significant portion of 
the spread is due to asymmetric information. This 
decomposition, however, assumes that the components of the 
spread are constant through time and models the inventory 
cost component in a rather ad hoc manner.
Stoll (1989) models the time-series behavior of the 
spread and specifies the relationship between the quoted 
spread and the realized spread. The quoted spread is the 
difference between the bid and ask prices quoted by the 
dealer at any given point in time. The realized spread is 
the average difference between the price the dealer pays for 
the stock (bid) and the next price at which he sells the 
stock (ask). Each of the three bid-ask components implies 
certain relationships between the quoted and realized spread. 
Under order processing costs alone, realized and quoted 
spreads are the same. The inventory cost and adverse 
information cost components imply that realized spreads will 
be less than quoted spreads, but for different reasons. 
Since the dealer is likely to lower the bid and ask prices 
after a dealer buy and raise them after a dealer sell in an 
effort to equilibrate his inventory position, realized 
spreads will be less than quoted spreads. The dealer is also 
more likely to lower (raise) the bid and ask prices after a
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buy (sell) because the trade may have come from an informed 
trader. This action has the effect of immediately impounding 
relevant information into prices.
Each of the bid-ask spread components also give rise to 
alternative views about the relationship between "true" price 
and bid-ask prices. If the spread contains only the cost of 
order processing, bid and ask prices will be set to straddle 
the "true" price. Since order arrival does not cause the 
dealer to revise his quotes, expectations about future prices 
are formed independent of order flow. When the spread 
reflects inventory holding costs, dealers set their bid-ask 
prices above or below "true" price in order to induce the 
type of trading (buy versus sell) which will even out their 
inventory position. Just as with order processing costs, the 
inventory holding cost component implies that dealers do not 
acquire new information about "true" price from the flow of 
orders. Spread adjustments are designed simply to even out 
inventory. In effect, these first two cost components make 
the dealer play the role of wholesaler. To perform the 
liquidity service, the wholesaler must be compensated for 
processing costs and inventory risks. The costs associated 
with adverse information, however, depend on the market 
maker's ability to revise expected equilibrium prices based 
on trading with informed investors. As noted previously, 
this component provides the mechanism whereby private 
information is aggregated and impounded into price.
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According to Stoll, the three views of bid-ask spreads 
discussed above can be summarized into two parameters; the 
size of a price reversal conditional on the occurrence of a 
price reversal, and the probability of a price reversal. If 
order processing costs are the only component of the spread, 
prices randomly fluctuate between bids and asks. The size of 
a price reversal, therefore, is equal to the spread and the 
probability of a price reversal is 0.50. Assuming only 
inventory holding costs, the size of the price reversal is 
one-half the magnitude of the spread. This is due to the way 
in which bid and ask prices are set in order to equilibrate 
the inventory position. And since the revision of prices is 
intended to alter the probability of a transaction in one 
direction or the other, the probability of a price reversal 
exceeds 0.50.
Under the pure adverse selection assumption, the size of 
the price reversal is one-half the magnitude of the spread 
because of the market maker's price adjustment rules. If an 
incoming order creates a dealer buy, for example, the dealer 
adjusts bid and ask prices downward (by one-half the spread). 
A price reversal will mean that the dealer sells at the 
original starting price. The difference between the round 
trip buy and sell, therefore, is one-half the spread. The 
probability of a price reversal is 0.50 since the dealer 
revises quotes in order to straddle the expected "true" 
equilibrium price.
151
Stoll, as in Glosten and Harris (1988), assumes a 
constant spread over the one month periods tested in his 
study. Closing prices and quotations are collected for 
National Market System (NMS) securities on the NASDAQ system 
during the months of October, November, and December, 1984. 
After the parameters of the model are estimated, it is shown 
that serial covariances of transactions returns are negative 
and inversely related to the square of quoted spreads (also 
see Roll (1984)). Serial covariance of price quotation 
returns are also inversely related to the square of quoted 
spreads, although this relationship is weaker than that of 
transactions data. As noted by Stoll (1989, p.132), "This 
result is evidence of an inventory adjustment component of 
spreads in which quoted prices are adjusted to induce 
transactions that tend to equilibrate a dealer's inventory."
In addition to finding evidence in support of the 
inventory holding cost component, Stoll also gives estimates 
for the average size of price reversals (0.734S, where S is 
the quoted proportional spread), the probability of price 
reversals (0.55), and the average realized spread (0.57S). 
Adverse information costs are estimated at 0.43S, inventory 
holding costs at 0.10S, and order processing costs at 0.47S. 
Stoll also observes that these component proportions show 
little variation across stocks, although quoted spreads vary 
considerably.
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George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (GKN) (1991) claim that 
previous attempts to decompose the bid-ask spread produced 
inefficient and biased estimates because of time variation in 
expected returns. All earlier models and their accompanying 
empirical tests assume that the only source of 
autocorrelation in transaction returns is due to the order 
processing cost component. GKN show that positively 
autocorrelated time-varying expected returns cause spread and 
component estimates to be biased downward. Using both daily 
and weekly data, the authors find that the adverse 
information component constitutes only 8-13 percent of quoted 
spreads. Since no evidence is found for the existence of an 
inventory holding cost component, order processing appears to 
be responsible for most of the quoted spread.
GKN develop their model based on the findings of Conrad 
and Kaul (1988,1989) and Keim and Stambaugh (1986) which show 
that the conditional expected returns of portfolios of stocks 
vary through time and are positively autocorrelated. In 
addition, Conrad, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1990) find that 
individual expected security returns are positively 
autocorrelated even though overall returns are negatively 
autocorrelated. Without accounting for the positively 
autocorrelated expected returns, previous estimates of 
spreads and components are biased. In effect, these earlier 
studies underestimate the relative size of order processing
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costs by failing to eliminate the positive autocorrelation of 
expected returns.
Although these earlier studies provide some insights 
into decomposing the bid-ask spread, they either employ 
cross-sectional regressions and/or use daily or weekly data. 
Since this study contains only twenty-six different firms and 
transactions data, a methodology adapted from Huang and Stoll
(1992) will be used to decompose bid and ask prices (see, for 
example, Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1994)). This methodology 
was first designed to predict quote revisions and transaction 
returns in the very short run (five minutes) . The use of 
transactions data, however, also requires the estimation of 
an additional bid-ask spread component called order 
persistence. This bid-ask spread component is due to the 
tendency of buy orders to follow buy orders and sell orders 
to follow sell orders.
Although this phenomenon of order persistence is 
reported in several studies (see, for example, Hasbrouck and 
Ho (1987) and Lin (1992)), its cause is less generally agreed 
upon. One hypothesis is that when favorable or unfavorable 
information is released, traders submit orders which cannot 
simultaneously clear the market. These orders are queued and 
their sequential execution induces order persistence. 
Another hypothesis is that specialists tend to partially 
adjust security prices to new information due to their 
obligation to maintain an orderly market and limit orders.
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This partial adjustment allows other traders to participate 
in the expected price movement, which also induces order 
persistence. But whatever its cause, order persistence must 
be accounted for when decomposing bid-ask spreads using 
transactions data.
4.2. Data and Method of Analysis
Intraday transaction price and bid-ask data are 
collected from the Institute for the Study of Security 
Markets (ISSM) files for the year 1988. A time grid is 
established starting at the beginning of trading and 
proceeding throughout the day by five-minute increments (this 
procedure is also applied to one-minute increments). The 
transaction file is scanned to find the last stock, PRIME, 
and SCORE transaction price before 9:00, for example, and 
this trade is defined as the 9:00 trade. Next, the file is 
scanned to find the last transaction before 9:05, and this 
trade is defined as the 9:05 trade. The difference in the 
log prices between 9:05 and 9:00 is used as the change in 
price variable (three separate series for stock, PRIME, and 
SCORE). Summary statistics, discussed in the following 
section, are provided in the appendix.
Unfortunately, PRIMES and SCORES do not trade with 
nearly the regularity as the underlying common stock. This 
means that while it is very rare to find a five minute 
interval without a trade for the common stocks, it is quite 
common to find such an interval for the derivatives
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(especially for the PRIMES). If an interval contains a 
missing trade from either the stock or the derivative, then 
the interval is not used in the lead-lag regressions. The 
resulting data set is a compromise between using daily data, 
as in Manaster and Rendleman (1982), using and truly 
transactional data. All results reported in this study, 
therefore, are based on intervals in which trades occurred 
for both the common stock and its derivative.
4.2.1. Lead-Lag Relationship
When testing for causality, researchers have used two 
slightly different formulations, one based on Granger (1969) 
and the other based on Sims (1972). This paper uses 
Granger's methodology because it is intuitively more 
appealing and, according to Hamilton (1994-p.304), is "the 
simplest and probably best approach." One specific problem 
with the Sims formulation is that it tends to generate 
autocorrelated error terms. Also, following previous 
studies using intraday data (Stephan and Whaley (1990), CCJ
(1993), etc.), no error correction term is added to the 
independent (lagged) variables in the regression formulation. 
An error correction term is used when two variables are 
cointegrated in levels and when one is interested in modeling 
their "long-term" relationship. Including such a term when 
it is not appropriate reduces efficiency, while failing to 
include such a term when it is appropriate induces model 
misspecification. Although there is considerable
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disagreement over definitions of long-term versus short-term, 
intraday transaction data probably belongs to the latter. 
However, for purposes of comparison, the test results 
reported in the following tables were duplicated with the 
addition of an error correction term. The inclusion of the 
error term had no significant effect on the results.
The methodology employed in this paper differs from that 
of Stephan and Whaley (1990) in that they regress actual 
stock price changes against lagged implied and actual stock 
price changes. The noise created by implying stock prices 
from an option pricing model was discussed in an earlier 
section. The methodology used here is closely related to 
that of Chan, Chung, and Johnson (1993) in that they also use 
actual stock price changes and actual option price changes. 
However, they include a delta hedge ratio into their 
formulation while this study does not.
The purpose of the delta hedge ratio is to linearize the 
relationship between stock price changes and option price 
changes. By excluding this delta hedge ratio from the 
formulation, 6578 fewer parameter estimates were needed just 
in the case of testing the lead-lag relationship between 
stocks and SCORES alone. Failing to estimate this parameter, 
however, induces some nonlinearities. Out of the 208
regressions used to test for causality between stocks and 
SCORES and stocks and PRIMES, 19 rejected the null hypothesis
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of linearity at the five percent level using a Lagrange 
Multiplier test (for squared and cubic terms).
The objective of using bivariate VAR methodology, or the 
Granger (1969) causality test, is to determine whether 
information about past changes in one variable provides 
useful information about current changes in another variable. 
More specifically, this methodology tests whether past values 
of stock (derivative) price changes improve the forecast of 
derivative (stock) price changes. There are four possible 
outcomes of this test: (1) stock price changes lead
derivative price changes, (2) derivative price changes lead 
stock price changes, (3) both (1) and (2), and (4) neither 
(1) nor (2).
The lead-lag relationship between stock price (in 
logarithms) changes, (Ast) , and SCORE price (in logarithms)
changes, (ACt) , assuming a stationary, normally distributed,
bivariate VAR(p) process, is tested using the following 
formulation.
(4.1) AS, = Clt + Si^OiASu + W f t A C *  + e lt
(4.2) AC, = C2t + Si=lP7iAĈ i + + e*
where:
AS, = log of stock price changes 
AC, = log of SCORE price changes
The null hypothesis that AC, does not Granger cause AS, cannot 
be rejected if and only if j8, = jS2 = ... = (3p = 0.
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Equivalently, ASt does not Granger cause ACt if and only if Sl
Sj "* ■ a o Sp 0  •
Both of these null hypotheses are tested using an F-test 
of the form:
(4.3) X = [SSEr - SSEu]/[p*a2] 
where:
SSEr = the sum of squared errors from restricted least 
squares estimation (i.e., j8t = ... = j8p = 0, 8l = ... = 
*P = 0)SSEy = the sum of squared errors from unrestricted least 
squares estimation
The F-distribution is only approximate because of the 
existence of stochastic regressors. The variable, pX, is 
more precisely described by an asymptotic Chi-square 
distribution. However, the use of the F-test is, more 
conservative than the x2 test because the F-distribution has 
a fatter upper tail. The F-test is probably more appropriate 
in small sample tests because it takes into account the 
additional uncertainty of estimating a2.
In this study, three types of lead-lag regressions are 
used. The first type of regressions use a pooled series 
containing all twenty-six firms. Lag lengths are first 
chosen based on the AIC criterion and residuals are checked 
for white noise using Box-Pierce Q-statistics (white noise is 
double checked via a Lagrange Multiplier test). If the Q- 
statistics reject the null of white noise at the five percent 
level, additional lags are added until white noise is
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achieved (that is, white noise for a minimum of twelve lags). 
The second type of regressions are designed to detect lead- 
lag relationships within individual firms. In this case, 
each firm is tested for causality using the same optimal lag 
length as selected from the pooled data.
These first two types of regressions are similar to the 
technique used in Stephan and Whaley (1990) and Chan, Chung, 
and Johnson (1993) in that the same lag length is applied to 
all the firms in the sample. Neither of these papers, 
however, discussed the method whereby the optimal lag length 
was chosen. In general, there is a trade-off between 
underspecifying the model (too few lags) and overspecifying 
the model (too many lags). Underspecification minimizes 
efficiency losses but increases the incidence of 
autocorrelation. Overspecification is subject to efficiency 
losses but reduces the incidence of autocorrelation.
The third type of regressions uses optimal lag lengths 
selected for each individual firm, thereby mitigating the 
effects of autocorrelation while accepting greater efficiency 
losses. This technique is used because empirical testing 
revealed that optimal lag lengths varied considerably over 
different firms. Applying the same lag length to each firm 
results in considerable autocorrelation which, in turn, 
reduces one's confidence in the standard errors used in t and 
F tests. Since Granger causality tests are dependent on the 
validity of F tests (or Chi-square tests), it appears that
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there is greater potential loss due to underspecifying than 
due to overspecifying.
4.2.2. Bid-Ask Decomposition
As mentioned above, this study uses an adaptation of 
Huang and Stoll (1992) to decompose the bid-ask spread. This 
method of decomposition is well suited to the type of data 
used here since it is capable of decomposing the spread of 
individual firms and handles transactions data.
Following Huang and Stoll, let Pt = Qt + zt, where Pt is 
the transaction price, Qt is the quote midpoint, and zt is the 
deviation of the trade price from the prevailing quote 
midpoint. Z, can also be thought of as one-half of the 
(signed) effective bid-ask spread. jnvestor buy orders are 
identified when Pt > Qt (i.e., zt > 0) and investor sell orders 
are identified when Pt < Qt (i.e., zt < 0). From this simple 
relationship, adverse selection, order persistence, and order 
processing components can be identified as follows.
4.2.2.1. Adverse Selection Component
The adverse selection component represents the 
relationship between the deviation of trade prices from 
prevailing quote midpoints (z) at time t and the change in 
quote midpoints (AQ) at time t+1. As private information is 
revealed through the trading process, the market maker will 
adjust next period's quote midpoint to reflect this 
information. This relationship can be represented by the 
following equation.
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(4.4) AQt+1 = Xzt + et+i
where et is a white noise process
If a trade carries no private information (i.e., X=0), then 
the quote midpoint follows a random walk as in Roll (1984). 
If a trade carries a great deal of private information and 
the entire effective spread is therefore due to the adverse 
selection component (X=l), then time t+l's quote midpoint 
will exactly equal time t's trade price. In general, 
however, one would anticipate that neither of these two 
extremes prevail and X will lie somewhere between zero and 
one.
4.2.2.2. Order Persistence Component
As mentioned above, empirical evidence demonstrates that 
buy orders tend to follow buy orders and sell orders tend to 
follow sell orders. Since buy orders are identified when zt 
> 0 and sell orders when z, < 0, z, should be serially
correlated. Following Hasbrouck and Ho (1987), this 
structure can be captured as an autoregressive process of 
order one, AR(1). The order persistence component, 
therefore, can be written as
(4.5) zt+, = 0z, + Mt+i
where |6| < 1
jut+1 is white noise and uncorrelated with et+1
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4.2.2.3. Order Processing component
Since trade prices at time t can be expressed as Pt = Qt 
+ zt, trade price changes from time t to t+ 1 can be expressed 
as (Pt+i-Pt) = (Qt+i-Q,) + (zt+i"zt) • This gives us equation 6 , 
which is the starting point for deriving the order processing 
component in equation 7.
(4.6) APt+1 = AQt+1 -I- Azt+1 
AP,+i — AQt+1 + (zt+1 - zt)
substituting from equations 4 and 5 gives 
APt+i = (Xzt+e,+1) + (flzt+Mt+i) - z,
APt+i = -(1-X-0) zt + (Ct+î Mt+i)
(4.7) APt+1 = -yzt + rjt+1 
where 7 = (1-X-0)
There are two ways in which one can view the 
relationship describing the order processing cost component 
in equation 7. 7 is the relation between the signed
effective spread at time t and the expected change in 
transaction prices at time t+1. A more intuitive way to view 
7 is that it is simply the third component of the bid-ask 
spread. In other words, since the total of all three 
components must add up to one hundred percent, 7 must be 
equal to l-(X+0).
The components of the bid-ask spread are estimated by 
running ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on equations
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4,5, and 7. All estimated coefficients should lie between 
zero and one in order to be economically meaningful.
4.3. Empirical Results
The appendix gives summary statistics for each of the 
twenty-six firms in the sample. Average transaction prices, 
bid-ask midpoints, volumes, absolute bid-ask spreads, and 
relative bid-ask spreads (% spread) are given for each stock, 
SCORE, and PRIME. The average number of matched stock and 
SCORE trades per firm is 1547, and the average number of 
matched stock and PRIME trades is 626. Given that there were 
253 trading days in 1988, this gives an average of 6.115 and 
2.47 matched trades per day for SCORES and PRIMES, 
respectively.
Since the data collection process requires that the 
stock and derivative trade in the same five minute interval 
(a matched trade), a variable called SECS is included in the 
summary statistics. SECS is the number of seconds between 
the matched stock and derivative trades and, therefore, 
ranges from a minimum of -300 to a maximum of 300 (60 seconds 
x 5 minutes) . A positive SECS value means that the stock 
traded subsequent to the derivative during the five minute 
interval. On average, stocks traded 63.27 seconds after the 
SCORE and 65.17 seconds after the PRIME. In order to check 
the extent to which subsequent results are driven by this 
time differential (nonsynchronous trading), a one minute time 
grid was set up and all results were duplicated using this
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interval. Using the one minute interval, stocks traded 3.91 
seconds after the SCORE and 4.69 seconds after the PRIME, on 
average.
Two other interesting summary statistics given in the 
appendix are the absolute bid-ask spread (ask price-bid 
price) and the relative bid-ask spread (absolute bid-ask 
spread/midpoint). These two figures show clearly that the 
market microstructure varies considerably between stocks and 
derivatives. For instance, the average absolute bid-ask 
spread for stocks is $0.2104 while the average for combined 
SCORES plus PRIMES is $0.9192 ($0.2790 for SCORES and $0.6402 
for PRIMES). And in relative terms, the average proportional 
spreads for stocks, SCORES, and PRIMES are 0.0039, 0.0353, 
and 0.0130, respectively.
These figures clearly demonstrate that the bid-ask 
spread, in absolute and relative terms, is significantly 
higher for the derivatives than for the underlying stocks. 
The benefits of increased leverage effects of trading 
derivatives, therefore, is offset by the increased costs of 
transacting in the derivatives market. The net effect, as 
seen in subsequent tables, is that informed traders seem to 
prefer the stock market to the derivatives market, thus 
confirming the findings of Stephan and Whaley (1990).
The first hypothesis tested in this study is that 
changes in the prices of large firms lead changes in small 
firms (Lo and MacKinlay (1990)). Table 4.1 gives the results
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of Granger causality tests for the lead-lag relation between 
stocks and combined PRIMES and SCORES (i.e., UNITs). The 
table shows the number of observations and the number of 
optimal lag values, as discussed in the methodology section. 
Based on the reported F-values, stocks appear to lead the 
derivatives and this lead-lag relationship is not mitigated 
by using bid-ask midpoints in place of transaction prices, as 
suggested by Chan, Chung, and Johnson (1993). This table 
also demonstrates the costs and benefits of using
Table 4.1
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five minute versus one minute time intervals. By reducing 
the interval from five to one minute, nonsynchronicity is 
reduced at the cost of finding fewer matched trades (i.e., 
loss of observations).
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Tables 3.3 through 3.5 analyze the lead-lag relation 
between stocks and SCORES. In table 4.5, the null hypothesis 
of SCORES leading stocks is rejected using five and one 
minute intervals for both transactions prices and bid-ask 
spread midpoints. In contrast, the null hypothesis of stocks 
leading SCORES cannot be rejected under any circumstance. 
These results suggest that the additional transaction costs 
of trading in the derivatives market outweigh the benefits of 
leverage effects.
Table 4.2
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Table 4.3
Lead-Lag between Stocks and SCORES
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Table 4.3
Lead-Lag between Stocks and Scores
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Zable 4.4
Lead-Lag between Stocks and SCORES
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Tables 3.4 and 3.5 confirm these results on an 
individual firm basis, differing only in the method of 
optimal lag selection. For example, table 4.4 shows that 
stocks lead SCORES in 24 out of 26 firms using the five 
minute interval. SCORES are never found to lead stocks and 
there are two instances of a feedback relationship. Results 
are similar for the one minute interval, although not quite 
as strong. These results are the most relevant in the debate 
over the lead-lag relation between stocks and options 
discussed above. Taken as a whole, the results support the 
findings of Stephan and Whaley (1990) and fail to support the 
findings of CCJ (1993).
Table 4.5 
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Similar results for the lead-lag relation between stocks 
and PRIMES are reported in tables 3.6 through 3.8. The 
pooled data in table 4.5 shows a lead for stocks over PRIMES 
at both intervals and for both transactions prices and bid- 
ask midpoints. The individual results reported in table 4.6 
show the same direction of causality but are not as 
convincing as those of table 4.8. The difference probably 
lies in the fact that when the optimal lag length is chosen 
for the overall sample, and then applied to each individual 
firm, the regression models often suffer from 
misspecification. In tables 3.5 (above) and 3.8, optimal lag 
lengths are selected on an individual firm basis and, 
therefore, give more reliable individual firm results. Both 
results are included here for comparison purposes.
After establishing that stocks lead both SCOREs and 
PRIMES, tables 3.9 and 3.10 report the lead-lag relation 
between PRIMES and SCOREs. Although one might expect the 
SCOREs, which are considerably more information sensitive, to 
lead the PRIMES, no clear relationship emerges based on the 
results reported herein. SCOREs lead PRIMES more than PRIMES 
lead SCOREs but the differences are not nearly as large as in 
the earlier findings. It is quite possible, however, that 
the small number of observations is responsible for the lack 
of any clear direction of causality.
173
Table 4.6
Lead-Lag between Stocks and PRIMES
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Table 4.6
Lead-Lag between Stocks and PRIMES
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Table 4.7
Lead-Lag between Stocks and PRIMES
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Table 4.7
Lead-Lag between Stocks and PRIMES
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Table 4.8
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Tables 3.11 through 3.13 report the bid-ask spread 
decompositions for all stocks, SCOREs, and PRIMES.
Unfortunately, small sample sizes rendered some of the 
PRIME decompositions economically meaningless (i.e., 
negative components and components in excess of 1). On 
average, the adverse selection, order persistence, and 
order processing components amounted to 0.2855, 0.3891, and 
0.3540, respectively, for the stocks. The SCORE and PRIME 
averages are 0.5167, 0.2240, 0.2715, and 0.5783, 0.2222,
0.1972, respectively, for adverse selection, order 
persistence, and order processing. For the stocks and 
SCOREs, all three average components are statistically 
significantly different at the one percent level. For the 
stocks and PRIMES, the adverse selection and order
178
Table 4.9
Lead-Lag between SCORES and PRIMES
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Table 4.9
£>ead-I<ag between SCOREs and PRIMES
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persistence components are significantly different at the 
one percent level while the order processing components 
show no statistical difference. None of the components are 
significantly different between the SCORES and PRIMES.
Consistent with the notion that differing security 
designs cause changes in market microstructure, bid-ask 
spread components are shown to be significantly different 
between the stock and its derivatives. Therefore, the 
absolute and relative bid-ask spreads, as well as the 
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Table 4.10
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Table 4.11
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Table 4.11
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Table 4.12
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Table 4.12
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Chapter 5
5.1. Summary and Conclusion
5.1.1. Options and Volatility
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether 
implied volatility is best described by a nonlinear 
deterministic or stochastic process. This issue is important 
to the options literature because, without additional 
restrictive assumptions, arbitrage-based arguments are valid 
only if volatility is not stochastic. Although recent 
research has been directed toward the construction of 
preference-based stochastic volatility models (see, for 
example, Hull and White (1987), Scott (1987), Wiggins (1987) 
and Johnson and Shanno (1987)), no previous study has 
directly tested for the possibility of deterministic chaos 
over stochastic volatility. The contribution of this study 
is the attempt to rule out the possibility of deterministic 
volatility before accepting the necessity of more complicated 
stochastic volatility models.
Chaos methodology is used to measure the correlation 
dimension of 62,906 intra-day implied volatilities on the S&P 
100 Index call option for the period covering July 1, 1985 to 
December 31, 1986. The Brock (1986) residual test is then 
performed on the residuals of a linear model fitted to the 
original implied volatility series in order to distinguish 
deterministic from stochastic data. Bootstrapping techniques
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are also applied to add additional support to the conclusions 
drawn herein.
The results show no support for the hypothesis of 
deterministic volatility. This study also finds that the 
null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected. These 
findings suggest that the Black-Scholes model and its 
deterministic offspring are misspecified with respect to 
implied volatility and that future research should focus on 
preference-based stochastic volatility models over the 
further improvement of deterministic models. Although this 
view has been suggested by earlier researchers (see, for 
example, Sheikh (1991)) , this study provides direct empirical 
evidence based on a large data set and chaos methodology.
5.1.2. PRIMES and SCORES
This paper contributes to the derivative security 
literature by confirming and updating the earlier results of 
Jarrow and O'Hara (1989) for all 27 firms over the entire 
life of their contracts. The market appears to have valued 
PRIMES and SCOREs above their underlying stock prices because 
these financial innovations added to market completeness and 
improved efficiency by reducing transaction costs.
Although PRIMES and SCOREs traded at premiums to stocks, 
arbitrage profits are not generally available once 
transaction costs are included in the formulation. After 
verifying the persistence of the premiums and testing the 
arbitrage-bounds conditions first introduced by Jarrow and
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O'Hara (1989), this study attempts to identify the source(s) 
of the value added.
Based on the market completeness hypothesis, premiums 
are expected to be reduced once the derivatives have less 
than 9 months to maturity since similar options can be 
purchased on a number of organized exchanges. The same line 
of reasoning applies to the premiums after the introduction 
of LEAPS on the CBOE and AMEX on October 5, 1990. Evidence 
is found supporting both of these implications. Trying to 
affirm or disaffirm the heterogeneous risk preferences and 
heterogeneous beliefs hypotheses proved to be considerably 
more difficult. No support is found for a risk-clientele 
effect and only weak evidence is found for the heterogeneous 
beliefs hypothesis.
The transaction cost hypothesis is supported based on 
the results of regression analysis and parametric and 
nonparametric difference in means tests. The tax hypothesis, 
based on possible dividend-capture advantages, is rejected 
since underlying stocks appear to be the capture vehicle of 
choice. Even though the price of PRIMES is only a fraction 
of that of stocks, larger bid-ask spreads may explain 
investor preference for underlying stocks.
The results of this study show that value can be created 
by dividing the cash flows of a security into separate, 
tradeable components. In essence, the financial markets 
confirmed the value of these derivatives by subsequently
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introducing new security designs mimicking the 
characteristics of PRIMES and SCORES (i.e., LEAPS, BOUNDS, 
PERCs, and USUs). These financial innovations and new 
security designs offer a rich area for future research since 
identifying the source(s) of value creation is of great 
interest to both academics and practitioners.
5.1.3. Lead-Lag Relationships
The purpose of this study is to make use of the unique 
attributes of PRIMES and SCORES in order to add evidence to 
one side or the other of the lead-lag debate related to 
stocks and options. Since SCORES are long-term call options 
and PRIMEs are long-term covered call options, and both are 
traded on the AMEX, this study is able to isolate the effects 
of security design from of those market type. Most previous 
studies used options data collected from the CBOE and stock 
data collected from the NYSE.
The overall hypothesis of this study is that differing 
security designs cause differences in the market 
microstructure which, in turn, generate lead-lag 
relationships. If no design offered advantages to informed 
traders, then one would expect all security types (stocks and 
derivatives) to impound relevant information at the same 
rate. Previous researchers (Manaster and Rendleman (1982), 
Bhattacharya (1987), Anthony (1988), Stephan and Whaley 
(1990), Chan, Chung, and Johnson (1993)), however, have found 
lead-lag relations between derivatives and their underlying
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common stock. Although these researchers agree that a lead- 
lag relationship exists, they disagree on its direction. 
This study contributes to the existing literature by 
providing additional evidence on the direction of causality, 
and by attempting to identify the variable(s) responsible for 
this lead-lag relationship.
Assuming that informed investors are subject to budget 
constraints, one would anticipate informed trading in the 
derivative security since it offers greater leverage. 
However, market makers are also aware of this leverage effect 
and are expected to adjust their bid-ask spreads accordingly. 
This is precisely what is found in this study. Bid-ask 
spreads are considerably higher for the derivatives than for 
the stocks, and a decomposition of the spread reveals that 
the adverse selection component is significantly higher for 
derivatives than for the stocks.
Higher spreads in the derivative security relative to 
the underlying stock may drive informed and uninformed 
investors away from this security type. A central hypothesis 
of this study is that it is the interaction of these two 
opposing forces, leverage effects and transaction costs, 
which is responsible for any observed lead-lag relationships. 
Whether the benefit of the leverage effect is greater than 
the cost of higher spreads is an empirical question.
Using Granger causality tests, evidence is presented 
herein which supports the conclusions of Stephan and Whaley
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(1990) (i.e., stocks lead options). This result holds for
both the stock-SCORE relationship and for the stock-PRIME 
relationship. In addition, no support is found for the 
results of Chan, Chung, and Johnson (1993) in which the lead- 
lag relation between stocks and options disappears once the 
bid-ask spread midpoint in used in place of transaction 
prices.
Based on these findings, PRIMES and SCORES appear to 
play relatively passive roles in the information aggregation 
process due to their higher costs of transacting relative to 
the underlying stocks. This information is useful to 
practitioners and academics interested in optimal security 
design since it points to a potential shortcoming in the 
design of derivatives. With respect to information 
processing, the optimal design is the one which maximizes 
leverage effects and minimizes transaction costs. Modeling 
and/or creating such designs is a fertile area for future 
research.
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Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
STOCK PRICE 1743 26.47195 1.63462 22.87500 30.25000
STOCK MID. 1743 26.48142 1.63260 23.00000 30.25000VOL (100'S) 1743 36.97762 129.11631 1.00000 2400.00000STOCK SPREAD 1743 0.17441 0.06128 0.12500 0.37500% SPREAD 1743 0.00662 0.00239 0.00414 0.01596SCORE PRICE 1743 3.80328 0.67473 2.62500 5.87500SCORE MID. 1743 3.81544 0.82372 2.62500 24.00000VOL (100'S) 1743 12.17499 21.59516 1.00000 386.00000SCORE SPREAD 1743 0.20503 0.08790 0.12500 0.50000
% SPREAD 1743 0.05471 0.02328 0.02174 0.16000
SCORE SECS 1743 67.88640 109.53434 -286.00000 296.00000PRIME PRICE 660 23.13200 1.51933 19.25000 25.75000
PRIME MID. 660 23.17396 1.72163 19.31250 43.75000VOL (100'S) 660 14.77424 36.26022 1.00000 490.00000
PRIME SPREAD 660 0.48390 0.21580 0.12500 1.25000% SPREAD 660 0.02104 0.00954 0.00495 0.05376
PRIME SECS 660 68.40000 111.83868 -265.00000 288.00000
AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTSVariable N Mean Std Dev Minimum MaximumSTOCK PRICE 671 77.96610 3.24802 70.87500 84.75000STOCK MID. 671 77.96945 3.25347 70.93750 84.81250VOL (100’S) 671 12.87929 37.64836 1.00000 500.00000STOCK SPREAD 671 0.29061 0.11841 0.12500 1.00000% SPREAD 671 0.00374 0.00156 0.00147 0.01361
SCORE PRICE 671 10.55067 1.13860 8.50000 13.25000SCORE MID. 671 10.56474 1.15755 8.37500 13.37500VOL (100'S) 671 8.15201 11.43668 1.00000 102.00000SCORE SPREAD 671 0.38245 0.16188 0.12500 0.75000% SPREAD 671 0.03655 0.01579 0.00952 0.08824SCORE SECS 671 38.49180 117.12682 -255.00000 296.00000PRIME PRICE 291 67.91194 2.23101 61.75000 72.50000PRIME MID. 291 67.91173 2.26337 63.00000 72.50000VOL (100'S) 291 8.12027 21.42531 1.00000 200.00000PRIME SPREAD 291 0.91108 0.42496 0.12500 3.00000% SPREAD 291 0.01344 0.00637 0.00190 0.04494PRIME SECS 291 40.17182 114.65098 -269.00000 278.00000
AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPHVariable N Mean Std Dev Minimum MaximumSTOCK PRICE 2825 27.52606 1.40156 24.12500 30.25000STOCK MID. 2825 27.53699 1.40053 24.18750 30.25000VOL (100'S) 2825 42.08212 224.92797 1.00000 6622.00000STOCK SPREAD 2825 0.16106 0.05703 0.12500 0.37500% SPREAD 2825 0.00586 0.00209 0.00413 0.01364SCORE PRICE 2825 5.78288 0.91402 4.12500 8.37500




AMOCOMean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
STOCK PRICE 517 74.79134 2.44215 68.25000 80.25000STOCK MID. 517 74.78131 2.43841 68.25000 80.12500
VOL (100’S) 517 21.05803 35.63805 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 300.00000STOCK SPREAD 517 0.24589 0.10389 0.12500 0.75000
% SPREAD 517 0.00330 0.00144 0.00156 0.01099
SCORE PRICE 517 7.46929 1.50278 4.50000 11.25000SCORE MID. 517 7.49577 1.51274 4.50000 11.12500VOL (100'S) 517 9.54352 46.03820 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 985.00000SCORE SPREAD 517 0.32133 0.13950 0.12500 1 . 0 0 0 0 0% SPREAD 517 0.04342 0.01698 0.01282 0.10526SCORE SECS 517 39.82012 118.55573 -254.00000 293.00000PRIME PRICE 227 67.29295 2.68360 58.00000 72.00000PRIME MID. 227 67.40474 2.63876 58.25000 72.50000VOL (100’S) 227 4.51982 7.56876 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 87.00000PRIME SPREAD 227 1.12445 0.53739 0.12500 5.00000% SPREAD 227 0.01679 0.00824 0.00183 0.07519PRIME SECS 227 44.11013 117.43095
ARCO
-247.00000 275.00000
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum MaximumSTOCK PRICE 387 81.56363 5.16861 67.62500 90.75000
STOCK MID. 387 81.56508 5.15984 67.62500 90.68750VOL (100'S) 387 26.45220 108.95067 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 1881.00000STOCK SPREAD 387 0.24063 0.08971 0.12500 0.50000% SPREAD 387 0.00297 0.00115 0.00139 0.00714SCORE PRICE 387 8.54845 1.49353 5.62500 1 1 . 0 0 0 0 0SCORE MID. 387 8.53763 1.47240 5.50000 11.25000VOL (100'S) 387 13.88889 53.30556 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 940.00000SCORE SPREAD 387 0.32784 0.12319 0.12500 0.75000
% SPREAD 387 0.03875 0.01388 0.01136 0.08824SCORE SECS 387 45.00775 113.96835 -271.00000 294.00000PRIME PRICE 118 71.49788 5.26093 60.50000 78.87500PRIME MID. 118 71.72511 5.38038 60.62500 86.68750
VOL (100’S) 118 21.09322 110.49856 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 1175.00000PRIME SPREAD 118 1.00953 0.45619 0.25000 2.00000% SPREAD 118 0.01427 0.00689 0.00317 0.03306PRIME SECS 118 57.06780 125.63927 
BRISTOL MEYERS
-229.00000 284.00000
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum MaximumSTOCK PRICE 1191 42.76511 1.85826 38.12500 46.50000STOCK MID. 1191 42.75908 1.85942 38.18750 46.50000VOL (100’S) 1191 19.33165 61.09838 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 1000.00000STOCK SPREAD 1191 0.20120 0.06537 0.12500 0.50000% SPREAD 1191 0.00472 0.00156 0.00271 0.01231SCORE PRICE 1191 6.11155 1.14976 4.25000 9.31300SCORE MID. 1191 6.11143 1.15012 4.31250 9.31250VOL (100’S) 1191 6.89757 11.59417 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 200.00000SCORE SPREAD 1191 0.22391 0.09300 0.0S200 0.50000
% SPREAD 1191 0.03730 0.01542 0.00710 0.08889SCORE SECS 1191 69.14778 113.14049 -293.00000 294.00000PRIME PRICE 610 36.48794 1.74694 33.00000 41.50000PRIME MID. 610 36.49330 1.76189 33.37500 41.62500VOL (100'S) 610 6.67541 17.24334 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 300.00000
PRIME SPREAD 610 0.45132 0.17767 0.06300 1 . 0 0 0 0 0% SPREAD 610 0.01239 0.00487 0.00178 0.03030PRIME SECS 610 61.91639 108.84266 -247.00000 291.00000
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Variable N CHEVRONMean Std Dev Minimum MaximumSTOCK PRICE 802 45.91599 2.61116 39.12500 52.00000STOCK MID. 802 45.91864 2.60820 39.00000 51.93750VOL (100'S) 802 25.78554 91.71619 1.00000 1450.00000STOCK SPREAD 802 0.21384 0.08799 0.12500 0.75000% SPREAD 802 0.00469 0.00200 0.00241 0.01571SCORE PRICE 802 4.64511 1.10632 2.75000 6.75000
SCORE MID. 802 4.63560 1.09176 2.87500 6.81250VOL (100'S) 802 13.70324 58.05572 1.00000 1500.00000SCORE SPREAD 802 0.28491 0.12488 0.12500 0.75000% SPREAD 802 0.06338 0.02826 0.01852 0.20000
SCORE SECS 802 49.38404 113.38038 -295.00000 291.00000PRIME PRICE 339 41.97788 2.73418 35.00000 47.25000PRIME MID. 339 41.97898 2.78846 34.50000 47.25000VOL (100'S) 339 12.00590 85.15968 1.00000 1500.00000PRIME SPREAD 339 0.89233 0.38054 0.12500 2.00000% SPREAD 339 0.02140 0.00916 0.00265 0.04969PRIME SECS 339 51.17994 116.47488 -293.00000 290.00000
COCA COLA
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
STOCK PRICE 970 39.42126 2.46884 35.25000 44.87500STOCK MID. 970 39.42713 2.47008 35.25000 44.93750VOL (100'S) 970 37.98969 188.82855 1.00000 4870.00000STOCK SPREAD 970 0.20683 0.07419 0.12500 0.50000% SPREAD 970 0.00527 0.00193 0.00279 0.01130SCORE PRICE 970 6.51237 1.15692 4.00000 9.62500SCORE MID. 970 6.52004 1.14818 4.56250 9.56250VOL (100'S) 970 13.14330 36.14997 1.00000 600.00000SCORE SPREAD 970 0.24317 0.10348 0.12500 0.50000
% SPREAD 970 0.03801 0.01599 0.01298 0.08889SCORE SECS 970 62.27113 118.05447 -284.00000 296.00000PRIME PRICE 508 33.33735 2.19606 29.25000 38.50000
PRIME MID. 508 33.32345 2.20568 29.25000 38.25000
VOL (100'S) 508 14.38386 42.08239 1.00000 560.00000
PRIME SPREAD 508 0.46727 0.19039 0.12500 1.00000% SPREAD 508 0.01402 0.00566 0.00330 0.03265PRIME SECS 508 46.53543 113.13948 -252.00000 287.00000
DOW CHEMICAL
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
STOCK PRICE 1476 85.76778 3.47299 77.12500 93.75000
STOCK MID. 1476 85.76431 3.47254 77.06250 93.62500VOL (100'S) 1476 21.41125 62.69844 1.00000 1500.00000STOCK SPREAD 1476 0.20850 0.06915 0.12500 0.50000
% SPREAD 1476 0.00244 0.00082 0.00134 0.00603SCORE PRICE 1476 15.36721 1.93791 11.75000 22.25000SCORE MID. 1476 15.36166 1.93630 11.87500 22.25000VOL (100'S) 1476 7.96951 45.80871 1.00000 1675.00000SCORE SPREAD 1476 0.46418 0.23636 0.12500 1.75000% SPREAD 1476 0.03041 0.01543 0.00568 0.10101SCORE SECS 1476 70.52100 113.50336 -272.00000 293.00000PRIME PRICE 268 70.92677 3.32942 61.25000 77.50000PRIME MID. 268 70.91908 3.33233 61.00000 78.00000VOL (100'S) 268 9.11567 32.70246 1.00000 350.00000PRIME SPREAD 268 1.58349 0.69548 0.25000 5.00000% SPREAD 268 0.02259 0.01080 0.00347 0.07813PRIME SECS 268 69.09701 116.31111 -232.00000 288.00000
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Variable N DUMean PONTStd Dev Minimum Maximum
STOCK PRICE 1659 84.56043 3.72921 75.75000 92.87500STOCK MID. 1659 84.55787 3.72987 75.93750 92.75000VOL (100'S) 1659 16.64798 33.86465 1.00000 500.00000STOCK SPREAD 1659 0.25301 0.10541 0.12500 0.75000% SPREAD 1659 0.00300 0.00125 0.00134 0.00923SCORE PRICE 1659 11.45607 2.34427 7.12500 18.00000
SCORE MID. 1659 11.45234 2.34394 7.12500 18.00000VOL (100'S) 1659 9.81133 27.73213 1.00000 800.00000
SCORE SPREAD 1659 0.26816 0.10957 0.12500 0.50000% SPREAD 1659 0.02371 0.00918 0.00752 0.05172
SCORE SECS 1659 57.13683 112.11784 -286.00000 297.00000PRIME PRICE 318 72.78341 2.90494 66.25000 79.75000
PRIME MID. 318 72.71187 2.95445 66.00000 80.00000VOL (100’S) 318 17.08176 44.47598 1.00000 485.00000
PRIME SPREAD 318 0.53774 0.14268 0.25000 1.75000% SPREAD 318 0.00740 0.00200 0.00313 0.02431PRIME SECS 318 52.60692 113.86244 -292.00000 290.00000
EASTMAN KODAK
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
STOCK PRICE 1993 43.79553 2.61038 39.75000 53.12500
STOCK MID. 1993 43.79049 2.61277 39.68750 53.06250
VOL (100'S) 1993 30.11540 89.84823 1.00000 2000.00000STOCK SPREAD 1993 0.20478 0.06873 0.12500 1.12500% SPREAD 1993 0.00469 0.00159 0.00235 0.02571
SCORE PRICE 1993 6.67010 2.09092 4.08300 12.66700
SCORE MID. 1993 6.67295 2.09540 4.16650 12.58350
VOL (100’S) 1993 6.50627 20.16735 1.00000 626.00000
SCORE SPREAD 1993 0.16760 0.07278 0.08300 0.83300% SPREAD 1993 0.02614 0.01094 0.00664 0.07809SCORE SECS 1993 74.99247 108.53963 -278.00000 291.00000PRIME PRICE 1065 36.81331 2.78063 32.00000 43.25000PRIME MID. 1065 36.82202 2.77618 32.00000 43.25000
VOL (100'S) 1065 4.24131 8.47325 1.00000 100.00000PRIME SPREAD 1065 0.26423 0.09996 0.08300 1.16600% SPREAD 1065 0.00721 0.00276 0.00204 0.03096PRIME SECS 1065 83.66009 106.85383 -247.00000 291.00000
EXXON
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
STOCK PRICE 2398 42.91793 3,94423 19.37500 47.62500
STOCK MID. 2398 42.93087 3.94616 19.40650 47.68750
VOL (100'S) 2398 48.30234 277.42460 1.00000 10031.0000
STOCK SPREAD 2398 0.18477 0.06675 0.06200 0.50000% SPREAD 2398 0.00433 0.00160 0.00262 0.01351
SCORE PRICE 2398 13.75777 1.95263 8.87500 17.25000
SCORE MID. 2398 13.76831 1.96282 8.87500 17.31300VOL (100'S) 2398 9.02961 12.68322 1.00000 192.00000SCORE SPREAD 2398 0.21732 0.08434 0.06200 0.81200% SPREAD 2398 0.01597 0.00624 0.00359 0.05479SCORE SECS 2398 76.65179 105.07551 -270.00000 299.00000PRIME PRICE 464 29.58495 0.32838 28.68800 30.50000
PRIME MID. 464 29.59672 0.31294 28.90650 30.62500VOL (100'S) 464 17.47198 31.01869 1.00000 320.00000
PRIME SPREAD 464 0.22726 0.10283 0.06200 0.50000% SPREAD 464 0.00768 0.00347 0.00206 0.01709PRIME SECS 464 87.71336 104.72074 -227.00000 294.00000
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FORD MOTORVariable N Mean Std Dev Minimum MaximumSTOCK PRICE 1614 47.90680 4.21277 38.12500 55.00000STOCK MID. 1614 47.90940 4.20888 38.37550 55.06250VOL (100'S) 1614 21.87546 76.82012 1.00000 2645.00000STOCK SPREAD 1614 0.17317 0.07574 0.06200 1.00000% SPREAD 1614 0.00364 0.00167 0.00153 0.02298SCORE PRICE 1614 10.09710 1.28414 6.81300 12.93800
SCORE MID. 1614 10.12055 1.49013 6.87500 40.75000VOL (100'S) 1614 6.60409 26.26216 1.00000 984.00000
SCORE SPREAD 1614 0.26724 0.11189 0.06200 0.87500% SPREAD 1614 0.02697 0.01200 0.00511 0.09722
SCORE SECS 1614 86.89405 105.37466 -257.00000 299.00000PRIME PRICE 760 37.58449 3.16688 30.50000 42.62500
PRIME MID. 760 37.59586' 3.20276 25.25050 42.68750VOL (100'S) 760 6.10263 14.49665 1.00000 200.00000
PRIME SPREAD 760 0.49499 0.18828 0.12500 1.00000% SPREAD 760 0.01330 0.00543 0.00300 0.03279PRIME SECS 760 89.13947 108.05026 -283.00000 286.00000
GENERAL ELECTRICVariable N Mean Std Dev Minimum MaximumSTOCK PRICE 1375 42 .92364 1.87206 38.50000 47.75000
STOCK MID. 1375 42.92650 1.87454 38.56250 47.75000
VOL (100’S) 1375 33.50255 88.51501 1.00000 1200.00000STOCK SPREAD 1375 0.16264 0.06120 0.12500 0.50000% SPREAD 1375 0.00379 0.00143 0.00262 0.01156
SCORE PRICE 1375 4.63524 1.35666 3.25000 8.87500
SCORE MID. 1375 4.63753 1.35920 3.25000 8.81250VOL (100’S) 1375 8.84218 42.40992 1.00000 1435.00000
SCORE SPREAD 1375 0.17191 0.08430 0.06200 0.50000% SPREAD 1375 0.03717 0.01469 0.00826 0.13333
SCORE SECS 1375 90.29455 102.04506 -262.00000 294.00000PRIME PRICE 450 38.33365 1.70820 35.50000 42.50000
PRIME MID. 450 38.35168 1.70741 35.62500 42.43750
VOL (100’S) 450 5.79333 16.46172 1.00000 250.00000
PRIME SPREAD 450 0.55250 0.22433 0.06300 1.50000% SPREAD 450 0.01444 0.00595 0.00175 0.04160
PRIME SECS 450 84.30444 102.31576 -277.00000 285.00000
GENERAL MOTORS
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
STOCK PRICE 1556 75.40601 6.46172 60.25000 88.00000
STOCK MID. 1556 75.40954 6.46499 60.25000 88.06250
VOL (100’S) 1556 22.00514 48.38079 1.00000 1000.00000
STOCK SPREAD 1556 0.20035 0.06200 0.12500 0.37500% SPREAD 1556 0.00269 0.00090 0.00142 0.00524SCORE PRICE 1556 7.40432 0.83218 5.50000 9.00000
SCORE MID. 1556 7.40633 0.82882 5.56250 8.93750VOL (100’S) 1556 11.91388 34.06686 1.00000 1000.00000SCORE SPREAD 1556 0.22686 0.08486 0.12500 0.62500% SPREAD 1556 0.03118 0.01260 0.01389 0.07353SCORE SECS 1556 66.80913 110.36467 -283.00000 294.00000PRIME PRICE 1045 66.85550 5.82022 54.50000 78.75000PRIME MID. 1045 66.88953 5.84372 54.25000 78.75000




Mean .T.E.Std Dev Minimum Maximum
STOCK PRICE 2633 39.80217 3.14654 33.87500 45.87500
STOCK MID. 2633 39.80740 3.14546 33.87500 45.87500
VOL (100'S) 2633 30.66768 90.35941 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 2084.00000
STOCK SPREAD 2633 0.19502 0.06738 0.12500 0.50000
% SPREAD 2633 0.00494 0.00180 0.00272 0.01394
SCORE PRICE 2633 5.86945 1.27688 3.25000 8.75000
SCORE MID. 2633 5.86596 1.28775 3.31250 8.75000VOL (100'S) 2633 11.54273 17.61201 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 400.00000
SCORE SPREAD 2633 0.20020 0.07701 0.12500 0.50000% SPREAD 2633 0.03520 0.01417 0.01429 0.08571SCORE SECS 2633 42.21876 116.44905 -289.00000 298.00000PRIME PRICE 1140 34.02511 1.78558 30.37500 37.25000PRIME MID. 1140 34.02242 1.79173 30.50000 37.12500VOL (100'S) 1140 16.93860 84.78822 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 2000.00000PRIME SPREAD 1140 0.35033 0.12866 0.12500 1 . 0 0 0 0 0% SPREAD 1140 0.01034 0.00390 0.00339 0.03101
PRIME SECS 1140 42.20702 113.84881 -276.00000 296.00000
HEWLETT PACKARDVariable N Mean Std Dev Minimum MaximumSTOCK PRICE 906 54.76131 5.85116 44.25000 65.37500STOCK MID. 906 54.76214 5.85655 44.18750 65.37500
VOL (100'S) 906 31.81236 139.37881 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 3672.00000STOCK SPREAD 906 0.21992 0.09379 0.12500 0.75000% SPREAD 906 0.00403 0.00167 0.00191 0.01345SCORE PRICE 906 10.70958 3.47344 5.50000 17.37500SCORE MID. 906 10.73558 3.67706 5.50000 46.37500VOL (100'S) 906 8.88190 25.81751 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 510.00000
SCORE SPREAD 906 0.32133 0.12658 0.12500 0.75000
% SPREAD 906 0.03180 0.01280 0.00735 0.07547
SCORE SECS 906 58.35762 114.86757 -269.00000 295.00000PRIME PRICE 438 44.75400 2.96709 38.50000 49.75000
PRIME MID. 438 44.74872 2.93772 38.62500 49.75000
VOL (100'S) 438 5.52283 14.77282 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 248.00000
PRIME SPREAD 438 0.62072 0.23937 0.12500 2.00000% SPREAD 438 0.01398 0.00568 0.00265 0.04553
PRIME SECS 438 62.76484 111.05235 -235.00000 291.00000
I.B.M.Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
STOCK PRICE 5996 115.70455 5.36988 104.62500 129.25000STOCK MID. 5996 115.70577 5.37182 104.62500 129.31250
VOL (100'S) 5996 17.64493 59.84406 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 2023.00000STOCK SPREAD 5996 0.17430 0.07227 0.12500 1 . 0 0 0 0 0% SPREAD 5996 0.00151 0.00064 0.00097 0.00851SCORE PRICE 5996 13.05452 3.08930 8.12500 24.12500
SCORE MID. 5996 13.06922 3.50961 8.18750 113.00000VOL (100'S) 5996 9.47198 65.99300 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 4644.00000
SCORE SPREAD 5996 0.21208 0.09604 0.12500 1 . 0 0 0 0 0
% SPREAD 5996 0.01652 0.00666 0.00524 0.05319
SCORE SECS 5996 90.89543 95.62267 -271.00000 298.00000PRIME PRICE 1720 103.15422 5.66321 92.75000 115.37500
PRIME MID. 1720 103.06988 6.10433 11.37500 115.50000VOL (100'S) 1720 13.10349 119.39629 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 4744.00000
PRIME SPREAD 1720 0.73249 0.26823 0.12500 2.00000% SPREAD 1720 0.00708 0.00254 0.00112 0.02020PRIME SECS 1720 107.48023 98.78801 -224.00000 297.00000
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Variable N JOHNSONMean & JOHNSONStd Dev Minimum Maximum
STOCK PRICE 931 80.43005 4.03359 69.62500 87.87500
STOCK MID. 931 80.42461 4.03623 69.56250 87.875nn
VOL (100'S) 931 14.99141 32.97904 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 500.00000STOCK SPREAD 931 0.21523 0.07524 0.12500 0.50000
% SPREAD 931 0.00269 0.00096 0.00142 0.00629
SCORE PRICE 931 13.55532 2.64699 7.50000 18.12500
SCORE MID. 931 13.62366 3.33070 7.50000 75.37500VOL (100'S) 931 6.26853 14.11393 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 200.00000SCORE SPREAD 931 0.39501 0.15044 0.12500 1 . 0 0 0 0 0
% SPREAD 931 0.03039 0.01361 0.00719 0.09756SCORE SECS 931 68.16864 111.69586 -271.00000 295.00000PRIME PRICE 426 67.79695 4.78545 58.00000 77.25000PRIME MID. 426 67.77201 4.79981 58.25000 77.25000VOL (100'S) 426 4.82394 8.64459 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 100.00000
PRIME SPREAD 426 0.72359 0.33415 0.12500 3.00000% SPREAD 426 0.01069 0.00511 0.00172 0.04810PRIME SECS 426 64.59624 119.27385 -269.00000 296.00000
MERCK
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
STOCK PRICE 1400 54.84613 2.59948 48.50000 59.62500
STOCK MID. 1400 54.84007 2.59674 48.45850 59.50000
VOL (100'S) 1400 21.66214 72.19841 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 1797.00000STOCK SPREAD 1400 0.17598 0.08968 0.04100 1 . 0 0 0 0 0
% SPREAD 1400 0.00319 0.00159 0.00076 0.01835
SCORE PRICE 1400 10.43694 1.74111 7.12500 19.08300
SCORE MID. 1400 10.41010 1.69217 7.16650 18.75000VOL (100'S) 1400 8.03000 50.53589 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 1280.00000SCORE SPREAD 1400 0.23105 0.20692 0.04100 2.00000% SPREAD 1400 0.02108 0.01396 0.00366 0.13333SCORE SECS 1400 67.02857 109.91179 -273.00000 288.00000PRIME PRICE 692 42.41047 4.03462 34.00000 48.33300PRIME MID. 692 42.36082 4.12643 33.66650 48.66650
VOL (100'S) 692 6.24422 23.03844 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 500.00000
PRIME SPREAD 692 0.57366 0.40005 0.08300 2.00000% SPREAD 692 0.01428 0.01114 0.00177 0.04959PRIME SECS 692 72.75578 106.37080 -248.00000 286.00000
MOBILE OIL
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum MaximumSTOCK PRICE 1169 44.29780 2.01841 38.75000 49.12500
STOCK MID. 1169 44.29630 2.01778 38.75000 49.00000
VOL (100'S) 1169 31.71086 151.49052 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 3612.00000STOCK SPREAD 1169 0.20274 0.07414 0.12500 0.50000% SPREAD 1169 0.00460 0.00173 0.00256 0.01133
SCORE PRICE 1169 5.47968 1.00612 3.62500 7.50000SCORE MID. 1169 5.46840 0.99940 3.75000 7.43750VOL (100'S) 1169 9.65783 51.18671 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 1701.00000SCORE SPREAD 1169 0.22829 0.07739 0.12500 0.50000% SPREAD 1169 0.04243 0.01444 0.01695 0.12121
SCORE SECS 1169 63.79555 110.65894 -266.00000 294.00000PRIME PRICE 723 38.87742 2.07545 33.50000 42.25000PRIME MID. 723 38.93154 2.04428 33.50000 42.12500
VOL (100’S) 723 4.68880 9.02083 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 100.00000
PRIME SPREAD 723 0.57400 0.18554 0.12500 1.37500% SPREAD 723 0.01483 0.00491 0.00301 0.03293PRIME SECS 723 56.43707 109.33435 -282.00000 298.00000
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Variable N PHILLIP MORRISMean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
STOCK PRICE 1509 91.34311 5.35183 80.75000 101.87500STOCK MID, 1509 91.34447 5.35040 80.68750 101.87500VOL (100'S) 1509 22.55732 59.11183 1.00000 1303.00000STOCK SPREAD 1509 0.23236 0.08868 0.12500 0.50000% SPREAD 1509 0.00256 0.00101 0.00123 0.00611
SCORE PRICE 1509 18.31122 2.45750 13.25000 23.75000
SCORE MID. 1509 18.33292 2.95266 13.12500 81.56250VOL (100'S) 1509 8.70775 40.64384 1.00000 1500.00000
SCORE SPREAD 1509 0.37475 0.22018 0.12500 2.00000
% SPREAD 1509 0.02064 0.01163 0.00529 0.10000
SCORE SECS 1509 71.65275 109.90064 -290.00000 295.00000PRIME PRICE 649 74.24634 3.92201 65.50000 83.00000
PRIME MID. 649 74.23555 3.90866 65.50000 83.00000VOL (100'S) 649 11.84900 36.04038 1.00000 600.00000
PRIME SPREAD 649 0.70262 0.29343 0.12500 2.00000% SPREAD 649 0.00954 0.00409 0.00153 0.02564PRIME SECS 649 79.02157 113.40006 -287.00000 292.00000
PROCTOR & GAMBLE
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
STOCK PRICE 548 79.97400 4.00485 71.12500 88.00000
STOCK MID. 548 79.96442 4.00688 71.12500 87.87500
VOL (100’S) 548 17.04197 39.02519 1.00000 500.00000STOCK SPREAD 548 0.25456 0.11328 0.12500 0.75000
% SPREAD 548 0.00318 0.00141 0.00142 0.00982SCORE PRICE 548 11.63435 2.45463 7.25000 19.00000
SCORE MID. 548 11.68248 2.47955 7.31250 18.87500VOL (100’S) 548 7.23358 17.19690 1.00000 250.00000SCORE SPREAD 548 0.48038 0.20977 0.12500 1.50000% SPREAD 548 0.04179 0.01709 0.00926 0.11940SCORE SECS 548 58.14599 116.42211 -261.00000 286.00000PRIME PRICE 277 68.07356 2.79214 63.00000 76.25000
PRIME MID. 277 68.12229 2.80482 63.00000 76.00000
VOL (100'S) 277 5.29964 12.16525 1.00000 150.00000
PRIME SPREAD 277 0.84025 0.24119 0.25000 2.00000% SPREAD 277 0.01233 0.00350 0.00368 0.02941
PRIME SECS 277 52.31408 120.30712 -257.00000 285.00000
SEARS
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
STOCK PRICE 2193 38.19152 3.48386 32.25000 46.12500
STOCK MID. 2193 38.19277 3.48125 32.37500 46.12500
VOL (100’S) 2193 37.05016 136.91869 1.00000 2462.00000STOCK SPREAD 2193 0.18924 0.06647 0.12500 0.50000
% SPREAD 2193 0.00500 0.00183 0.00272 0.01429SCORE PRICE 2193 4.35853 0.89047 2.87500 6.75000SCORE MID. 2193 4.36921 1.12714 2.81250 36.87500VOL (100'S) 2193 10.78659 21.50202 1.00000 529.00000SCORE SPREAD 2193 0.20252 0.08092 0.12500 0.75000% SPREAD 2193 0.04774 0.01938 0.02041 0.14286SCORE SECS 2193 63.72914 109.77530 -279.00000 299.00000PRIME PRICE 1072 33.87010 3.13238 27.75000 41.00000PRIME MID. 1072 33.85745 3.25258 6.25000 41.12500VOL (100'S) 1072 8.34195 25.03368 1.00000 500.00000PRIME SPREAD 1072 0.46350 0.19853 0.12500 1.75000% SPREAD 1072 0,01371 0.00586 0.00309 0.05600PRIME SECS 1072 70.68097 113.22565 -278.0000 288.00000
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UNION PACIFIC
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
STOCK PRICE 538 61.79833 3.82537 51.00000 69.87500
STOCK MID * 538 61.80216 3.82482 51.18750 69.87500
VOL (100’S) 538 17.21933 38.33694 1.00000 500.00000STOCK SPREAD 538 0.27161 0.09009 0.12500 0.62500% SPREAD 538 0.00442 0.00150 0.00180 0.01082SCORE PRICE 538 8.59270 1.49698 5.75000 11.50000
SCORE MID. 538 8.61164 1.50398 5.87500 11.37500VOL (100'S) 538 14.49071 36.48990 1.00000 400.00000
SCORE SPREAD 538 0.37291 0.12521 0.12500 0.75000
% SPREAD 538 0.04404 0.01493 0.01136 0.08696
SCORE SECS 538 35.63383 120.52669 -273.00000 285.00000PRIME PRICE 233 52.19903 3.88316 43.50000 59.12500
PRIME MID. 233 52.36534 3.94158 44.00000 64.62500VOL (100'S) 233 11.79399 27.70380 1.00000 200.00000
PRIME SPREAD 233 0.62446 0.21479 0.12500 1.00000% SPREAD 233 0.01212 0.00460 0.00263 0.02247PRIME SECS 233 38.08155 107.65357 -235.00000 282.00000
XEROXVariable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
STOCK PRICE 1226 55.58157 2.40340 50.37500 63.00000
STOCK MID. 1226 55.56974 2.39873 50.43750 63.12500VOL (100'S) 1226 20.09869 82.48334 1.00000 2380.00000STOCK SPREAD 1226 0.21778 0.08997 0.12500 0.62500
% SPREAD 1226 0.00392 0.00163 0.00202 0.01214SCORE PRICE 1226 5.71289 1.67915 3.62500 10.75000SCORE MID. 1226 5.70198 1.67426 3.68750 10.75000VOL (100'S) 1226 10.14682 47.90691 1.00000 1565.00000SCORE SPREAD 1226 0.28446 0.15164 0.12500 1.00000% SPREAD 1226 0.04993 0.02217 0.01282 0.13158SCORE SECS 1226 44.56933 117.82857 -271.00000 295.00000PRIME PRICE 429 50.11830 2.03124 46.50000 55.00000
PRIME MID. 429 50.12413 2.01490 46.75000 54.75000VOL (100'S) 429 6.16317 15.19504 1.00000 200.00000PRIME SPREAD 429 0.72844 0.30934 0.12500 2.50000% SPREAD 429 0.01455 0.00618 0.00263 0.04902PRIME SECS 429 52.. 53147 115.35480 -262.00000 294.00000
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